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Abstract 
Project finance has become a vital financing vehicle for undertaking capital-intensive and 
infrastructure investments. In 2017 alone, the value of deals signed using project finance was 
estimated at approximately $229 billion. Despite its increasing importance, little is known 
regarding the impact of project-level, and country characteristics on the loan terms. This 
thesis proceeds in examining these determinants along three empirical essays. The first essay 
(Chapter 3) focuses on how domestic lead arrangers’ certification (in emerging markets) 
impact the pricing of project finance loans. Using a sample 1270 project finance loan 
tranches signed between 1998 and 2011, and worth over $300 billion, the chapter posits that 
domestic lead arrangers’ certification reduce search and information cost, which in turn, 
reduces the financing cost. The results, after controlling for endogeneity of certification 
decision, indicate a reduction of 47 basis points in the spread offered on PF loans. The 
magnitude of this reduction differs across industries, geographic region, and income 
classification of the project countries. The second essay (Chapter 4) examines the relationship 
between PF contractual structures and loan outcomes, using a sample of 5872 project finance 
loan tranches signed between 1998 and 2013, and worth approximately $1.2 trillion. The 
chapter hypothesises that (i) non financial contracts (NFCs) (that is, contracts used to manage 
the various project functions), reduces overall project risk, (ii) the involvement of project 
sponsors as key counterparties to the non-financial contracts is an additional signal of 
project’s potential worth, and (iii) the effects observed in (i and ii) are stronger, if sponsor 
counterparties have verifiable credit ratings. After matching loan tranches with NFCs to those 
without, the results indicate that the use of NFCs reduce both the loan spreads and leverage 
ratios. This impact is higher if the sponsors counterparties are credit-rated. The results are 
also stronger for developing countries. The third essay examines the impact of country-level 
institutions on project finance loan spread and leverage ratio, using a sample of 3,362 loan 
 v 
tranches signed between the year 1998 - 2012. The chapter investigates whether political and 
legal institutions are substitutes (or complements), that is, if improvement in one absorbs the 
weakness of the other, and vice versa. Further, the essay examines if project finance network 
of contracts substitutes for these institutions. The results indicate that political and legal 
institutions are substitutes. Specifically, improvements in political institutions lead to a 
reduction in both the loan spread and leverage ratio for countries with weak legal and 
governance institutions. The chapter also finds that where NFCs are included in PF, the 
impact of political institutions on loan spread reduces. On the other hand, the impact of 
political institutions on leverage ratio is higher when NFCs are used. The findings from the 
three research chapters provide interesting insights on how lenders and sponsors create value 
through contract design.  
 
Keywords: Project finance, sponsors, mandated lead arrangers, certification, non-financial 
contracts, loan spread, leverage ratio, counterparty risk, credit rating, political institutions, 
legal institutions, governance institutions.                                    
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background  
  Project finance (hereafter, PF) is a financial technique that involves raising funds to 
undertake a single indivisible large-scale capital investment project, where cash flows are the 
sole means to meet financial obligations and to provide returns to investors (Dailami and 
Hauswald, 2007). PF has become an essential source of financing for capital-intensive and 
infrastructure investments globally. Data from Thomson Reuters’ Project Finance 
International indicate that between 1994 and 2013, PF grew by a factor of ten (10) from 
$41.3 billion to $415 billion (Esty et al., 2014). Recent statistics also show that on average PF 
deals closed between 2011 and 2016 were approximately $232 billion per annum (Thomson 
Reuters, 2017a).1   
 PF lending however reduced after the 2007 global financial crises. Figure 1 shows a sharp 
decline in PF lending in 2009, representing a 44.5% year-on-year reduction (see Table 1). 
The market has since recovered, albeit at lower volumes (and values) compared to the  pre-
crisis period.2 Another notable change in PF lending is the emergence of emerging market 
mandated lead arrangers, especially from Asia (an issue examined in Chapter 3 of the thesis). 
For instance, between 2012 and 2017, the league table of global lead arrangers (by amount 
underwritten) was dominated by banks headquartered in Japan (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
UFJ & SMBC), India (State bank of India), China (China Development Bank) and Korea 
                                    
1 Statistics on total volume of PF deals for January - September 2017 is estimated at US$157.3 billion (Thomson 
Reuters, 2017b).  
 
2 The wide variation in the year-on-year values of PF investment means that estimated results are likely to be 
biased. To control for this, year dummies are included as additional controls in all regressions in the thesis. 
These year dummies reported in the appendix are statistically significant, especially in the financial crisis period 
(2007-2009). 
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(Korea Development Bank). This trend is in sharp contrast to what prevailed prior the 
financial crisis when global lead arrangers were headquartered in Western Europe and the 
USA (Esty et al., 2014). 
Figure 1: Project Finance Bank Loans, 1994 to 2017 (US billion) 
Source: Esty et al. (2014) and Global Project Finance Review 2015, 2016 and 2017  
The growth in PF investment is partly due to its deployment in infrastructure investments. 
Traditional use of PF lending is mainly in resource-rich projects, such as mining, pipelines, 
oil fields, and power plants. However, the last three decades have seen its extension to public 
infrastructure projects like transportation, water, and sewage and telecommunication 
(Girardone and Snaith, 2011; Esty et al., 2014).3 With an investment of $4 trillion required 
per annum until 2030 to reduce the global infrastructure deficit, PF is expected to become an 
essential financing vehicle to meet these demands (World Economic Forum, 2013).  
 Despite its burgeoning growth and increasing importance in the global financial system, 
PF remains relatively under-researched, especially in economics and finance literature. For 
instance, there is limited knowledge on what motivates the use of PF and how it creates value 
                                    
3 For public infrastructures initiatives, PF is often “christened” public-private partnerships (PPPs) or public 
finance initiatives (PFIs). PPPs/PFIs are contractual agreements that delegate the responsibility over the design, 
build, and operate or a combination of these functions, from the public sector institutions to the private sector, 
allowing the latter to share in the risk and return of these arrangements (Yescombe, 2014; Finnerty, 2013). 
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for parties.4  From a theoretical standpoint, the structural attributes of PF, that is, separate 
incorporation, high leverage, and concentrated equity ownership, provide effective 
mechanisms to maximise asset value and minimise managerial discretion - a common 
problem in corporate finance (Esty, 2004). Corporate finance is plagued with deadweight 
costs arising from managerial discretion and agency costs. These costs arise because 
managerial behaviour and risk aversion often prevent firms from undertaking risky but 
positive net present value projects - underinvestment and debt overhang (Stulz, 1984, Myers, 
1977). Other costs include the allocation of free cash flows, signalling cost of new capital 
issues and asymmetric information between firm managers and capital providers (Jensen, 
1986).  
Table 1.1: Project Finance Investment, 1994 to 2017 
Year PF loan value ($US Billion) Year to Year change 
1994 13.7 13.60% 
1995 23.3 70.1% 
1996 42.8 83.7% 
1997 67.4 57.5% 
1998 56.7 -15.9% 
1999 72.4 27.7% 
2000 110.9 53.2% 
2001 108.5 -2.2% 
2002 62.2 -42.7% 
2003 69.6 11.9% 
2004 116.4 67.2% 
2005 140.3 20.5% 
2006 180.6 28.7% 
2007 220 21.8% 
2008 250.6 13.9% 
2009 139.2 -44.5% 
2010 208.2 49.6% 
2011 213.5 2.5% 
2012 198.7 -6.9% 
2013 204 2.7% 
2014 230.9 13.2% 
2015 192.11 -16.8% 
2016 230.9 20.2% 
2017 229.6 -0.6% 
Source: Esty et al. (2014) and Global Project Finance Review 2015, 2016 and 2017 
 
                                    
4 Though earlier studies like Shah and Thakor (1987), John and John (1991), Esty (2003); Chemmanur & John 
(1996) attempt to conceptualise the motivation for using PF, there are limited empirical evidence to support 
these earlier works.  
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Thus, PF is seen as a panacea to most of the problems identified in the corporate finance 
literature. For example, the separate incorporation of the new investment under PF limits 
potential spillover effects from the new investment onto the sponsoring firm. Also, the high 
leveraging in PF act as a disciplinary tool in preventing misallocation of free cash flows by 
the managers and related parties (Esty, 2004). Further, the extensive use of project contracts 
reduces managerial discretion, which in turn, reduces the tendency to misapply project cash 
flows. 
For parties to PF lending, an understanding of the fundamental loan terms is essential to 
determine when to use it, how to structure it to suit project and country characteristics, and how 
to deliver value. The thesis attempts to provide some insights into these issues. The thesis 
contains three research chapters on the determinants of PF loan terms. These chapters explore 
how PF institutional features like concentrated debt ownership, separate incorporation, 
management by contracts, and country-level institutional characteristics affect the loan terms. 
The findings from these chapters offer both academic and policy insights on PF and how they 
deliver value. 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of domestic lead arranger certification on the pricing of PF 
loans. Given the increasing involvement of domestic financial institutions (FIs) in the design 
and funding of PF loans across emerging market economies, this chapter seeks to quantify the 
economic benefits or otherwise of these certifications. Specifically, the chapter examines 
whether the involvement of domestic lead arrangers provides a remedy to asymmetric 
information. Using a sample of PF syndicated loans, signed across 53 emerging market 
economies between 1998 and 2011, the chapter accounts for the possibility that certification by 
domestic lead arrangers is endogenous to loan outcomes. Hence, the distribution of loans with 
and without domestic lead arranger certification is likely to be non-random or systematically 
different.  The study utilises the endogenous switching regression procedure proposed by 
 5 
Maddala (1986a & 1986b) to address this bias to estimate the impact of domestic lead arranger 
certification on loan pricing (loan spread).  
Chapter 4 explores the potential benefits (or costs) of sponsor involvement as counterparties 
to the project contracts. Though theoretical and empirical evidence has established some 
benefits in using NFCs to manage project risks, little is known about how sponsor (promoters) 
involvement as contractual counterparties affect these benefits. Secondly, existing studies have 
usually treated the use of NFCs as exogenous; a claim the present chapter challenges. In this 
regard, the study conjectures that the involvement of sponsors as counterparties can either be 
beneficial (by better aligning the interest of the sponsors to that of the project) or costly (by 
introducing a conflict of interest between the sponsors’ financial rewards as a counterparty and 
that as an equity holder). The chapter tests these hypotheses using a sample of 5,872 PF loans 
signed from 1998 and 2013.5 The propensity score matching (PSM) procedure is used to 
control for any potential endogeneity in the decision to use NFCs by matching loan tranches 
with NFCs to those without based on a set of pre-contract variables. The matched sample from 
the PSM procedure is then used to estimate the impact of sponsor counterparty involvement on 
the loan spread and the leverage ratio. 
Chapter 5 investigates how political and legal institutions shape PF loan terms. Though 
existing literature identifies political and legal institutions as essential determinants of loan 
contract terms, the effect of these factors in the context of PF remains under-researched. The 
chapter uses a sample of PF loans signed in over 100 countries to estimate the effect of both 
political and legal institutions on PF loan spread and leverage ratio. Chapter 6 discusses the 
                                    
5 Data samples for all three empirical chapters show some notable variations. These variations are attributable to 
two main reasons - data unavailability and sample selection. First, the thesis relied on Dealogic Projectware 
dataset, of which the School of Business and Economics (Loughborough University) discontinued the 
subscription in June 2013. Thus, the author is unable to update the study sample, limiting the sample to this 
period. Second, sample selection strategies, especially in Chapter 3 restricted the sample loans to earlier years 
(2011) relative to the dataset’s sample period (2013). 
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empirical relevance of the results, offers policy implications and directions for future 
research.  
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Chapter 2 Overview of Project Finance and Type of Risks  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The chapter provides background and review of PF lending. It begins with definitions of 
PF and the rationale for its use. It then discusses the various parties involved and their roles. 
Following this is a review of the risk evaluation and allocation processes that precede the 
design and structuring of NFCs. The section ends with historical background on PF and a 
summary of research gaps. 
2.2 Definition and Characteristics of Project Finance 
PF has often been utilised to fund investments in capital-intensive industries like mining, 
oil & gas and energy-related projects (Yescombe, 2014; Sawant, 2010). Recent years have 
however seen it extended to economic infrastructure projects like telecommunication, 
transportation, and social infrastructures like schools, prisons, and recreational facilities. 
Infrastructures delivered using PF are often referred to as public-private partnerships (PPP); 
where private sector entities are contracted to fund and undertake projects hitherto were 
provided by government (Gatti, 2012; Esty and Sesia, 2007). 
One of the earliest definitions of PF is that of Shah and Thakor (1987). They defined PF as 
an arrangement where there is the separate incorporation of the project to isolate its cash flow 
and to enable an independent evaluation of the projects. Similarly, Gatti (2013) defined PF as 
the structured financing of a single economic asset through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
created by sponsors using equity capital and debt capital from lenders, who have to rely on 
the project cash flow as the primary source of loan repayment and assets as collateral. 
Finnerty (2013) also describe PF as the incorporation of capital investment as a separate 
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entity with equity and debt capital, whereby repayment is structured to suit cash flow 
characteristics of the project. Lenders can only rely on cash flows for reimbursement and the 
project assets as collateral. The definitions of Finnerty (2013) and Gatti (2013) emphasise the 
abilities of parties to design financing based on the evolution of project’s cash flows, which 
in turn, ensures that debt servicing does not threaten the project's viability.6  
Yescombe (2014) provides a slightly different perspective, stressing the importance of 
detailed evaluation of project risks and subsequent allocation to contractual parties. 
According to the author, PF is a structured financing technique that involves rigorous 
assessment of a project’s construction, operation, demand and other relevant risks to 
determine cash flow against which to secure funds. Though the definition of Yescombe 
(2014) shares similarities with earlier ones, it also extends the definition to cover risk 
evaluation and allocation, a crucial aspect of these financing agreements.7 Gardener and 
Wright (2011) emphasise the use of high leverage in PF. They define PF as the funding of a 
capital investment project through limited or non-recourse loans to the project company, with 
the expectation that repayments are made through project revenues. 8 
These definitions highlight the following features of PF. First, it entails the incorporation 
of a separate legal entity (SPV or project company) to carry out an investment separately 
from its sponsors. The SPV usually has a limited life that coincides with the lifespan of the 
                                    
6 A typical PF loan contract charges different interest rates at various stages. For instance, during construction 
and operational phase of the project, lenders may charge a lower rate, which then increases once the project 
begins to generate cash flow (operations). Lenders may also charge higher interest during the project’s 
construction phase to incentivise SPV and construction counterparty to complete the construction on schedule 
(Gatti, 2013). 
7 A study by Corielli et al. (2010) emphasised the relevance of these contractual agreements in influencing loan 
terms - price and debt-to-equity ratios of PF loans. 
8 One of the main distinguishing features of PF from other forms of financing is the limited or non-recourse 
nature of the loan agreements. Limited-recourse loan agreement typically allows for some form of compensation 
(indemnity) from the project company and sponsors in the event of project failure or difficulty. These 
compensations usually take the form of additional equity contribution, reduction in dividend payment or 
royalties among others. On the other hand, non-recourse loan agreements provide lenders no compensation from 
the project company and sponsors in the event of project failure (Hainz and Kleimeier, 2008; Gardener and 
Wright, 2011).  
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project. The sponsors, together with the SPV, undertake a comprehensive evaluation of 
project risks and return to determine economic, technical, financial and legal viability. After 
these, risks are managed through various contracts between the SPV and its counterparties 
(Corielli et al., 2010). Lenders are approached to provide funding for the project. The lenders 
evaluate project documents and contracts to determine the risk level, and the amount of debt 
they are willing to provide the SPV. Debt capital is typically higher, relative to the sponsor’s 
equity, often ranging between 70% and 100% of total project cost (Sorge and Gadanecz, 
2004; Esty, 2002).  Debt capital is provided on a limited or non-recourse basis through the 
syndicated loan. PF is a form of a syndicated loan and varies from others loan types in some 
ways. Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) in their paper, document these differences by 
showing that PF loans typically have a longer maturity, third-party guarantees, and are likely 
to be extended to more risky borrowers. The syndicate banks in PF are also more relative to 
other loan types, with the majority of these loans extended to resource-rich industries, such as 
oil and gas, utilities and real estate. 9 In return for increased exposure to project risks, lenders 
demand more control and monitoring of the project than would be in conventional corporate 
debt finance.  
2.3 Rationale for Project Finance 
The motivation for the use of PF has dominated debates among academics and 
practitioners. This section attempts to present a systematic review of these arguments, to 
provide a foundation for its use and relevance. 
2.3.1 Signalling Benefit from Risky Projects 
One of the earliest theoretical works on PF is that of Shah and Thakor (1987). The authors 
are the first to provide an economic motivation for PF and its high levered nature. They show 
                                    
9 More details on syndicated lending in PF is offered in Chapter 3 of the thesis.  
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that in equilibrium, risky firms prefer high leverage and are willing to pay a higher interest 
rate. According to the authors, PF benefits from information production, which reduces 
signalling cost and increases lenders’ willingness to commit debt capital to the project.  Chen, 
Kensinger and Martin (1989) cited in Finnerty, (1996) contested Shah and Thakor (1987) 
assertion on the signalling benefits of PF and its preference for risky projects. They note that 
PF is utilised for projects less sensitive to information asymmetry. Using Myers and Majluf’s 
pecking order theory, Chen, Kensinger, and Martin (1989) indicate that firms are likely to use 
PF for more transparent projects to preserve financial stability (Finnerty, 2013). This in turn, 
allows them to fund internally projects that are more information sensitive, without giving 
away valuable information to competitors. 
In Chapters 3 and 4 the thesis examines a strand of asymmetric information and signalling 
effect in PF, albeit from lenders and sponsors perspective. In these chapters, I show that 
arranger certification by domestic lenders in emerging economies generates economic 
benefits through a reduction in asymmetric information among syndicate banks. Further, the 
thesis demonstrates that sponsor involvement as counterparty to some of the project contracts 
provide signals on project quality, and hence lowers the financing costs on these deals.  
2.3.2 Contamination Risk  
Gatti (2013) also notes that PF is more appropriate when the new project is risky. 
However, unlike Shah and Thakor (1987), the author argues that PF reduces exposure to 
contamination risk; that is, the risks that failure of the new project is likely to curtail the 
continuation of existing businesses. Thus, financing new projects on the firm’s balance sheet 
makes them susceptible to contamination risk, in case the project fails. Creditors, before 
extending financing, typically evaluate how the new project affects existing businesses of the 
 11 
borrower. With PF, firms can separate the new investment from its existing activities and 
allow for independent evaluation of project risks.  
 2.3.3 Underinvestment  
Another rationale provided in the literature for PF is the reduction of leverage-induced 
underinvestment. According to John and John (1991), PF enables creditors to evaluate 
lending decisions on a project-by-project basis, which reduces agency costs. Agency costs 
arise because of difficulties on the part of lenders to verify a firm’s portfolio of investments. 
Debtholders will often have access to the firm’s aggregate investments, but not the individual 
projects.  In response, debtholders are likely to charge higher interest costs when lending to 
the firm. The firm, aware of this increase in the cost of funding, abandons or postpones 
positive net present value (NPV) projects – underinvestment. John and John (1991) suggest 
that through PF, lenders verify firms’ actions on a project-by-project basis, which in turn, 
informs appropriate risks evaluation and pricing. Therefore, firms can reliably invest in 
positive NPV projects due to reduced agency costs. 
2.3.4 Agency Cost from Free Cash Flow 
PF also minimises managerial discretions on how free cash flows are utilised (Finnerty, 
2013). The separation of shareholders and debtholders from the directors (and managers) 
means that the former cannot verify the actions of the latter, especially on the use of free cash 
flows. Moreover, corporate finance literature acknowledges the difficulty investors have in 
verifying how much free cash flow firms generate at any point in time.  PF, on the other 
hand, allows lenders to determine beforehand, how free cash flow will be allocated (Finnerty, 
1996; Gatti, 2008). By specifying in contractual terms, how cash flows generated by the 
project are distributed, PF reduce these agency costs. A common contractual tool is the cash 
flow waterfall, where there are specific allocations of all cash flows that the project generates 
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(Gatti 2012). Other contracts include the NFCs, which also specify parties entitled to cash 
flow disbursements.  
2.4 Parties in Project Finance 
PF is an intricate financing arrangement that involves numerous parties that play several 
critical roles in the feasibility study, the design of the deal, and delivery of the project’s 
intended outcome (Gatti, 2013). Figure 1 illustrates a typical PF structure with the main 
parties, such as the project company, sponsors, lenders, contractual counterparties (Product 
Purchaser, Fuel Supplier, Plant Constructor and Plant operator). This party forms the core of 
PF structure and exemplifies the nexus of contract used to manage the project venture 
(Dailami and Hauswald, 2007). An essential principle in PF design is the alignment of the 
parties’ interest and that of the project’s outcome. It ensures there is sufficient incentive for 
each party to fulfil their obligations (Finnerty, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s sketch (adapted from Gatti, 2012) 
Lenders Host Government Project sponsors 
Output Purchaser Fuel Supplier 
Project Company (SPV) 
 
Plant Operator Plant Constructor 
Figure 2: Typical Project Finance Structure 
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2.4.1 Special Purpose Vehicle (Project Company) 
The formation of a separate legal entity with the sole responsibility to manage the new 
venture is often the first step in PF (Gatti et al., 2013). The new legal entity, also known as 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) or project company, is legally distinct from its sponsors. The 
SPV must form, build and manage the new venture as well as sign contracts with relevant 
counterparties. These contracts are usually negotiated in a vertical chain from construction to 
the sale of output (Corielli et al. 2010). It is also common for sponsors to act as counterparties 
to some of these contracts.10 The SPV must also decide how much debt capital and equity to 
be provided by lenders and sponsors respectively. At the projects’ operational phase, the SPV 
manages day-to-day activities. Crucial among these responsibilities is the disbursement of 
project cash flows to lenders and other counterparties, such as supplier and equipment 
suppliers. As depicted in Figure 1, the SPV is the central party in PF. It is responsible for 
managing various operational and financial details with other parties. 
2.4.2 Sponsors 
Sponsors are promoters of PF ventures and take up responsibilities of the project until an 
SPV is in place. There are four categories of sponsors. The first category, industrial sponsors, 
are corporations that directly benefit from the activities of the new project. Second, are public 
sponsors that are state or government institutions that promote the project in fulfilment of 
social welfare and public interest. There are contractor sponsors who typically have an 
economic interest in the project, such as, building or operating the project infrastructure or 
supply equipment to the project. The last categories are financial sponsors who are investors 
hoping to earn good returns on their investments (Gatti, 2013).  
                                    
10 In Chapter 4, the thesis examines the economic impact of sponsor involvement as key counterparties to 
project contracts. Specifically, the study examines whether such involvement align sponsor interest to that of the 
project or increases the tendency for opportunistic behaviours. 
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Sponsors, as shown in Figure 1, provide SPVs with equity capital, though there may be 
instances where they do not contribute any capital towards the project.11  Further, the 
proportion of equity to debt capital is small, relative to an average leverage ratio (usually 60-
80%). Despite the low percentage of equity funding in these ventures, contracts are often 
designed to provide sufficient incentive for sponsors to remain committed to the project. For 
instance, an integrated energy company such as British Petroleum (BP) may be the sponsor of 
an oil exploration and drilling project in Angola. BP as the primary sponsor may only be 
required to provide a relatively small proportion of capital, with the lenders providing most of 
the financing. However, the output from this oil filed may still be of vital importance to BP. 
In this instance, it is sufficient to assume that BP’s incentive is aligned to that of the project. 
Corielli et al. (2010), examine the involvement of sponsors as counterparties to the project 
contracts. They show that lenders are not in favour of sponsor involvement as counterparties 
in PF. In particular, they find that lenders are reluctant when sponsors are counterparties in 
construction and supply equipment because of the potential for conflict of interest. On the 
other hand, lenders favour deals with sponsors’ counterparties to the off-take (sales) 
agreements.  
In Chapter 4, the thesis examines how sponsors’ counterparty affect PF loan outcomes. 
However, unlike Corielli et al. (2010), I hypothesise that the decision by sponsors to act as 
counterparties to project contracts is non-random and depends on the project risk level and 
loan outcome. The chapter also argue that any measure of the sponsors’ impact must consider 
this potential endogeneity.  
                                    
11 The sample PF projects deals analysed in Chapter 4 of the thesis indicate that about half (49%) of deals have 
100% debt financing, indicating no capital contribution from sponsors. However, the majority of deals with 
100% funding are brownfield projects. Beyond these, the rationale for equity contribution is an empirical 
consideration that is not addressed in the current thesis. 
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2.4.3 Lenders 
The majority of PF funding is provided in the form of debt capital, with the syndicated 
loan market being the primary source of project finance capital (Ansar, 2012; Gatti, 2012). 
The capital market through project bonds also serv as a vital source of loan capital for PF 
ventures. However, project bonds’ market share of total funding has reduced since the onset 
of the financial crisis (Abadie, 2008). This section provides an overview of lenders’ role in 
PF.   
Lenders provide SPV with debt capital, generally on non-recourse or limited recourse 
terms. Unlike corporate finance loans, PF loans are often not claimable on sponsors’ existing 
assets (non-recourse). Lenders have to rely on project cash flows for repayment and project 
assets as collaterals. In instances, where loan is limited recourse, liabilities only extend to 
specific assets of the sponsor in case the project fails.  On average, lenders provide 60 - 70% 
of total project capital and thus, stand to lose more in the event of project failure (Esty et al., 
2014; Sorge and Gadanecz, 2008).  
There are two main categories of PF lenders. The first category is made up of banks and 
FIs that usually lend to the SPV via the syndicated loan market (Byoun et al. 2013; Gatti et 
al. 2013). Syndicated lending ensures that single lender exposure to the borrower (SPV) is 
minimised (Sufi, 2007). The loan amount is segregated into smaller financing packages - 
tranches. Tranches usually vary, based on maturity or their purpose. Thus, PF loans can be 
distributed into multiple tranches like term loan, credit facilities, bridge loans and standby 
facilities. These tranches differ not only in their maturity and purpose but also in the banks 
that finance them. For instance, Maskara (2010) argues that risk management motivation 
underlines tranching in syndicated loans. The authors show that riskier borrowers that use 
multiple tranche are likely to reduce their overall borrowing cost.  
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The deal structuring is led by lead bank(s) also known as mandated lead arrangers (MLA). 
The MLA deals directly with SPV and sponsors on behalf of other syndicate banks – 
delegated monitoring (Nini, 2004). The MLA is expected to conduct due diligence on the 
project and contract to determine its viability and bankability (Gatti, 2013; Nini, 2004). The 
due diligence also covers details on various project contracts and their counterparties. For 
performing this role, the MLA is expected to underwrite the issue by taking up a relatively 
significant proportion of the loan capital. Gatti et al. (2013) show that PF syndicated loans 
certified by prestigious (reputable) lead arrangers have lower the loan spread. They attributed 
this finding to the arrangers existing network and scale that allow them to study these deals at 
a lower cost. In Chapter 3, I extend this argument and examine whether domestic FIs, acting 
as MLAs in emerging markets’ PF deals, provide any valuable certification benefits.  
The second category of lenders are investors on the capital market who invest in the 
project company through project bonds.  These bonds are targeted at institutional investors 
like pension funds and insurance companies who have the financial resources and are willing 
to hold these bonds over the long run. These bonds are often underwritten by reputable 
monoline insurers, which provide some certification for investors. However, the 2007 
financial crisis brought the reputation of most of these monoline insurers into question; 
leading to a sharp reduction in the number and volume of PF bond issue.   
2.5 Risk Evaluation and Allocation in Project Finance 
Risk evaluation and management is at the core of PF. The SPV, sponsor(s) and their 
advisors dedicate much time at this stage to evaluate and allocate risks to counterparties with 
the requisite expertise and financial resources to manage them (Esty, 2004; Finnerty 2013). 
The evaluation and allocation stages are preceded by the due diligence process, leading to the 
identification of all relevant risks. 
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A key component at this stage is the design and signing of project contracts with 
counterparties to transfer key project risks. Corielli et al. (2010) referred to these contracts as 
risk shifting non-financial contract (NFC) since they help the SPV transfer risks to its 
counterparties. Further, Esty (2002) refers to the extensive contracting process as ‘an 
institutional tool of risk management’.12 The process ends with a determination of what level 
of risks the SPV should retain.13 
2.5.1 Risks in Project Finance 
Risks in PF can be classified into pre-completion: those occurring at the project 
construction phase; post completion: occurring at the operational phase of the project, and 
risks overlapping both pre-completion and post-completion phase of the project (Gatti, 2013).  
2.5.1.1 Pre-Completion Risks  
Pre-completion risks comprise events that occur before, and throughout the construction 
phase of the project. During this phase, the project does not generate any cash inflow and any 
investment at this stage is high risk. Lenders thus require some protection from SPV and its 
sponsor, against these risks (Gatti, 2012; Finnerty, 2013). These risks range from activity 
planning, technology, construction, and completion risk.  
                                    
12 The emphasis on detailed identification and management of risk is because there is limited collateral 
available to lenders in the case of default. Also, the susceptibility of these investments to hold-up, and 
opportunistic behaviour by the sponsor makes risk management essential (Dailami and Hauswald, 2007). As a 
result, lenders are demanding and would insist on comprehensive risk assessment and analysis of the project to 
ensure that all potential risks are identified and appropriately dealt with. Esty (2004) estimates that it takes on 
average 18 months to close a deal. 
13 Yescombe (2014) underscores the need for the project company to retain only a reasonable level of risk, since 
excessive exposure of SPV to these risks is likely to pose problems at the financing stage. This is because any 
risks the SPV retains is priced by the lender in determining the financing cost (Blanche-Brude and Strange, 
2007; Dailami and Hauswald, 2007). Where lenders deem these risks to be excessive, they may be reluctant to 
commit capital to the SPV or completely back-out of the deal. In some instances, SPV may be required to 
provide guarantees or credit supports to reassure lenders. Thus, effective risk evaluation and management strikes 
a fine balance between risks managed through contractual relationships and those retained by the SPV.  
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Activity planning risk: Planning risk is the risk that a project phase or activity is not captured 
or not well planned, thus delaying the project operation phase. Projects are complex 
undertakings and require SPV and sponsors to carefully identify critical stages or activities 
throughout the entire project phase. Project planning is carried out by breaking projects into 
smaller phases and creating a logical link between each of them. Afterwards, time and 
deadlines are specified to each phase.  
Technology risk: It is related to technology design and processes that will be used for the 
proposed project. Project engineers are required to evaluate the proposed facility’s technical 
feasibility. If the technology is unproven or underdeveloped, a lot of testing and piloting is 
required to ensure that there is reasonable assurance over its feasibility. It is also imperative 
that proven technological processes are tested and reassessed on their ability to accommodate 
future expansion and changes. The assessment must also incorporate the impact of 
environmental factors on the proposed facility design or processes (Finnerty, 2013; Gatti, 
2012).  
Construction Risk: Construction or completion risk is the risk that the project will not be 
ready at the scheduled date. Common factors that determine construction risk include force 
majeure cost overrun, performance deficiency or delayed construction schedule (Gatti, 2013). 
Since project profitability hinges on timely construction of project infrastructure, 
management of these risks is essential.  
The convention is for lenders to charge a lower rate during construction, since the project 
will not be in a position to generate any cash flow at this stage. Once operation starts, this 
charge is reviewed upwards. This process is essential to ensure that SPV is not cash flow 
distressed during construction period. Construction cost overrun is the most common cause 
with the infamous Eurotunnel Project in the 1990’s a classic example. Construction risks are 
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mitigated through either construction contracts or Engineering Procurement and Construction 
contracts (Gatti, 2013). Other mechanisms may include a contingency fund or line of credit 
(Ruster, 1996).  
2.5.1.2 Post-Completion Risks 
This category of risks covers all risk factors that arise upon the completion of the project. 
At this stage, the facility is ready for operation. Potential risks range from availability of raw 
material (supply), plant meeting operational expectation, to the sale of output (Gatti, 2013). 
Similar to pre-completion risk, failure to adequately manage post completion risks can lead to 
cash flow shortfall and undermine long-term viability of the project. The main post-
completion risks include supply, operational and market risks.  
Supply risk: Supply risk is related to the quantity and quality of the input as well as their cost. 
It arises because the SPV is unable to obtain the input needs for operation on a day to day 
basis.  Supply risks if not properly managed can lead to poor functionality of plants, lower 
margins and unexpected increase in production cost (Gatti, 2008). Lenders usually require the 
SPV to determine the source, quantity and quality of input available to the project Finnerty 
(2013). The main risk tool available for managing this is the Supply contract, which pre-
specifies the quantity and quality of inputs to be supplied to it. 
Operation Risk:  It arises when the when project infrastructure function is below its optimal 
or post-completion test level. It is essential that project facilities, once the project becomes 
operational, work according to technical specification and predetermined output levels. This 
is because underperformance or mismanagement of the facility can potentially jeopardise the 
projects economic viability. It usually entails identification of likely operational factors such 
as emission and environmental impact.  It can also arise due to reduction in input-output 
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levels or lower efficiency. Operation of the project is managed using Operation and 
Management (O&M) agreement. 
Market Risk: market risk arises if the project is unable to meet sales and revenue projection 
due to market fluctuation or volatility. It is important that at the design stage, revenue 
estimates and projections are carefully made to prevent over estimation, which can cause 
distress to the SPV in terms of paying project cost, lenders and sponsors as well. Demand 
fluctuation can also be due to introduction of new technology or product, which can lead to a 
sharp decline in demand for project output. An off-take (sales) agreement is usually signed 
with customers to guarantee a ready market when output is ready. 
2.5.1.3 Risks Overlapping Pre-Completion and Post-Completion Phases 
The category covers risks overlapping the pre-completion and post-completion phases of 
the project. It is important that parties identify and manage these risks at all levels to 
guarantee project viability. These risks include political and country risks, legal risks, and 
market or macroeconomic risks.  
Political and country risk: Political risk is a central concern for PF ventures because these 
investments are long-term and overlap multiple political regimes. For example, a power-
generation project that provides electricity households may last generations. Political risk can 
jeopardise a viable project that stands to be derailed if the political environment does not 
promote political stability, policy transparency or prevent government intervention 
(nationalisation) and civil unrest. Political risk arises because the project under consideration 
exists in a political regime or involves a government agency. The main political risk factors 
include investment risk, change-in-law risk and quasi-political risk. Investment risks arise 
from government policies, such as foreign exchange restriction, international capital transfer 
restriction and macroeconomic measures that are detrimental to the operation of the project. 
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It can also be triggered by civil war, coup d’état. Change-in law (regulation) risks arise when 
there are modifications to a country’s legislation to the detriment of the project. Quasi-
political risk relates to factors such as contract enforcement and judicial independence that 
can affect the operation of a project.  
Political risks are mitigated through government support agreements, such as guarantees, 
escrow accounts, tax reliefs and exemptions from bureaucratic procedures. Project sponsors 
can also assess the commercial insurance market to cover political risk partially or fully. 
Multilateral banks mostly provide these insurances. These banks often use their influence and 
resources (guarantees) to drive private capital investment into a politically volatile 
environment. They also act as direct financiers and risk guarantors in PF and usually provide: 
(i) direct loans: granted through co-financing with a private sector and structured as A and B 
loans. These guarantees allow the private sector to enjoy the same privilege as the 
multilateral in these transactions. In effect, the multilateral bank takes the A-loan and private 
sector, the B loan; (ii) Partial guarantees are offered to cover political risks when a private 
sector is lending directly to the government or a government body.  Partial guarantees cover 
all the types of risks mentioned above, except for political force majeure. (iii) Partial credit 
guarantees are used to resolve issues of long-term repayment for which the private sector 
might be unwilling to accept.  
PF involving the provision of public infrastructure or service are more susceptible to 
political risk. It thus requires support from governments and international agencies like 
developmental banks and multilateral institutions (World Bank and IMF) to reassure lenders 
of project viability. Hainz and Kleimeier (2006) in a study demonstrate that availability of 
political risk guarantees in developing countries stimulates PF investment in infrastructure.  
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Market risks: PF ventures, like any financial transactions, are exposed to a series of market 
risks. The main market risks include credit risk; that is, the probability that the project will 
not return sufficient cash to meet capital and interest payment obligations to lenders. Lenders 
thus require reasonable assurance from SPV in the form of an off-take contract and or a credit 
guarantee. However, the use of off-take agreements introduces another risk, referred to as 
counterparty risk. Counterparty risk is the risk of default due to inability of the off-taker to 
fulfil their obligation. Lenders thus assess off-takers creditworthiness to estimate their 
exposure to counterparty risks in these agreements. In a study of the Ras Lafan project in 
Qatar, Dailami and Hauswald (2007) find that bond spread of the project company to be 
positive and significantly correlated with the ratings of the off-taker (Korea Electricity Power 
Company) - an indication of counterparty risk exposure.14 Other market risks, like interest 
rate risk, exchange rate or currency risk and inflation risk are usually mitigated through 
various financial instruments, such as derivatives, interest rate swaps, inflation indexing and 
exchange rate swaps (Ruster, 1996; Gatti 2012).  
Legal risk: Legal risk comprises legal quality measures related to enforcement of laws, 
protection of creditors’ rights, effectiveness of commercial laws, legal origin and institutional 
quality. At the project structuring, lenders usually seek legal counsels from domestic lawyer 
and justice ministries to understand the legal risks inherent in the host country (Beenhakker, 
1997).  
2.5.1.4 Project Risks and its Relationship with Loan Maturity and Pricing 
The average maturity of PF loans is approximately twice that of syndicated loans 
(Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000). Empirical evidence by the authors indicate a negative and 
significant relationship between maturity and the spread on PF loans - a finding that 
                                    
14 Project finance bonds are bonds issued on the capital market by the SPV to raise debt capital. 
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contradicts syndicated loans. This negative relationship is thought to be due to the long-tenor 
of PF loans, for which a positive relationship would be uneconomical. Building on this 
finding, Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) examine whether long tenor of PF carry lower risk than 
short-term deals. Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) note that peculiar features of PF loan contracts, 
that is, short-term liquidity concerns, high leverage ratios and sequential resolution of risks 
over project life means that the relationship between spread and maturity is non-linear. 
Consistent with their argument, they find a hump-shaped relationship between PF loan spread 
and maturity, with long-term loans relative cheaper than short-term deals. 
2.6 Non-Financial Contracts 
As discussed in section 2.4, project contracts are the main tools available to SPV and 
sponsors to manage project risks. A number of these contracts exist for managing both pre-
completion and post completion risks. Corielli et al. (2010) identified four of these contracts 
as the most important. They include Engineering, Procurement and Construction agreement, 
Supply/raw material agreement, Operation and Management agreement, and off-take/sales 
agreement. The SPV, before approaching lenders, is expected to secure some form of 
contract or commitment with various counterparties regarding how the project risks will be 
managed. Together these contracts are called non-financial contracts (NFCs). Corielli et al., 
(2010) define NFCs as “contracts that generate cash inflows or outflows that affect the 
unlevered free cash flow of the SPV”. 
As to whether these contracts are secured before approaching lenders or afterwards remain 
a debate in PF literature. While Corielli et al. (2010) and Gatti (2013) assume that these 
contracts have to be signed before lenders are approached; Blanche-Brude and Strange 
(2007) hold a different view. They believe that these contracts are only signed during or after 
negotiation with lenders. They indicate that lenders potentially influence the final terms of 
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these contracts and only agree on the financing details when they are happy with these 
contract terms.  
In the thesis (Chapter 4), we adopt the argument of Blanche-Brude and Strange (2007) and 
assume that the signing of the NFCs goes hand-in-hand with the negotiation of the financing 
package. Specifically, we argue that finalising NFCs before approaching lenders is likely to 
make the financing stage onerous. This is because where lenders disagree with counterparties 
or feel aspects of project risks are not fully covered, sponsors will have to go back and 
renegotiate these contracts. As a result, we assume that a logical approach would be to sign 
these contracts after lenders have indicated their agreement to these terms.15  
2.6.1 Engineering Procurement and Construction Contracts  
EPC contracts are used to transfer project construction risks to the contractor counterparty. 
EPC contracts are written as turnkey agreements: where the contractor counterparty assumes 
all risks related to the engineering, procurement and construction of the project infrastructure. 
Thus, they effectively transfer all construction related risks from SPV and sponsors to the 
contractor counterparty. The SPV will require the EPC to provide performance guarantees on 
the technology used in the construction (also known as wrapping). Wrapping provides a form 
of assurance to lenders regarding the project’s construction technology. It certifies the 
contractor’s familiarity and confidence with the project’s construction technology. Also, 
there are minimum performance standard provision clauses that are usually the theoretical 
minimum performance level of the plant. For assuming these risks, the contractor 
                                    
15 The overlap between securing NFCs counterparties and the financing package is likely to induce an 
endogenous relationship between the NFCs terms and that of the financing package. If lenders significantly 
influence how these contracts are designed and/or who they are signed with, then one would expect the 
financing terms to reflect these biases. For instance, one option available to lenders is to request that sponsors 
take up responsibilities as NFC counterparties, if it is likely to align sponsors’ interest with project outcome. On 
the other hand, they can also require sponsors to relinquish such roles where they (lenders) infer conflict of 
interest. In Chapter 4 of the thesis, we examine these issues and thus assume that the involvement of lenders as 
project counterparties is non-random and likely to be determined by a number of pre-contract characteristics.  
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counterparty is compensated through regular fixed payment by the SPV (Gatti, 2008; Corielli 
et al., 2010).  
There are instances, where the contractor only assumes the risk of construction risk but not 
engineering or procurement of material for setting up the infrastructure. In other words, the 
contractor counterparty’s liability, in this case, is limited to meeting pre-determined post-
completion specification of the facility. Gatti (2013) notes that the proportion of construction 
risks that a contractor is willing to assume is influenced by the construction technology 
adopted, that is, whether it is proven or not. Where proven technology is adopted, contractor 
counterparty is likely to agree on a turnkey contract with the SPV. Where this is not possible, 
the SPV may either retain the risks or seek alternative means to manage them 
Once the construction of the plant is completed, an independent engineer is required to 
perform initial tests on the commercial operating date.  When this initial test reveals that the 
new facility meets the minimum performance standard, a provisional acceptance certificate 
(PAS) is issued. Next, a series of test runs is conducted over a period, to determine if the 
plant meets operational specifications. Where the plant does not meet the optimal 
(operational) level, the contractor is required to make a commitment, buy-down damage; 
which is the difference in revenue if the plant had operated at the optimal level and the 
minimum performance standard level. If the plant, however, meets the operational 
expectation, the final acceptance certificate is issued. After which the plant becomes formally 
operational and handed over to the SPV.  
2.6.2 Supply contracts 
 The supply contract is signed to ensure raw material, and other critical inputs needed by 
the SPV to operate are available unconditionally. These agreements are usually drafted as a 
put-or-pay agreement, which imposes an obligation on the SPV to purchase from a supplier 
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(s) for the supply of inputs stipulated in the contract.  In the same way, if the supplier fails to 
deliver the raw materials on time, the supplier is required to make alternative arrangements 
for the delivery of raw materials in specified quantity and quality. To ensure fairness, the 
price of the input is usually adjusted to the Market Price Index to ensure that there is 
sufficient economic interest for the supplier to fulfil contractual obligations. If the input 
needs transportation from to the SPV plant location, then sponsors would have to arrange for 
transportation, either as part of the supply contract or through a separate transportation 
agreement.  
2.6.3 Operation and Management Contracts 
Operation and Management contracts are signed to manage operational and management 
risks that could adversely affect the project. For the SPV to generate the requisite cash flow 
to pay its costs and investors, the SPV must ensure that the plants are running efficiently to 
guarantee project profitability and viability. In this regard, the O & M contracts are signed 
with experienced and reputable management firms. In return for managing a projects’ day-to-
day operation, the O&M contractor must be compensated through payments directly from the 
SPV, which can be either a fixed-price contract or pass-through contract.  In a fixed price 
contract, the operator takes up all costs relating to operational cost overrun. On the other 
hand, a pass-through contract pertains to fixed payment and performance related incentives, 
made to ensure the operator takes the necessary steps to reduce cost.  
2.6.4 Off-take Contracts 
 Off-take agreements are contracts signed with the project counterparty to secure ready 
market for the project outputs. These contracts specify delivery of specified quantities of 
goods or services to the counterparty at a pre-agreed or market determined price (Gatti, 
2013). The market price is often indexed to consider inflation. Off-take contracts can take 
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several forms, with the most common being take-or-pay, take-if-offered, and hell-or-high 
water. Under take-or-pay agreements, the counterparty is obligated make payment to the 
SPV, whether they take delivery of output or not. Cash payments for non-delivery are usually 
credited against future deliveries. However, this is conditional on the SPV fulfilling specific 
requirements related to pre-agreed quality and standard (Ruster, 1996). Take-if offered 
agreements requires the purchaser of the SPVs output to only pay for the output, only if the 
project delivers. Thus payment is only expected if the SPV delivers the output. Hell-or-High 
Water provides no opt-out clauses for the purchaser of the output. The project counterparty 
must pay the SPV in all circumstances, regardless of adverse conditions that might affect the 
purchaser’s ability to take deliveries (Finnerty, 2013).   
2.7 Historical and Market Trends of Project Finance 
2.7.1 History of Project Finance 
Before the 1970s PF was mostly used to finance natural resource projects such as oil field 
exploration and mining (Davis, 2003). Natural resource projects are traditional low risk 
investments with regard to country, market and technology risks; hence the possibility of 
lenders financing them against its stream of future cash flows (Gatti, 2008). Some of the 
landmark natural resource projects for which this technique was applied include the $7.7 
billion Trans Alaska Pipeline Project in 1969 and the Hibernia Oil Field Projects at a cost of 
$4.1 billion (Finnerty, 1996).  
The use of PF to the power generation sector was boosted by deregulations and 
privatisation initiative in advanced countries like the U.S and the UK. Finnerty (1996) noted 
that the passage of Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) in the U.S in 1978, 
allowed independent power producers (IPP’s) to sign long-term contracts with domestic 
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electric utility companies that guarantees the purchase of electric output from the IPP’s at a 
guaranteed price (usually commensurate with the marginal cost of electric production).  
From 1980 to 1990s, the emergence of PF took two trajectories; the replication of natural 
resource projects in developing countries and the use of PF by advanced economies in non-
traditional PF markets (Gatti, 2008). Developing countries at the time had weak 
infrastructural profiles. With the saturation of investment opportunities in advanced 
economies, investors are turning to projects in emerging and developing countries. One major 
catalyst for this trend was the involvement of international and multilateral agencies like the 
World Bank, Regional Development Banks and Export Credit Agencies from the home 
countries of the contractors who supported these transactions by providing guarantees for 
political, sovereign and other project risk.   
The second trajectory from advanced countries’ perspectives, is the extension of PF 
techniques to new project sectors, such road and rail transport infrastructure, leisure, 
telecommunication, water and sewage among others. The distinct feature of these new 
projects is the relatively high market and country risk involved. Unlike the natural resources 
and power, generation projects where long-term contracts can be written to mitigate market 
risk, it is more difficult to do so in these new project sectors. In place of these long-term 
contracts, a public fund is set up by the sponsor or has a stake in the project. The involvement 
of government or public sector is often referred to as public private partnership (PPP).  
2.7.2 Project Finance Market  
The size and volume of PF markets have both increased greatly over the past three 
decades, and PF is now seen as the main finance vehicle for capital intensive and 
infrastructural investment projects. Data from Project Finance International (cited in 
Yescombe, 2006) puts the total value of PF loans as at 2005 at over $165 billion, from a 
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value of a little over $131 billion in 2000. Similarly, Infrastructure Journal also estimated 
total value of PF loans to be $212 billion in 2006. More recent data from Thomson Reuters’ 
Project Finance International indicates that PF lending grew by a factor of ten (10) from 
$41.3 billion in 1994 to $415 billion in 2013 (Esty et al., 2014). Between 2011 and 2016 
alone, the average volume of deals structured using PF is approximately $232 billion per 
annum (Thomson Reuters, 2017a). 
Regarding project sectors, power, energy & natural resources sectors commanded a higher 
portion of project loans. The power sector, however, suffered a downward trend after the 
Enron scandal but recovered strongly from 2004 and remains a key driver of PF initiatives. 
Gatti (2008) found that nearly 50% of all PF loans executed between 2003 and 2006 were for 
energy and power sector. This was followed by infrastructural and transportation sector 
accounting for 25% of all PF loans. The telecommunication sector, after experiencing active 
use of PF in the early 2000s, drastically reduced by 2005 from $36.7 billion to $ 10 billion as 
at 2005 (Yescombe, 2007). Estimates from Gatti (2008) put this total market share for 
telecommunication sector at 6.5% as at 2006.  
In Chapter 4, the sample data show that Electricity and Power generation projects account 
for 30% of total deals between 1998 and 2013. Following this are Oil & Gas and 
Transportation projects with 21% and 16% respectively.  
Regarding geographical distribution of PF loans, Gatti (2008), using a dataset from 
Thompson One Banker, reported a geographical concentration of projects funded using this 
technique in Europe, North America and Asia. Africa only accounted for 18% of the total 
financing over the sample period (2003-2006). The dataset, however, revealed a higher 
proportion for these loans were used to finance natural resource and energy projects in 
developing economies. For instance, Africa/Middle East and Asia region saw an increase in 
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their total share of PF from 10.5% and 15.4% in 2003 to 30% and 43%, respectively, as at 
2006. Over the same period, there was a reduction in Europe’s share of PF loans from 52.1% 
in 2003 to 38.8% in 2006. This clearly shows that PF is now more deployed in emerging and 
developing economies than it was some decades ago.  
2.8 Summary 
This chapter reviewed key principles and concepts in PF lending. The chapter focussed on 
the evaluation and allocation of project risks, and how it offers superior means to deliver 
long-term and capital intensive investments. The review shows that the main motivations for 
using PF are related to risks. Specifically, the review show that asymmetric information and 
agency costs of free cash flows are the main arguments advanced for the growth of PF 
lending. Further, the review shows that by separating the new venture via an SPV, both 
sponsors and lenders benefit from information production and pricing of project risks. At the 
heart of PF lending is the nexus of contracts-NFCs - used to manage the relevant project 
risks. The review shows that NFCs are crucial to managing risks and the relationships 
between the various parties in PF. Further, the review examined how political and legal risks 
influence contractual design in PF.  
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Chapter 3 Impact of Domestic Lead Arranger Certification on 
the Pricing of Project Finance Loans: Evidence from Emerging 
Market Economies 16 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Over the past two decades, project finance (PF) has become a popular vehicle for 
chanelling capital into emerging markets (Gatti et al., 2013). In 2017, the total value of global 
PF transaction was worth $229.6 billion, based on data compiled by Thomson Reuters Deal 
Intelligence (Thomson Reuters, 2017). Approximately $80.6 billion (35%) of these deals 
were signed in emerging market economies to financed long-term infrastructure projects in 
transportation, water and sewage, power, oil and gas and mineral explorations. The increase 
in PF investments is partly because of the increasing involvement of home-grown and often 
state-backed financial intermediaries (FIs) (Ansar, 2012).  
Domestic FIs usually have easier access to their markets and can navigate complexities.17 
For instance, domestic FIs can easily access “soft information”, that is, information which is 
difficult to completely summarise in a numeric score (Peterson and Rajan, 2002). They can 
also rally support and utilise their connections with host governments for the projects (Mian, 
2006). The literature on foreign banking also notes that foreign banks face informational 
disadvantages in emerging market economies (Giannetti and Ongena, 2012). Foreign banks 
typically have less local, market or firm-specific information than their domestic 
counterparts, and must overcome cultural and bureaucratic barriers in the host country 
                                    
16 A revised version of this chapter titled “Domestic Lead Arranger Certification and the Pricing of Project 
Finance Loans” (with Gregory James) is accepted for publication in The International Journal of Finance and 
Economics 2018, 1-18. 
 
17 In this chapter, domestic FIs refers to FIs that are ultimately owned by shareholders domiciled in the same 
country as the project country and are not a subsidiary of a foreign parent company.  
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(Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Buch, 2003; Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Mian, 2006). Empirical 
evidences indicate that cost of borrowing is increasing in the geographical distance between 
borrowers and lenders, due to the difficulty in obtaining and verifying soft information over 
distance (Knyazeva and Knyazeva, 2012). The chapter in line with these studies argue that 
the superior ability of domestic FIs to assess projects and its underlying network of contracts, 
credibly communicate the project’s true value, and provide effective monitoring of the 
project company. As a result, loans can be arranged at lower risk premium by domestic FIs 
(with or without the involvement of foreign counterparts). 
PF is defined as the financing of long-term capital investment through a project company 
with equity from sponsors and debt capital from lenders on a limited or non-recourse basis 
(Esty, 2014; Gatti, 2012). PF typically starts with the formation of the project company as a 
separate legal entity, from its sponsors, and tasked with the responsibility to design, construct 
and manage the project venture (Corielli et al. 2010). The project company then signs 
contracts with counterparties to manage the various project risks from construction to sale of 
output. Esty (2003) describes the contractual feature of PF as institutional risk management 
tools, due to its ability to reduce agency cost and cash flow volatility.  
These project contracts and other relevant documents are submitted to lenders to secure 
debt funding. Lenders, then undertake due diligence on the project to determine an 
appropriate risk premium (Gatti et al., 2013). The loan contract is usually structured as a form 
of syndicated loans led by one or more mandated lead arranger (MLA). The lead arranger is 
appointed by the sponsor through a competitive bidding process (Della Croce and Gatti, 
2014) and is principally responsible for undertaking due diligence on the project venture. The 
lead arranger first examines the project company’s network of contracts and relevant 
documents. After that, participating lenders are invited to provide a share of the loan. 
However, the non-involvement of participating lenders in the due diligence induce 
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asymmetric information at the level of the lead arranger. The lead arranger is an informed 
lender who can monitor and learn about the firm through unobservable and costly efforts, 
whereas potential participant lenders in the syndicate are uninformed lenders who rely on the 
information and monitoring provided by the informed lender to make profitable investment in 
firms (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). To overcome the problem of moral hazard, at the lead 
arranger level, given that informed lender effort is unobservable, the lead arranger must retain 
a stake in the borrowing firm to reassure the syndicate members that the firm will behave 
diligently, otherwise referred to as certification. The only study that examine the lead 
arranger certification in PF is Gatti et al. (2013). The authors explore the relationship 
between prestigious lead arranger certification and the spread on PF loans. They argue that 
“the ability to certify arise from the superior ability of the arranging bank to structure and 
screen the deal set up by the sponsors, as well as to later monitor the loan contract or resolve 
financial distress situations.” Using a sample of 4,122 PF loans arranged from 1991 to 2005, 
they find that spread on PF loans are significantly lower when arranged by prestigious 
arrangers (banks that have a high market share in the PF loan market in the year prior to the 
signing date of the loan), compared to those arranged by non-prestigious lead arrangers. 
Further, they find that participating lenders, rather than the project sponsors, “pay” for the 
certification provided by prestigious lead arrangers by allowing them to keep larger fractions 
of arranging fees.  
This chapter builds on the work of Gatti et al. (2013) by examining the causal impact of 
domestic FI certification on loan spread, using a sample of 1,270 syndicated PF loan tranches 
signed between 1998 and 2011 and worth over $300 billion. The study merges market data 
on PF loans from Dealogic Projectware database with ownership data on the lead arrangers 
and global ultimate owner information from Bankscope and Zephyr databases (Bureau van 
Dijk), to determine the origin of lead arrangers. Specifically, data from Bankscope and 
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Zephyr are used to categorise lead arrangers in the sample as domestic or foreign. To derive 
the causal estimate of certification by domestic FIs, the endogenous switching regression is 
used to control for potential self-selection of domestic lead arranger into these deals. 
Specifically, the endogenous switching regression model is used to estimate (i) the 
determinants of certification by domestic FIs; (ii) the determinants of loan spread for deals 
with certification by domestic FIs and those without; and (iii) the causal impact of 
certification by domestic FIs on the loan spread. The main advantage of the endogenous 
switching regression relatively to other treatment effect models is the explicit estimation of 
the conditional and counterfactual outcomes. 
The main findings are that certification by domestic FIs are less likely when the loans are 
signed in foreign currencies, have political risk guaranteees included, and are issued by 
Export-Import bank (EXIM).18 The study also finds the spread on the loans to be negatively 
related to currency and sovereign risks. Overall, the causal impact of certification by 
domestic arrangers is -47 basis points (bps). This impact is economically and statistically 
significant across the industrial, geographical and income classifications. 
The chapter contributes to the literature in various ways. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this study is the first to examine the pricing effect of certification by domestic 
lead arrangers specifically in the context of PF syndicated loans.19 Using Projectware dataset, 
the study identifies domestic FIs that act as MLA’s as opposed to those who only provide 
funding to the syndicates. This treatment enables the author to measure the benefits of using 
                                    
18 EXIM loans are credit facilities issued by export credit agencies to firm’s from that country (usually 
developed), to undertake businesses in other countries (developing countries). These facilities usually provide 
political and business risk covers/guarantees.  
19 A domestic arranger can also be a prestigious arranger, for instance if it succeeds in exploiting a home 
advantage to build profitable market share over the long run. However, only six domestic arrangers in the 
sample can be categorised as prestigious according to the league table of the top 25 PF lead arrangers published 
in Gatti (2013, pp. 175-178) These arrangers are Gulf International Bank (Bahrain) and Chiao Tung Bank 
(China) for the period 1998-2005, and State Bank of India (India) Axis Bank (India) IDBI Bank (India), and 
Korea Development Bank (Koera) for the period 2006-2011.  
 35 
domestic lead arrangers in both the deal-structuring and the financing phase of the project. 
The chapter also contributes to the syndicated loan literature on delegated monitoring. The 
non-involvement of lending banks in the due diligence carried out by the lead arranger on the 
project company, induce asymmetric information (Focarelli et al., 2008). Specifically, the 
lead arranger is an “informed lender” who is able to monitor and learn about the firm through 
unobservable and costly effort whereas potential participant lenders in the syndicate are 
“uninformed lenders” who rely on the information and monitoring provided by the informed 
lender to make profitable investment in firms (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). The chapter’s 
findings indicate that, in the presence of asymmetric information, domestic FIs help to 
ameliorate the search and information costs, resulting in an economic reduction in the loan 
spread.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the PF syndicated 
lending process and related literature. Section 3.3 presents the testable hypothesis, while 
Section 3.4 details the empirical model, variables and how the estimation procedure. Section 
3.5 presents the empirical results and Section 3.6 concludes.    
3.2 Institutional Features of Project Finance and Syndicated Lending 
3.2.1 Project Finance 
PF refers to the incorporation of capital ventures as stand-alone investment with equity 
financing from sponsors and debt financing from lenders, where repayments are tailored to 
suit the cash flow characteristics of the project (Finnerty, 1996). Three important 
characteristics distinguish PF from standard corporate finance loans. First, there is a legally 
distinct project company given the responsibility to design, construct and manage the project 
venture (Corielli et al. 2010). Second, the project company signs complex network of 
contracts to manage the various risks of the project. Third, majority of capital (usually 70% 
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and above) is provided by lenders on a limited or non-recourse basis, which absolves 
sponsors from any future liabilities in the event of project default (Yescombe, 2006; Gatti, 
2008; Esty and Sesia, 2009).  
Some studies have examine PF loans and its features. Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007) 
explore the pricing PF loans for public-private partnerships (PPP) initiatives in Europe. They 
find that lenders only price systematic risks (risks that affect the probability of default), and 
manage other risks at the project-level through contracts and project design. Corielli et al. 
(2010) focus on the contractual mechanism used to manage the project risks. They examine 
whether NFCs (that is, contracts that generate inflows and outflows that affect the unlevered 
free cash flows of the project company) affect the loan spread and leverage offered by 
lenders. They find that NFCs reduce agency costs and cash flow volatility of the project, 
which in turn reduce (increase) the spreads (leverage) on these loans. Sorge and Gadanecz 
(2004) show that the term structures of PF loan spread are hump-shaped unlike other loan 
types. The authors attribute the hum- shaped term structure to effective long-term risk 
management provided by PF such as short-term liquidity resolution, high leverage, sequential 
resolution of risk, and the availability of political risk guarantees. Kleimeier and Versteeg 
(2010) show that PF investments promote economic growth in countries where financial 
development and governance are weak. Similarly, Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) examine the 
loan contracts for financing project in countries with high political risk. They conclude that 
the characteristics of PF (separate incorporation of the project company, high leverage, non-
resource lending and the participation of development banks) make it more suitable for 
developing countries projects.  
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3.2.2 Syndicated Lending and the Role of Mandated Lead Arrangers (MLAs)  
Lending for PF ventures is often carried out through the syndicated loan market. 
Syndicated lending involves two or more FIs jointly granting a loan to a single borrower Sufi, 
2007). This process reduces the duplication of efforts by the borrower in negotiating 
individually with each lender. It also reduces lenders exposure to a single borrower (Dennis 
and Mullineaux, 2000; Esty, 2004; Carey and Nini, 2007). The syndication process is 
typically led by small number of FIs, known as lead arrangers. The lead arrangers negotiate 
the terms and conditions of the loan with the project company on behalf of the syndicate 
members. Lead arrangers perform three primary functions. These include conducting due 
diligence on the project company and its counterparties, forming syndicate to provide the 
project company with debt capital and monitoring the project company to prevent moral 
hazards (Gatti et al. 2013). These functions are performed at various stages of the syndication 
process, which starts once the lead arranger is appointed. Before syndication, there is 
typically a competitive tendering, where FIs or consortia of them tender their proposals to act 
as lead arrangers.  
The syndication process can be divided into three phases: pre-mandate, post-mandate and 
post-signing (Sufi, 2007; Chaudhry and Kleimeier, 2013). The pre-mandate phase begins 
with negotiation and drafting of preliminary loan terms and conditions between the project 
company and the lead arrangers. The lead arrangers review the project company and the 
counterparties to obtain information needed for determining an appropriate risk premium. 
Lead arrangers typically rely on technical experts like engineers, lawyers, financial analyst 
and accountants to assess these activities. If successful, a preliminary lending agreement is 
signed between the lead arrangers and the project company (Sufi, 2007). Next at the post-
mandate phase, lead arrangers together with the project company produce an information 
memorandum containing relevant details on the project company and terms of the loan 
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contract. These are then sent to prospective lenders to invite them to take part in the 
syndication. Lenders with prior and existing relationships with project company sponsors as 
well as those within the geographic reach of the project country are more likely to be invited 
to form the syndicate. However, there are times where new lenders are invited to join the 
syndicate all together. There is often a road show as part of this phase, where prospective 
lenders are offered the opportunity to engage the project company and sponsors on details 
contained in the information memorandum. The phase concludes with the allocation of the 
loan to each syndicate member and the signing of loan agreements between the project 
company and syndicate members. The lead arrangers would usually underwrite the loan issue 
and retain a higher portion. These actions by the lead arrangers convey credible signals on the 
project creditworthiness (Nini, 2004; Sufi, 2007).  
The post-signing phase involves monitoring of the project company by the lead arranger to 
ensure compliance with the loan agreements. The lead arrangers are usually paid an arranging 
fee for undertaking these monitoring. There are often multiple FIs (deposit and non-deposit) 
involved in the transaction structuring and syndication process. These FIs include 
commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, pension funds, private equity 
funds and sovereign wealth funds (Gatti, 2008). Further, multilateral financing agencies, 
development banks and export credit agencies (ECAs) play the role of lead arrangers and 
usually provide guarantees against certain political risk events (Hainz and Kleimeier, 2012). 
3.2.3 Asymmetric Information in Syndicated Lending  
The chapter relates to two broad areas in the finance literature. First is asymmetric 
information in the syndicated loan market (Diamond, 1984; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997 and 
Sufi, 2007). Second is the role of domestic FIs in financial intermediation (Berger, Klapper 
and Udell, 2001; Main, 2005 and Degryse and Onega, 2005).  Syndicated lending, by design, 
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induces asymmetric information between the lead arrangers and the participating lenders. 
This situation is because the efforts of the former are unobservable to the latter as there are no 
credible way for their actions to be verified. This scenario is similar to Diamond (1984), who 
referred to banks as delegated monitors - by performing costly verification and monitoring on 
behalf of uninformed creditors (depositors). In the context of syndicated lending, the 
delegated monitor is the lead arranger, and the uninformed creditors are the participating 
lenders (Sufi, 2007). As Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) note uninformed lenders only commit 
to syndicated loans if the lead arrangers take up a higher portion of the loan amount. Thus, 
with each additional amount of fund provided by the lead arrangers, there is a reduction in 
their incentive to shirk, which decreases moral hazard. Further, the reputation of lead 
arrangers can communicate valuable signals to the participating lenders about project 
creditworthiness. As a result, participating lenders interpret certification by reputable lead 
arrangers as an indication of project soundness and increase their willingness to join the 
syndicate (Gatti et al., 2013). 
Studies on asymmetric information in syndicated lending support the earlier discussions. 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), Sufi (2007) and Chaudhry and Kleimeier (2013) examine the 
effect of asymmetric information on syndicate structure. They find that syndicated is more 
likely when (i) the loan size is large (ii)  it is arranged by repuatable lead arrangers, and (iii) 
borrowing firm is public. Similarly, Lee and Mullineaux (2004) demonstrate that syndicates 
are smaller and concentrated when borrowers have little public information and have high 
credit risks. Other studies including Vu and Skully (2008), Ivashina (2009) and Nini (2004) 
also came to similarly conclusion. Vu and Skully (2008) find that information disclosure by 
lead arrangers reduces the spread for participating lenders and increases the arranging fee 
charged by the lead arrangers. Ivashina (2009) finds that the spread on syndicated loans 
reduce when the lead arrangers retain a higher proportion of the loan size. This reduction is 
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because lead arrangers in taking-up higher portion of the loan, communicate valuable signal 
to participating lenders on the creditworthiness of the deal. Nini (2004) also show that 
certification by domestic banks lowers the observed loan spread. The author attributes this 
reduction in spread to the certification benefits of domestic lenders who are perceived to be 
better informed relative to their foreign counterparts. 
Studies on PF syndicated loans by Esty and Megginson (2003) and Gatti et al. (2013) 
came to similar conclusion. Esty and Megginson (2003) demonstrate that the loan syndicates 
are larger creditor rights protection in the project country is weak. Gatti et al. (2013) show 
that the loan spread is lower if the lead arrangers are prestigious with participating banks 
rather than borrower firm paying for the certification via lower upfront arranging fee. 
 3.3 Testable Hypotheses 
The institutional features and related literature discussed in the previous section provide 
the context to develop the following testable hypotheses on the certification effect of 
domestic FIs. The main priori is that certification by domestic FIs enhance the loan deal by 
reducing asymmetric information. The following hypotheses are thus formulated. 
Hypothesis 1: Certification by domestic FIs reduces search and information costs, which in 
turn reduce the loan spread.  
Uninformed lenders can mitigate asymmetric information by involving informed lenders 
as lead arrangers in the loan syndicate. Studies by Berger et al. (2001) and Mian (2006) 
underscore domestic FIs as informed lenders compared to their foreign counterparts. Other 
studies have also documented a negative relationship between lenders’ geographical 
proximity and spread on loans (Degryse and Onega, 2005). Domestic FIs are usually better-
informed on domestic market conditions, have political connections and can navigate easily 
the bottlenecks in their local markets. Thus, the inclusion of domestic FIs as lead arrangers 
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provide an effective mechanism for reducing asymmetric information and project risks. 
Domestic FIs can reduce search and information cost, due to superior access to so called “soft 
information” (information that is difficult to completely summarise in numerically score 
(Peterson and Rajan, 2002).). It is to be expected that the certification by domestic lead 
arrangers will reduce loan spread. The remaining hypotheses are corollaries to the main 
hypothesis above.  
Hypothesis 2: The reduction in loan spread from certification by domestic FI differs across 
project industries because of heterogenous industry risks.   
In the second hypothesis, the chapter notes that heterogeneity in industry risks should 
influence the certification effect of domestic FI certification on the loan spread. In emerging 
market economies, industry-specific risks are pervasive, in part, due to the inadequacy of 
industry information needed to do effective project due diligence (Jones and Viros, 2014). 
Thus, it is expected that lenders in certifying PF loans would evaluate these industry-specific 
risks. However, domestic FIs help to overcome these these difficulties through their 
knowledge and connections in these markets. Further, project industries differ based on how 
much risks can be transferred through written contracts. While it is easier to manage raw 
material and demand risks in an oil and gas or power generation projects, it is however 
difficult in the case of transportation projects. This difference is because the latter has traffic 
risks - the risk that actual traffic will be lower or higher than actual forecast (Bull et al., 
2017), which is absent in the former. Further, it is easier to write contracts to manage demand 
risks in power-generation projects, a task that is difficult in transport projects because of 
difficulties in accurately estimating future traffics.20  
                                    
20 Bull (2017) notes that a number of toll road projects have ended in high-profile bankruptcies, renegotiations 
and government bailouts due to inaccurate forecasts whereby actual traffic flows (and associated toll revenues) 
have turned out to be much lower than forecast. The crystallization of this traffic risk has led to many project 
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Hypothesis 3: The reduction in loan spread from domestic FI certification differs across 
projects geographic location due to differences in country risk profile.  
The chapter also expects variation in the spread impact of certification by domestic 
arrangers due to the geographical location of the project. Projects in more developed 
geographical locations such as Europe are likely to vary from those in less developed regions 
like Sub-Saharan Africa. Also, these regions differ based on the strength of the financial 
system. Therefore, the study expects domestic FI certification to differ in line with these 
heterogeneities.  
Hypothesis 4: The impact of certification by domestic FI on the loan spread is higher in 
countries with lower income classification due to the pervasiveness of asymmetric 
information.  
Lastly, the study expects domestic FI certification to vary across income classification of 
project countries. Deals located in lower income countries are more likely to have higher 
risks and asymmetric information when compared to those in high-income countries. Thus, 
the study expects the impact of certification by domestic arrangers to be higher for lower-
income countries.  
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Data 
Data for the study comes from Dealogic ProjectWare. The dataset covers global PF loans 
provided by transacting banks, agents and project companies. It contains information on loan 
and project specific characteristics such as tranche spread, tranche amount, tranche maturity, 
debt to equity ratio, project sponsors, project financiers, project contracts and project 
                                                                                                                
failures. Financiers, now significantly more cognitive of the risk, have a reduced appetite for such projects or are 
aggressively pricing the risk in their cost of finance. 
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counterparties. The dataset also categorises project lenders based on their roles, that is, lead 
arrangers, participating banks, book-runners and agent banks among others. A main 
drawback, however, is the unavailability of comprehensive pricing variables on these loan 
contracts. Though data on loan spread is available for a sizeable number of deals that of 
arranging fees is largely unavailable. This constraint limited the analysis to the loan spreads 
as the only measure of risk premium in the study. The full dataset covers over 24,000 PF loan 
tranches (14,000 PF loan deals) signed between January 1997 and March 2013. The study 
sample is retrieved by extracting all tranches for which the loan spreads are available. This 
filtering reduced the observation from 24,000 tranches to approximately 5,000 tranches. 
Next, the study filters out deals not signed in emerging market economies using four 
emerging market country list: the IMF World Economic Outlook, the FTSE Annual 
Classification Review, the S&P Dow Jones Country Classification Consultation Results, and 
the Russell Construction Methodology. This classification reduces the sample to 
approximately 2,000 loan tranches. To obtain a sample of syndicated loan tranches the study 
filters out bilateral agreements and club finance loan tranches. The final sample comprises 
1,270 syndicated loan tranches (921 PF loan deals) arranged across 53 emerging market 
between 1998 and 2011 and worth over $300 million.  
3.4.2. Endogeneity of Domestic Financial Institutions Certification  
The chapter assumes that certification by domestic FIs is endogenous to the outcomes of 
the loans. In other words, domestic lenders self-select to certificate based on the expected 
loan outcomes.21 Self-selection is induced by the domestic FIs superior knowledge on the 
domestic markets and ability to manoeuvre information opacities. Hence, domestic FIs are 
                                    
21 Domestic FIs have connections and networks, that can enhance deal structuring. These networks are valuable 
when it comes to raising additional capital from the domestic market or generate political support to the venture 
(Mian, 2006). This is because host governments are likely to be reluctant in intervening or taking actions that 
jeopardise projects viability, especially when domestic FIs own a substantial share of the domestic financial 
market or is a state-owned institution (Esty, 2004). 
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more likely to determine the creditworthiness of deals in order to decide whether to certify or 
not. Foreign lenders are also likely to include domestic counterparts as lead arrangers in other 
to benefits from their superior knowledge of the project country. Given that emerging market 
economies have less developed financial markets, lack credible data across project sectors, 
have high political, sovereign and regulatory risks, foreign lenders are more likely to use 
capitalise on the valuable expertise of domestic FIs to manage these risks (Ansar, 2012; Jones 
and Viros, 2014; Dailami and Leipziger, 1998). Nevertheless, certification by domestic FI in 
emerging markets is not without costs (Nini, 2004). Emerging market FIs have less capacity 
to fund large-scale projects consistently and thus have to weigh the opportunity costs of 
investing these projects compared to their short-term lending functions. 
3.4.3 The Model 
The chapter draws on studies by Nini (2004), Sorges and Gadanecz (2004), Corielli et al 
(2010) and Gatti et al. (2013), to develop a model that measures the determinants and impact 
of certification by domestic lead arrangers. Self-selection by domestic lead arrangers means 
that ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of certification would be biased. This is because 
the error term of the loan spread for deals with domestic lead arranger certification and those 
without are likely to differ. In line with this, study utilised the endogenous switching 
regression model developed by Maddala and Nelson (1975) and Maddala (1983). The 
endogenous switching regression model controls for endogeneity using the error term of the 
selection and outcome equations since unobserved characteristics that influence certification 
by domestic lead arrangers are likely to be correlated with the loan outcomes.  
The basic model is composed of (i) a selection equation that determines which of the two 
regimes (domestic vs foreign) a loan tranche belongs to and (ii) two loan spread equations for 
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deals certified by domestic and foreign lead arrangers respectively. The lead arranger’s 
selection equation is specified as 
  Ii = αZi + µi                                  (3.1) 
where Ii is a binary variable, which equals 1 if for loan tranche i a domestic FI is a mandated 
lead arranger, 0 otherwise. This can be summarised as 
Ii =1 if αZi + µi > 0 
Ii =0 if αZi + µi ≤ 0 
The loan spread equations are specified as 
    y1i=β1X1i+ε1i                                                                                                 (3.2) 
    y2i=β2X2i+ε2i                                                                  (3.3) 
where y1i (y2i) is the loan spread for loan tranche i if it is arranged by one or more domestic 
lead arrangers (by foreign arrangers only). Z, X1i and X2i are sets of overlapping explanatory 
variables; α, β1 and β2 are the coefficients; µi ε1i and ε2i are the error terms of the equation and 
assumed to have trivariate normal distribution with mean vector zero and covariance matrix 
shown below. 
 
where  is the variance of the error term in the selection equation (which can be assumed to 
be equal to 1 since α is estimable to a scale).  and  are the variances of the error terms of 
the loan spread equations 3.2 and 3.3.  is the covariance of µi and ,  is the covariance 
of µi and .  is the covariance between  and  and is not defined as y1i and y2i are 
never observed simultaneously (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004).  
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Endogeneity of certification by domestic FI mean the expectation of the error term for 
equation (3.2) and (3.3) conditional on the selection process will be non-zero, that is, 
E (ε1i │X,I=1) = -  ≠0 
E (ε2i │X,I=0)=  ≠0 
where F is a cumulative normal distribution function and f is a normal density distribution 
function. An OLS estimate of equation (3.2) and (3.3) should therefore yield inconsistent 
estimate of β1 and β2.  
The model is thus estimated using logarithmic likelihood function with full information 
developed by Loskin and Sajaia (2004).  Ameriya (1973) show that the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the model is consistent and asymptotically efficient. The log likelihood form is 
shown as: 
InL= Ii [In {(F(ΦLi)}+In{f (ε1i /σ1)/σ1}] + (1- Ii) [In {1- F(ΦN,i)} + In{f (ε2i/σ2)/σ2}]) (3.4) 
 
where F is a cumulative normal distribution function, and f is a normal density distribution 
function.  
Φji=    j= Domestic FI certification, No domestic FI certification.      (3.5) 
where ρL= /σuσ2, is the correlation coefficient between ε1i and ui and ρN = /σuσ2, is the 
correlation coefficient between ε2i   and µ. The correlation coefficients determine the selection 
of domestic and foreign banks conditional on their certification.  
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3.4.4 Counterfactual Loan spreads and impact of domestic FI certification 
After estimating the model parameters for equation (3.1) and (3.2), the study computes the 
unconditional expectation of loan spread for deals with domestic FI certification and those 
without using these error terms. For deals with domestic FI certification, the unconditional 
expectation is the loan spread without self-selection. In other words, it is an estimate of the 
loan spread for loans with domestic lead arranger certification given that there did not self-
select themselves in these deals. The same explanation holds for deals without domestic Fi 
certification. These are shown below.  
E (yL│XIi) = β1X1i                                                                               
E (yN│X2i) = β2X2i                                                                              
Endogeneity of domestic FI certification means the characteristic of loans with domestic 
FI certification is likely to systematically differ from those without domestic FIs certification. 
If this is true, the error term for the two samples should be different. As a result comparison 
of the difference between the two subsamples (domestic and non-domestic FI) will yield 
misleading estimates of domestic FI impact. A better way to access this impact is to first 
estimates the conditional loan spread given that there is certification less the conditional loans 
spread if, for the same loans, there is no certification – the counterfactual loan spread.  
To measure the impact of certification by domestic lead arrangers, the study estimates the 
conditional loan spreads for deals with domestic and foreign lead arrangers respectively. 
These conditional estimates are free of selection bias since the correlation of the error terms 
of the selection and outcomes equations of the endogenous switching regression controls for 
it. The conditional loan spread for deals with domestic FI’s certification given that domestic 
FIs actually participated and its counterfactuals specified in equation (3.6) and (3.7) below:  
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                                E (yL│I =1,XIi) = β1X1i + σ1ρ1 f (αZi)/ F (αZi)                                      (3.6) 
                                E (yL│I =0,XIi) = β1X1i -σ1ρ1 f (αZi)/{1-F (αZi)}                                  (3.7) 
Similarly, the conditional loan spread for deals without domestic FI certification and the 
counterfactual loan spreads are given in equations (3.8) and (3.9) respectively below.  
                      E (yN │ I =0,X2i) = β2X2i – σ2ρ2f (αZi)/{(1-F(αZi)}                            (3.8) 
                                E (yN│I =1,X2i) = β2X2i + σ2ρ2 f (αZi)/{(1-F(αZi)}                               (3.9) 
   
The impact of domestic FI certification is calculated as the difference between equation 
(3.6) and (3.7) or equation (3.8) and (3.9). Thus, the impact of certification by domestic lead 
arrangers is the loan spread for deals with domestic FI certification conditional that they did 
have domestic certification less their counterfactual loan spread. Alternatively, domestic FI 
certification can be measured as the difference between loans spread for deals foreign lead 
arrangers certification conditional that they have no domestic FI certification and the 
counterfactual loan spread.  
However, in this chapter the latter definition of impact, that is the difference between 
equation (3.8) and (3.9). This treatment is because loan deals with foreign lead arrangers that 
have a clean sample unlike those with domestic lead arrangers. Specifically, these loans have 
only foreign lead arrangers certifying it. On the other hand, the sample with domestic lead 
arranger certification can have foreign lead arrangers certifying as well. Thus, using equation 
(3.8) and (3.9), the conditional loan spread reflects only the estimate for deals structured by 
foreign mandated lead arrangers since no domestic FIs are contained in this categorise. 
Equation (3.8) measures the conditional loan spread given that the loans did have non-FI 
certification while (3.9) measures the counterfactual loan spread if these deals had domestic 
FI participating instead. Where the estimate of (3.8) is higher than (3.9), then domestic FI 
certification is beneficial, since it leads to a lower loan spread. Alternatively, where the 
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estimate of (3.8) is lower than (3.9) then it means domestic FI certification is more expensive 
compared to deals without domestic FIs.  
The empirical estimates of (3.8) and (3.9) are reversed to (3.9) - (3.8) to ensure that the 
estimate of the impact provides a clearer intuition on domestic FI certification. Thus, where 
domestic FI certification is beneficial, the impact will be a negative reflecting a reduction in 
the loan spread. Similarly, positive difference indicates that domestic FI certification 
increases loan spread for such deals.  
3.4.5 Variable Definition and Sources 
For each syndicated PF loan tranche included in the sample, information on 
microeconomic loan characteristics (tranche spread, tranche amount, tranche final maturity 
and tranche sign date), project-specific characteristics (currency risk, guarantees and 
refinance loans) and project sector as well geography are used. Additional controls are 
created for loan types (term loans, credit facilities, bridge loans and standby facilities). 
Macroeconomic variables are also added to capture the level of financial development and 
sovereign credit risk in the project country.  
The dependent variable, tranche loan spread, is the value of spread over base rates such as 
Libor, Euribor and US Treasury Bill. This variable measures the cost and risk premium on 
the loan deals. In line with Corielli et al. (2010), the chapter uses the spread above these base 
rates as a measure of risk premium. However, there are instances where deals are priced as an 
absolute value without any base rate. In such cases, the study uses the absolute spread values 
as recorded in the dataset. This loan spread data exhibited various heterogeneity regarding its 
term structure. In most instances, loan spreads are priced in tiers, usually to correspond with 
the various phases of the project and in anticipation of future risk changes. A sizeable number 
of deals are also structured as a single rate over the base rate throughout the loan period. To 
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ensure that the tranche loan spread is homogenous, the chapter computed a weighted average 
method, where the maturity for each loan spread represents the weights. This treatment is in 
line with Blanc-Brude & Strange (2007) and Corielli et al. (2010), who also used the 
weighted average method to estimate the loan spread. 
To distinguish between loans with domestic and foreign FI certification, a dummy variable 
is created, that equals one (1) if domestic FIs certify and zero (0) otherwise. A domestic lead 
arranger is an FI owned by shareholders resident in the project country, without a foreign 
owner or controlling parent (Nini, 2004). Hence, banks domiciled in a project country but are 
subsidiaries of foreign banks/parents, are classified as a foreign bank in the study. 
ProjectWare provides detailed information on the names of all the FIs in a PF deal and their 
roles. For each deal, the study checks the origin of the lead arranger using the global ultimate 
ownership field (GUO) in Zephyr and Bank Scope. When one or more lead arrangers are 
domestic without a foreign owner or controlling parent, it is assigned the value one or zero 
otherwise. Zephyr is also used to track FIs that have merged or were acquired during the 
sample period. If this is the case, it is only the ownership status at the time the loan is made 
that it used.  
Other loan microeconomic variables include tranche amount, tranche maturity, tranche 
guarantees, where the tranche has an explicit political risk guarantee; tranche refinance, 
where the deals are to finance an on-going project and currency risk: deals structured in 
currencies other than that of the project country. The study also included additional dummies 
to account for the tranche loan types, such as secured, short term, credit facilities, EXIM and 
term loans. To account for industrial, regional and yearly differences, the chapter created 
industrial, regional and yearly dummies for each of the years captured in the sample period.  
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Similar to Nini (2004) the study measures sovereign credit risk using Institutional Investor 
magazine country credit score. The scores are compiled by interviewing leading economists 
from leading investment banks globally, to ascertain their outlook on sovereign credit risk. 
These responses are then compiled into scores ranging from 1-100, with a higher score 
indicating improved sovereign credit risk outlook. The scores are released biannually in 
March and September of every year. This variable is preferred to other sovereign credit risk 
measures because of its periodic and futuristic nature. The other macroeconomic variable, 
Private Credit to GDP, is a measure of the level of financial development in the model. The 
variable is included to account for the impact of financial development on domestic FI 
certification. Data on private credit by deposit money bank and other FI to GDP measured in 
US constant and obtained from World Bank Financial Development and Financial Structure 
Dataset first developed by Beck et al. (2000) and Cihak et al. (2012). A list of all the 
variables and their description is provided in Appendix 1. 
3.5 Empirical Results 
This section reports the main results of this chapter. It begins with the univariate analysis 
of the loan sample. This is followed by summary distribution of the loan sample based on 
industry, geography and country income classification. Next, the empirical results from the 
regression analysis are reported. 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
3.5.1.1 Comparison of Loan Tranches by Type of Arrangers 
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample data of syndicated PF deals 
structured in emerging markets for the period 1998 to 2011. Panel A reports the summary 
statistics for the full sample while Panel B and C reports that of deals with domestic and 
foreign FI certification respectively. 
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Results for the full sample in panel A show that on average, PF deals are priced 216 bps 
above the base rate with a maximum spread of 2,284 bps. The mean loan spread in Panel B 
and C are also similar to that of the full sample. However, the standard deviation indicates 
that there is more variation in the loan spread for deals with certification by domestic FI 
(232.7bps) compared to those with certification by foreign FI (144.1 bps). 
Table 3.1: Univariate analysis of loan tranches by type of arrangers 
1998-2011 
Loan 
Tranches 
(Number) 
Total 
($USM) 
Percent Mean 
St. 
Dev Min Max 
Panel A: Full Sample        
Tranche spread (bps) 1270 215.5 185.9 1 2284 
Tranche Maturity (months) 1270 
  
122 75 0.96 393 
Tranche Amount ($USM) 1270 306,360 100 241.2 403.6 0.32 6787 
II Credit Risk (0-100%) 1262 
  
57.8 14.8 4.3 87.1 
Private Credit to GDP (%) 1252 
  
61 43.6 8.1 159.6 
Panel B: With Domestic FI Certification 
Tranche spread (bps) 526 
  
214.9 232.7 10 2284 
Tranche Maturity (months) 518 
  
147.9 82.4 2.4 393 
Tranche Amount ($USM) 526 158,301 52% 301 538 0.32 6,788 
II Credit Risk (0-100%) 522 
  
65.8 12.1 18.3 87.1 
Private Credit to GDP (%) 525 
  
85.2 48.3 9.4 159.6 
Panel C: Without Domestic FI Certification 
Tranche spread (bps) 744 
  
215.9 144.1 1 1150 
Tranche Maturity (months) 734 
  
103.8 63.7 10 300 
Tranche Amount ($USM) 744 148,058 48% 199 263.4 1.3 2,186 
II Credit Risk (0-100%) 730 
  
52.1 13.8 4.3 87.1 
Private Credit to GDP (%) 737 
  
43.6 29.5 8.1 159.6 
Table 3.1 shows the univariate analysis for syndicated project finance deals for the sample period. Panel A, 
reports the results for the full sample of deals in our study while panel B and C shows the result for deals with 
domestic FI certification and those without domestic FI certification respectively. Sample period: 1997-2011. 
 
Tranche Maturity for the full sample is 122 months (10.2 years) with the longest contract 
spanning 393 months (32.8 years). For deals with domestic FI certification, the average 
maturity is 147 months relative to 103 months in Panel B and C respectively, with the 
maximum value indicating that deals with domestic FI certification have longer tenor 
(maturity). Tranche Amount for the full sample of syndicated PF deals shows an average of 
$241.2 million. This amount can, however, be as low as $320,000 rising up $6.8 billion. For 
the subsample of deals with domestic FI certification, the average tranche amount is slightly 
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higher at $304 million, while those without domestic FI certification are lower at $199 
million. The total value of deals with domestic certification is $158 billion (52%), compared 
to $148 billion for deals without domestic certification. Interestingly, deals with certification 
by foreign FIs have more tranches (744) compared to those with domestic certification (526). 
These results confirm the capital-intensive nature of PF transactions. It also shows that 
foreign FI use more tranches in financing deals in these markets.  
II Credit Risk, a measure of sovereign credit risk, reports an average score of 57.8 for the 
full sample with a standard deviation of 14.8. The sample deals with domestic FI certification 
show an average rating of 65.8 compared to 52.1 for deals without domestic bank 
certification. Generally, the results indicate that countries with better sovereign credit risk 
outlook are more likely to have domestic FIs certification. The average value of Private 
Capital to GDP for the full sample is 61 with a maximum value of 159.6. Deals with 
certification by domestic FI’s record higher ratio of 85.2 while those with foreign lead 
arranger’s certification record an average of 43.6. This result indicates the importance of 
financial development in promoting domestic FI certification. 
3.5.1.2 Summary Statistics of Loan Tranches 
Table 3.2 shows the summary description of loan tranches based on Industrial, Regional 
and Income classifications over the sample period. Panel A reports the results for industrial 
classifications, while panel B reports that of regional classifications. Finally, panel C reports 
the results for income classifications. Column 1 shows the individual count of deals, while 
column 2 reports the dollar value of the tranche value in (US$ million). The mean and 
standard deviation of the tranche amount is reported in column 3 and 4. For each panel, we 
report the statistics for loans certification by domestic FIs and that of foreign lenders. 
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Panel A of Table 3.2 indicates that infrastructure projects (transportation and water and 
sewage) receive more domestic FI certification, while extractive projects (mining, oil & gas, 
power & utility) and telecommunication receive lower domestic FI certification. The tranche 
value on these projects also shows that deals with domestic FI certification are usually larger 
compared to those without them. The results further indicate that foreign FIs usually 
participate in infrastructure projects together with domestic FIs in these markets. 
Governments in emerging markets economies have interests in infrastructure projects and are 
likely to promote more domestic FI especially they state-owned. A recent case is Brazil and 
India, where the government through state-owned FIs have undertaken numerous 
infrastructure projects over the past decades (Izaguirre, 2011). These government supports 
are likely to have driven the results reported here. In panel B, the study finds that domestic FI 
certification is more likely in regions like Indian Subcontinents, Middle East and South-East 
Asia. Tranche values show that domestic FI certification is associated with high-value deals 
compared to those without domestic FI certification. Interestingly, these regions include 
countries like India, South Korea, China and Saudi Arabia and UAE who in the last decade 
have increased their infrastructure investments (Ansar, 2012). On the other hand, Latin 
America, Western & Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa have relatively low domestic 
FIs certification. Lastly, panel C shows that income classification offers some explanation on 
domestic FIs certification. While 293 deals had domestic certification from high-income 
countries, only 82 deals had domestic certification in lower-income countries. However, the 
sample did not record any domestic FI certification for lower-income countries. Regarding 
mean value, the study finds that deals with domestic FI certification are higher compared to 
those without domestic FI certification.  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of project finance loan tranches based on industrial, regional and income classification of PF deals from 1998 to 2011 
 
  No of Tranches Value Mean St. Dev 
  With domestic FI Without 
domestic FI 
With domestic FI Without 
domestic FI 
With domestic 
FI 
Without 
domestic FI 
With domestic FI Without 
domestic FI 
Panel A: Industrial Classification 
Industrial and Commercial  35 29 14,200.90 3,310.50 405.7 114.2 680.6 189.2 
Mining  10 38 2,065.90 8,381.60 206.6 220.6 222.3 207.2 
Oil and Gas  46 159 26,830.50 52,933.80 583.3 332.9 819.4 365.3 
Petrochemical  55 51 23,598.60 15,502.10 429.1 304 356.2 363.8 
Power and Utility 98 198 31,292.40 34,535.40 319.3 174.4 429.3 210.4 
Telecommunication  37 138 10,711 20,046 289.5 145.3 482 198 
Transportation 134 61 43,321.50 7,315.30 322.6 119.9 663.7 137.4 
Water and Sewage 32 28 1,062.10 1,453.30 33.19 51.9 29.4 47.1 
Others 79 43 5,308.60 4,592.10 67.2 106.8 164 108.2 
Total  526 745 158391.5 148,070.10 
    
Panel B: Regional Classification 
Indian Subcontinent  53 23 18,313.20 3,924.50 345.5 170.6 509.1 183.9 
Latin America  44 255 12,798.60 46,918.90 290.9 184 301.3 185.5 
Middle East  103 115 62,503.50 29,698 606.8 258.2 708.8 283.5 
South-East Asia 259 137 43,606.20 18,202.40 168.4 132.9 484.9 160.1 
Sub-Saharan African 7 45 1,464.30 9,833.90 209.2 218.5 135 357.4 
Western Europe 20 50 8,672 5,070.90 433.6 101.4 429.8 119.5 
Eastern Europe 40 119 10,943.80 34,410.10 273.6 289.2 333.6 417.3 
Total  526 744 158301.6 148,058.70 
    
Panel C: Income Classification 
High Income  293 223 90970.3 63,658.30 310.5 285.5 521 361.9 
Upper Middle Income  151 358 42684.2 56,112.20 282.7 156.7 621.9 173.3 
 
Lower Middle Income  
82 157 24647 26,114.50 300.6 217.7 425.1 217.7 
Lower Income  - 6 - 2,173.70 - 362.3 - 585.3 
Total  526 744 158301.5 148,058.70 
    
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of syndicated project finance tranches based on the Industrial, regional and income classifications of the project tranche amount. For each of the classifications, we compute number of 
tranches, deal value, mean and standard deviation for deals with and without domestic FI certification. Panel A reports the result for industrial classification while panel B reports that of regional classification. Finally, 
panel C reports the result for income classification. Sample period: 1997 - 2011. 
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3.5.1.3 Distribution of Loans Tranches 
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of PF loan tranche value based on industrial, regional and 
income classification of project countries for the period 1998 to 2011. Panel A, shows that oil 
& gas, power & utility and petrochemical projects accounts for more than half (60%) of all 
project in the sample. Regarding deal size, these projects together with transportation account 
for the highest mean values. This result indicates that a high proportion of these deals are 
energy related. Infrastructure related projects like transportation and telecommunication 
account for 16% and 10% respectively. However, infrastructure projects in water & sewage 
and others accounted for less than 5% of total project value. The regional distribution of the 
loan sample shows that most of the projects are located in South-East Asia, Middle East and 
Latin America accounting for 69% of total project value. This result is followed by projects 
in Eastern Europe (15%) while projects in Indian Subcontinent, Western Europe and Sub 
Saharan Africa account for 11% of total value of PF deals. Finally, the income classification 
shows a polarisation of deals in high-income countries, accounting for 50% in deal values. 
This result is followed by Upper Middle and Lower Middle-Income countries, which account 
for 32% and 17% respectively. Low-income countries formed only 1% of the total project 
value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  57 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of syndicated project finance deals based on industrial regional and geographical classifications  
 
Tranches Value (US$M) St. Dev Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Panel A: Industrial Category Projects 
Industrial and Commercial  64 17511.4 6% 273.6 536 2.8 2,800 
Mining  48 10,447.5 3% 217.7 208 10 950 
Oil & Gas  205 79,764.3 26% 389.1 512.3 2.6 3,600 
Petrochemical  106 39,100.7 13% 368.9 363.9 15 2,000 
Power & Utility 296 65,827.9 21% 222.4 307.9 1.3 2,672 
Telecommunication  175 30,757 10% 175.8 287.1 3.9 2,451 
Transportation 195 50,546.8 16% 259.2 562.8 1.3 6,788 
Water and Sewage 60 2,515.5 1% 41.9 39.5 1.6 154 
Others 122 9,900.7 3% 81.2 147.5 0.32 1,314 
Total  1271 306,371.8 100% 
    
Panel B: Regional Classification 
Indian Subcontinent  76 22,237.7 7% 292.6 442.9 10.3 2672 
Latin America  299 59,717.5 19% 199.7 209.5 2.6 1314.4 
Middle East  218 92,201.5 30% 422.9 555.7 1.3 3600 
South-East Asia 396 61,808.6 20% 156.1 403.3 0.32 6787.8 
Sub-Saharan African 52 11,298 4% 217.3 335.2 14.9 1785 
Western Europe 70 13,742 4% 196.3 289.6 4.8 1639.3 
Eastern Europe 159 45,353 15% 285.2 396.9 1.3 2185.5 
Total  1270 306,358 100% 
    
Panel C: Income Classification  
High Income  516 154,628.5 50% 299.7 458.8 0.32 3600 
Upper Middle Income  509 98,796.4 32% 194.1 372.1 1.3 6787.8 
Lower Middle Income  239 50,761.6 17% 212.4 310.9 4.8 2672 
Lower Income  6 2,173.7 1% 362.3 585.3 80 1550 
Total  1270 306,360.2 100% 
    
Table 3.3 shows a breakdown of our sample based on industrial, regional and income classification. Panel A shows the results based on 
Industrial classification of projects while Panel B classify the sample based on geographic regions. In panel C, classification is based on Income 
level of project country. Sample period: 1997-2011. 
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3.5.2 Determinants of Certification by Domestic Financial Institutions 
Table 3.4 reports the coefficients of the determinant of domestic FI certification using the 
endogenous switching regression model. Model 1 reports result for loan characteristics, 
country credit risk and financial development. Model 2 add interaction term of sovereign credit 
risk (II Credit Risk) and year dummies to the variables in Model 1, while Models 3, 4 and 5 
adds loan types, industry and regional dummies respectively.22  
The results show domestic FIs certification is likely when the loan tranches have longer 
maturities. The estimated coefficients on Tranche Maturity are positive and statistically 
significant in Models 1, 3 and 4. This finding adds to the notion in the syndicated lending 
literature that domestic bank certification is required when the loan maturity is longer (Nini, 
2004). Similarly, Tranche Amount is positive and statistically significant in Model 1, 2, 3 and 
4, suggesting that domestic FI certification is likely for larger project. Tranche Guarantee is 
negatively related to domestic FI certification and statistically significant at the 10% level 
across all the models. These results mean that deals structured with political risk guarantees 
are less likely to have certification by domestic FIs. This finding potentially suggests that 
domestic FI certification is more likely when political risk guarantees are not in place. 
Tranche Currency is negatively related to certification by domestic FIs and significant at the 
1% level across all the models. The coefficients suggest that deals structured in foreign 
currencies are less likely to receive certification from domestic FIs. With currency fluctuation 
common in emerging markets, the negative relationship observed suggests that domestic FI 
reduce their exposure to foreign currencies deals to guard against future fluctuation. Further, 
EXIM Loans are significant in all the three models at the 5% significant level. The 
coefficients for Short-Term loans and Credit Facilities are also positively associated with 
                                    
22 The coefficient on the unreported coefficients (that is, interaction term of II Credit Risk and year dummies, 
industrial dummies and regional dummies) are provided in Appendix 1.2.  
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certification by domestic FIs. However, these coefficients are insignificant. The coefficients 
on industrial and regional dummies (reported in Appendix 1.2) are positively related to 
domestic FI certification but statistically insignificant across all the five models.  
The measure of sovereign credit risk, II Credit Risk, is positively related to domestic FI 
certification in all the five models. These results show that countries with better sovereign 
credit risks are likely to have domestic FI certification. However, these results are 
insignificant in all models except Model 2 and 3. The interaction term of II Credit Risk and 
year dummies yield some variations in sovereign credit risk over the sample period. The 
estimated coefficients (in Appendix 1.2) show that for most years, sovereign credit risk 
remains positively related to domestic FI certification. The estimated coefficients for the loan 
type dummies show that domestic FI certification is less likely when loan is secured or a term 
loan. Finally, Private Credit to GDP, included in the regressions to instrument for the 
endogeneity of domestic FI certification, shows a positive relationship with domestic FI 
certification. The results show positive relationship between financial development and 
certification by domestic lead arrangers. The results are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. This result is weaker than that of Nini (2004) who also found a positive and significant 
relationship between domestic bank certification and financial development for syndicated 
loans in emerging markets.  
Overall, the results identify loan maturity, currency risk and EXIM facilities as the main 
determinants of certification by domestic FIs. Aside these, most variables in the model are 
statistically insignificant. These results are somewhat similar to those obtained by Nini 
(2004) who also examined domestic bank participation in emerging market economies. 23 
                                    
23 To check for potential multicolinearity, a correlation analysis of the key variables is carried out and reported 
in Appendix 1.3. The results indicate that multicolinearity is less likely to bias the estimated results in Table 3.4, 
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Table 3.4: Determinants of certification by domestic financial institutions 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant -2.575 *** -2.072** -2.265*** -2.188*** -1.293* 
 
(0.868) (0.682) (0.628) (0.604) (0.606) 
Tranche Maturity 0.227 *** 0.167 0.199* 0.165* 0.075 
 
(0.079) (0.109) (0.091) (0.099) (0.099) 
Tranche Amount 0.115* 0.105** 0.097* 0.096* 0.090 
 
(0.064) (0.045) (0.052) (0.051) (0.057) 
Tranche Guarantee -0.386* -0.439** -0.521** -0.523** -0.652** 
 
(0.208) (0.219) (0.245) (0.218) (0.234) 
Tranche Refinance 0.210 0.178 0.139 0.147 0.122 
 
(0.121) (0.123) (0.123) (0.129) (0.129) 
II Credit Risk 0.014 0.016** 0.014* 0.011 0.012 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Tranche Currency -1.265*** -1.306*** -1.250*** -1.178*** -1.097*** 
 
(0.158) (0.151) (0.163) (0.165) (0.207) 
Private Credit/GDP 0.246** 0.158 0.181 0.199 0.038 
 
(0.094) (0.161) (0.124) (0.146) (0.205) 
Loan Type dummies: 
     
Secured  
  
-0.249 -0.292 -0.213 
   
(0.280) (0.267) (0.269) 
Short Term  
 
0.145 0.19 0.0873 
   
(0.220) (0.213) (0.226) 
Credit Facility 
  
0.008 -0.017 0.012 
   
(0.287) (0.282) (0.265) 
Term Loan 
  
-0.011 0.018 -0.030 
   
(0.201) (0.192) (0.185) 
EXIM loans 
  
-1.385** -1.327** -1.553** 
   
(0.501) (0.484) (0.525) 
II Credit Risk 
* Yearly Dummies 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industrial Dummies 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Regional Dummies No No No No Yes 
No of Observations 1228 1228 1228 1228 1228 
Notes: This table reports the results of the determinants of certification by domestic FI using an endogenous switching regression model. 
Model 1 includes microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants. Model 2 adds the interaction term II Credit Risk multiplied by yearly 
dummies. Models 3-5 control for loan type, industrial and regional dummies. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
3.5.3 Determinants of Loan Spread for Deals with and without Domestic FI 
Certification  
The results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are the loan spread determinants for deals with domestic 
and foreign FI certification respectively. The estimated coefficients on Tranche Currency in 
                                                                                                                
with the highest correlation coefficient of 0.645 (that is, the correlation coefficient on tranche currency and 
private credit to GDP) 
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Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are both negative, indicating an inverse relationship with the loan spread. 
The magnitude on the coefficients for Tranche Currency in Table 3.5 reduced from -0.78 to -
0.49 after controlling for industrial and regional characteristics. Similar reductions are 
observed for Tranche Currency in Table 3.6 with the coefficient reducing from -1.16 to -0.72 
across the models. However, coefficient is insignificant once the study controls for regional 
differences in Model 5. The magnitude of reduction is higher for loans without domestic FI 
certification (Table 3.6). These results contradict that of Corielli et al. (2010) who find 
currency risks to be an insignificant determinant of PF loan spread. The coefficients on II 
Credit Risks are negatively related to the loan spreads in Table 3.5 and 3.6. The magnitudes 
of the coefficients are also similar for the two samples. For deals with domestic FIs 
certification, the coefficients remain significant at the 1% across the models while, those 
without domestic FI certification are insignificant in model 5.  The results indicate that loan 
deals signed in countries with better sovereign credit risk are priced lower than those in 
countries with higher sovereign credit risk. Further, the study finds that these effects are 
stronger in deals with certification by domestic FIs. These results are similar to those of Nini 
(2004), who also report negative relationship between sovereign credit risk and loan spread. 
The unreported coefficients (see Appendix 1.4) from the interaction of II Credit and year 
dummies are positive and statistically significant for deals with certification by domestic FIs. 
On the other hand, these coefficients were only significant in 2008 for deals without the 
certification of domestic FIs.  The coefficient on EXIM loans shows a positive relationship 
with the loan spread in Table 3.5 and 3.6. This result means EXIM loans are priced higher 
irrespective of whether domestic FIs are involved or not. However, the coefficient on EXIM 
becomes insignificant after controlling for regional differences (Model 5). Credit Facilities 
and Term Loan estimates are positively related with loan spread, while Secured Loans and 
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Short-Term Loans shows a negative relationship. However, these estimates are not 
significant.  
The coefficients on industrial dummies (reported in Appendix 1.4), indicate that loan 
spread is relatively higher for Transportation and Industrial & Commercial projects. While 
results for Transportation projects are significant across the sample, Industrial and 
Commercial projects are only significant for the sample without domestic FI certification. 
These results may indicate that foreign lenders reduce their exposure to Industrial and 
Commercial projects in emerging markets, where economic uncertainties are higher. In 
response, foreign lenders charge a higher risk premium for investing in these markets. 
Coefficients on the regional dummies in Appendix 1.4 show that deals in Latin America and 
South East Asia are positively related to loan spread and significant at 5% and 10% levels. 
Finally, the covariance of the error terms measures whether FI certification in the two 
samples are beneficial compared to the average population. For deals with domestic bank 
certification, the error term of covariance with certification equation ranges between 0.46 and 
0.58, while deals without domestic certification have a covariance ranging from 0.92 to 0.95. 
These estimates are, however, not significant indicating that deals with domestic FI 
certification are not necessarily better than the average population. 
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  Table 3.5: Loan spread results for deals with certification by domestic financial institutions  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 5.628*** 6.239*** 6.294*** 6.271*** 5.518*** 
 
(0.794) (0.499) (0.538) (0.529) (0.526) 
Tranche Maturity -0.011 -0.022 -0.075 -0.092 -0.065 
 
(0.071) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.050) 
Tranche Amount -0.021 -0.035 -0.043 -0.057* -0.038 
 
(0.034) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
Tranche Guarantee -0.3 -0.209 -0.136 -0.101 -0.066 
 
(0.360) (0.332) (0.316) (0.274) (0.252) 
Refinance 0.113 0.073 0.051 0.016 -0.031 
 
(0.138) (0.125) (0.121) (0.114) (0.112) 
Tranche Currency -0.780** -0.726*** -0.672*** -0.595*** -0.496** 
 
(0.296) (0.172) (0.161) (0.147) (0.152) 
II Credit Risk 
-0.007 -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -
0.023*** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Secured  
  
-0.151 -0.203 -0.229 
 
  
(0.239) (0.243) (0.253) 
Short-Term  
 
0.028 -0.028 -0.019 
 
  
(0.192) (0.185) (0.192) 
Credit Facility 
  
0.143 0.061 0.11 
 
  
(0.269) (0.282) (0.282) 
Term Loan 
  
0.264 0.252 0.204 
 
  
(0.182) (0.184) (0.197) 
EXIM 
  
1.078*** 0.885** 0.029 
 
  
(0.306) (0.310) (0.395) 
II Credit Risk * Yearly Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industrial Dummies 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Regional Dummies 
No No No No Yes 
Error Term Covariance 
 
0.54 
 
0.52 
 
0.46 
 
0.46 
 
0.58 
Number of Observations 1228 1228 1228 1228 1228 
Notes: This table reports the loan spread equation of the endogenous switching regression model for deals with domestic FI certification. 
Model 1 includes microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants. Model 2 adds the interaction term II CR multiplied by yearly 
dummies. Models 3-5 control for loan type, industrial and regional dummies. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  
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Table 3.6: Loan spread regression for deals without certification by domestic financial institutions 
Notes: This table reports the loan spread equation of the endogenous switching regression model for deals without domestic FI certification. 
Model 1 includes microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants. Model 2 adds the interaction term II CR multiplied by yearly dummies. 
Models 3-5 control for loan type, industrial and regional dummies. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
3.5.4 Impact of Certification by Domestic Financial Institutions  
The coefficients in Model 5 of Table 3.5 and 3.6 are used to construct conditional and 
counterfactual loan spreads for loan tranches arranged by foreign arrangers using equation 
(3.8) and (3.9). The conditional and counterfactual loan spreads are converted from their 
natural logarithm forms to basis points using the exponential function. The conditional loan 
spread for loans without domestic FI certification is the expected loan spread given that these 
loans actually had no domestic FI certifying them [eq. (3.8)]. The counterfactual loan spread 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 6.038*** 6.632*** 6.793*** 6.625*** 6.092*** 
 
(0.36) (0.38) (0.348) (0.403) (0.444) 
Tranche Maturity 0.092 0.065 0.048 0.021 0.040 
 
(0.061) (0.053) -0.047 -0.049 -0.05 
Tranche Amount 0.005 -0.028 -0.035 -0.034 -0.028 
 
(0.065) (0.041) (0.047) (0.044) (0.051) 
Tranche Guarantee -0.206 -0.15 -0.135 -0.17 -0.152 
 
(0.12) (0.111) (0.111) (0.114) (0.109) 
Refinance 0.265* 0.213* 0.184 0.133 0.116 
 
(0.105) (0.104) (0.099) (0.096) (0.09) 
Tranche Currency -1.161* -0.999* -0.900* -0.837* -0.716 
 
(0.571) (0.457) (0.393) (0.377) (0.458) 
II Credit Risk 0.002 -0.017* -0.018** -0.021*** -0.020*** 
 
(0.01) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Secured 
  
-0.032 -0.055 -0.068 
 
  
(0.178) (0.176) (0.170) 
Short Term  
 
-0.355 -0.332 -0.204 
 
  
(0.185) (0.193) (0.203) 
Credit Facility 
  
-0.245 -0.224 -0.0991 
 
  
(0.191) (0.194) (0.186) 
Term Loan 
  
-0.057 -0.0342 -0.037 
 
  
(0.152) (0.151) (0.152) 
EXIM 
  
-1.467*** -1.488*** -1.385*** 
 
  
(0.263) (0.265) (0.289) 
II Credit Risk* Yearly 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industrial Dummies 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Regional Dummies No No No No Yes 
Error Term Covariance 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.9 0.92 
Number of Observations 1228 1228 1228 1228 1228 
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for deals without domestic FI certification is the expected loan spread conditional that these 
loans have had domestic FI certification [eq. (3.9)]. The spread impact is computed as the 
difference between these two expected loan spreads (conditional less counterfactual). In 
Table 3.7 the conditional loan spread is subtracted from the counterfactual for interpretational 
convenience so that impact is measured as a negative value if domestic FI certification 
reduces expected loan spread. Table 3.7 also reports the median, 25th and 75th percentile of 
the spread impact. The ‘Percentage Impact’ is the basis point spread impact divided the 
conditional loan spread. The results in Table 3.7 are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Panel A reports the spread impact by industry classifications while panel B is based on 
geographical classification. Panel C is based on income classification.  
The mean basis point spread impact for the full sample of loans without domestic FI 
certification is - 47 bps with 75th percentile impact of -61 bps. This result means that, for 
deals without domestic FI certification, the spread is 47 bps lower compared to those without 
domestic FI certification. This finding supports the first hypothesis, which states that 
certification by domestic FIs can be valuable in reducing asymmetric information, which in 
turn reduces spread. Panel A also reports the spread impact result for industrial 
classifications. The results show that Water and Sewage projects have the highest spread 
impact of -91 bps with median impact of -53 bps. The 75th percentile is also -68 bps.  This is 
followed by projects in Mining, Oil and Gas, and Power and Utility sector. The sectors that 
receive the lowest impact include Transportation, Petrochemical and Commercial projects. 
Overall, the negative result confirms the widespread effect of domestic FI certification in all 
the industrial classification. It shows that domestic FI certification affects deals in all industry 
categories. These results confirm the second hypothesis that the impact of domestic FI 
certification varies across industry due to differential risks and cash flow characteristics. 
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Table 3.6: Impact of domestic financial institution certification 
 
Basis Point Impact Percentage Impact 
Mean 25th Pctl Median  75th Pctl Mean  Median 
Total Sample -47 -20 -33 -61 0 -42 
Panel A: By Industry 
Industry and Commercial -23 -5 3 -37 -4 -33 
Mining -79 -69 -68 -111 -69 -91 
Oil and Gas -67 -25 -56 -97 -78 -108 
Petrochemical -28 -21 -26 -9 -42 -9 
Power and Utility -61 -21 -60 -91 -71 -80 
Telecommunication -56 -42 -52 -53 -66 -44 
Transportation -21 -20 -12 -5 -13 -4 
Water and Sewage -91 -43 -53 -68 -83 -65 
Panel B: By Geography 
Eastern Europe -43 -27 -52 -49 -62 -86 
Indian Subcontinent -143 -106 -128 -200 -209 -229 
Latin America -87 -39 -96 -111 -73 -91 
Middle East -31 -17 -31 -29 -51 -62 
South East Asia -50 -18 -36 -49 -62 -48 
Sub Saharan Africa -73 -75 -76 -78 -81 -88 
Western Europe -76 -42 -67 -96 -120 -102 
Panel C: By Income Classification  
High Income -45 -24 -32 -37 -65 -52 
Upper Middle Income -48 -33 -42 -60 -49 -48 
Lower Middle Income -113 -84 -104 -146 -131 -132 
Notes: The table reports the basis point spread impact and the percentage spread impact for our sample of syndicated project finance deals. 
Column 1 reports the mean impact, which is the difference between the counterfactual and the conditional loan spread together with 25th, 
median and 75th percentile values. Column 5 and 6 reports the mean and median percentage impact, which is the mean spread impact 
divided by conditional loan spread 
The geographical distribution of spread impact in Panel B shows that Indian subcontinent, 
composed of India and Pakistan have the largest impact reporting a mean spread impact of -
143 bps with a 75th percentile impact of -200 bps. This region experienced a higher 
proportion of domestic FI certification compared to other regions in the sample from Table 
3.2 and 3.3. In India for instance, the number of government-owned banks is over 50% of the 
banking sector (Izaguirre, 2011) and could have accounted for the observed differences. This 
is followed Latin America, Western Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa with spread impacts of -
87 bps, -76 bps and 73 bps respectively. However, these regions have a lower domestic FI 
certification from Table 3 and 4. The lowest spread impact of -43 bps and -31 bps is observed 
in Eastern Europe and Middle East respectively. These regions saw many domestic FI 
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certification especially in Middle East where sovereign wealth funds dominate this market. 
The results confirm the third hypothesis which state that due to differences in economic 
characteristics across regional groups, domestic FI certification are likely to be different. 
Panel C reports the spread impact results based on income classification of the project 
countries. For High-Income countries, the spread impact is -45 bps with a median of -32 bps. 
The percentage spread impact for the mean and median values are 65% and 52% 
respectively. For upper-middle-income countries, the reported spread impact is slightly 
higher at -48 bps with a median of -42 bps. However, lower-income countries report a higher 
spread impact of -113 bps with a median value of -104. The percentile values show that the 
lowest impact is -84 bps and the highest impact of -146. However, the study did not report 
the results for low-income countries because there was no domestic FI certification from our 
sample. Overall, the result shows that lower income countries benefit more than high-income 
countries from the certification of domestic FIs. This result is not surprising given that lower-
income countries have higher asymmetric information and uncertainties compared to high-
income countries. A domestic FIs certification can be seen as a good signal of project quality 
and viability. Finally, the result confirms the fourth hypothesis, which states that income 
classification of project countries is likely to influence the impact of domestic FI on loan 
spread. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the impact of domestic FI certification on emerging and frontier 
market PF loans.  The results show that certification by domestic FIs are less likely when 
there is political risk guarantee included as part of the deal. Deals signed in currency other 
than the project country are also less likely to receive certification from domestic FIs. 
However, domestic FIs certification is more likely in countries with lower country risk. 
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Second, the chapter finds that EXIM loan, transportation, industry and commercial projects, 
and projects located in Latin America and South East Asia region have higher loan spread on 
average.  
The results for the main hypothesis and its corollaries confirm the importance of domestic 
FIs in these markets. Specifically, the study finds that (i) domestic FIs certification reduces 
the loan spread by 47 bps on average, (ii) the impact of domestic FI certification is higher in 
sectors like Water & Sewage, Oil and Gas, Power and Mining, (iii) the impact of spread is 
higher in Indian subcontinent and Latin America, and (iv) the impact of spread is higher in 
low income countries.  
These results provide important policy directions for market participants in PF and 
international finance. In an environment where asymmetric information is pervasive, lenders 
can use of domestic or home-grown institutions to overcome deficiencies. This in turn, 
enables an appropriate pricing of financial contracts. For borrowers and sponsors, the 
inclusion of domestic FIs provide and economic gain – reduction in the spread. Further, the 
results provide support to on-going efforts on financial system reforms in these markets. A 
well development financial system does not only increase access to finance but reduces the 
cost of doing so.  
The findings also provide scopes for future research and improvements. First, the study 
relies on loan spread as a measure of cost of borrowing, leaving out tranche arranging fee, an 
equally important cost component. This treatment is mainly due to the unavailability of data 
on loan fees. With access to data that captures complete information on loan spread and fees, 
future research explore how domestic FI certification impacts both spread and arranging fee. 
Another possible direction for future research is to measure domestic FI certification by the 
proportion of loans they contribute. In the present study, the author only tracked the inclusion 
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of domestic FI using a dummy variable. This is because Dealogic Projectware only provide 
details on the total loan and not that of the lead arranger. Future research with lead arrangers’ 
share of loan can improve on the existing findings.  
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Chapter 4 Sponsor Counterparties and PF Loan Outcomes 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In project finance (PF) the sponsoring firm(s) that commission the project is often shielded 
from project risks by limited liability. Typically, the projects are set up as bankruptcy-remote 
separate companies with the sponsors holding the equity stake in the new venture. The 
providers of debt finance to the project, not the sponsor, therefore carry future liabilities that 
arise from the project. It is therefore perhaps surprising that the sponsor often complicates 
this separation by becoming a counterparty to some of the NFCs agreed when the project is 
established (Gatti, 2013). For instance, the sponsor may be the primary or sole purchaser of 
the output, the sole supplier of raw material to the project company or the general contractor 
among others.  
Sponsors involvement as contractual counterparties can make risk management more 
effective by reducing cash flow volatility and agency problem. It can also better align the 
interest of sponsors to that of the lenders (Corielli et al., 2010). On the other hand, it can 
increase the likelihood of conflict of interest between sponsors and lenders. These conflicts 
arise because sponsor counterparties have control over the key variables that affect cash 
flows. This, in turn, can induce opportunistic renegotiation of construction or supply 
contracts. For instance, sponsor counterparties anticipating lower equity return on their 
investment may compensate themselves in other ways such as high-cost construction 
contracts if they are construction contractors or providing O&M services (Yescombe, 2014). 
Only a few studies have empirically examined these conflicts of interest in the context of 
PF. Studies by Dailami and Hauswald (2007) and Bonetti et al. (2010) provide evidence of a 
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positive relationship between sponsors’ creditworthiness and the loan spread based on case 
studies of specific projects in which sponsors are involved as counterparties to the relevant 
project contracts. Further, Corielli et al. (2010) examine how NFCs and sponsor involvement 
as contractual counterparties affect the spread and leverage ratio offered on PF loans. Using a 
sample of 1093 PF loan tranches and a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator to control for 
the simultaneous determination of the spread and leverage ratio, they find that lenders charge 
higher spread when the sponsors are involved as counterparties to project contracts. 
The present chapter build on the work of Corielli et al. (2010) and examines the causal 
effect of sponsors involvement as counterparties on the loan spread and leverage ratio.24 In 
line with previous studies, the chapter hypothesise that NFCs reduce the volatility of project 
cash flows and result in lenders charging a lower spread while increasing debt capital. Also, 
the involvement of the sponsors as contractual counterparties to the project company make 
risk management effective by lowering the interest rate and increasing the debt capital 
provided by lenders. Further, the chapter examines whether these impacts are stronger for 
sponsor counterparties with a verifiable credit rating or not.  
The chapter tested these hypotheses using a sample of 5,871 PF loan tranches worth 
approximately $1.2 trillion and signed between January 1997 and March 2013. Data on PF 
loans and sponsors from Dealogic Projectware is merged with corporate credit ratings 
information from Thomson Reuters Eikon for the study. 
The main contribution of the current study is that it treats the decision to use NFCs as 
potentially endogenous to the loan outcomes. Blanche-Brude and Strange (2007) note that 
lender are heavily involved in the PF deals design phase and may require the use of certain 
types of contracts such as fixed-price construction contracts as a mechanism to reduce agency 
                                    
24 Leverage ratio is the proportion of project debt divided by total project amount, where project size is debt plus 
equity.  
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costs and manage project risks among others. In addition, Corielli et al. (2010) recognize that 
sponsors choose contractual structure anticipating how lender would react to it regarding loan 
pricing, which adds an element of endogeneity to the negotiation process. This chapter 
addresses this potential endogeneity by conducting a pseudo-experiment using propensity 
score matching (PSM) technique to match observable pre-contract characteristics across loan 
tranches with and without NFCs. Thus, for every loan tranche with NFCs, there is a 
comparable loan tranche with similar propensity score for which there are no NFCs. The 
difference in the loan spread and leverage ratio between these two comparable tranches 
provide an estimate of the impact of NFCs on loan outcomes. The study is also the first to 
examine the effect of credit-rated PF sponsor on the spread and leverage ratios. Existing 
studies have ignored the dual role of sponsors as shareholder and counterparty to the SPV. 
However, this dual role typically transforms PF transactions from non-recourse financing to 
limited recourse (Yescombe, 2014). 25  Thus, the study provides new evidence on the 
difference between non-recourse and limited recourse loans and how project sponsors 
influence this relationship. 
The findings suggest that the use of NFCs reduce both spread and leverage ratio on PF 
loans. Further there is a greater reduction in spread and leverage ratio if sponsors are 
involved as project counterparties and/or credit rated. Disaggregated results based on a 
country level of development indicate that these reductions are driven mainly by loans signed 
in emerging and developing countries. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides institutional 
background and related literature on PF lending. Section 4.3 presents the testable hypotheses, 
                                    
25 Limited-recourse loan agreements allow for some form of compensation (indemnity) from the project 
company and sponsors in the event of project failure or difficulty. On the other hand, non-recourse loan 
agreements provide lenders no compensations from project company and sponsors in the event of project failure 
(Hainz and Kleimeier, 2008; Gardener and Wright, 2011). 
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while section 4.4 details the data and econometric procedure used. Section 4.5 reports the 
empirical findings and section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2. Institutional Background of Project Finance and Related Literature 
4.2.1 The Structure of PF Loans 
PF is the financing of a single-purpose capital asset through a new legally distinct project 
company with equity from sponsoring firm(s) and non-recourse debt from lenders (Esty et al., 
2014). It usually commences with the formation of a project company (also known SPV) that 
is solely responsible undertaking the new venture (Yescombe 2014). The project company 
initially assumes all project risks, and to manage them, signs a set of contracts (also referred 
to as NFCs) with various project counterparties.  
Formally, NFCs are contracts that generate cash inflows or outflows that affect the 
unlevered free cash flow of the proposed venture (Corielli et al., 2010; Gatti, 2013). These 
contracts cover various risks related to the construction of new project physical infrastructure, 
raw material supply, O&M and sale of outputs. A number of these contracts exist, with the 
essential ones being the construction, EPC, O&M, Supply and the off-take agreements. A 
well-structured NFCs ensures there is (i) separation of project cash flows from the sponsors 
main businesses, (Esty, 2003), (ii) allocation of project risks into managed and unmanaged 
risk and the subsequent transfer of manageable risks to counterparties best suited to manage 
them (Dailami and Hauswald, 2007; Brealey, Cooper and Habib, 1996), and (iii) increase 
cash flows verifiability and reduction in agency problem associated with free cash flow 
(Subramanian and Tung, 2016). Carefully designed thus, NFCs convey credible signal about 
project quality to lenders and assure them that there would be sufficient revenue to meet debt 
service obligations. 
The set of NFCs and other relevant project documents are then submitted to lenders to 
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secure debt financing for the project (Yescombe, 2014). Lenders typically require assurance 
from the project company regarding project completion schedule, potential cost overruns.  
Lenders also ascertain whether the project can generate sufficient cash flow to repay loan and 
interest charge, even when there are significant disruptions due to political instability or force 
majeure (Finnerty, 2013). If successful, lenders will typically provide the project company 
with debt financing on a limited or non-recourse basis.26 
A number of studies have examined sponsors’ motive for separate incorporation of new 
ventures through PF as opposed to financing them on their balance sheet.  Shah and Thakor 
(1987) argue that PF is preferred if project risks are high. This preference is because the 
value of high-risk projects is maximized if they are incorporated separately. Empirical 
evidence however suggests that PF is common in industries with low cash flow volatility.27 
Separate incorporation of PF ventures also curb agency costs arising from managerial 
discretionary use of free cash flow. PF require capital injection at the construction phase after 
which free cash flow is generated once operational. Through various contractual agreements, 
lenders are thus able to ring-fence project cash flow from sponsors’ primary business.  
Further, PF ventures are highly levered with the majority of free cash flow allocated to debt 
servicing. PF also reduces the possibility of leverage-induced underinvestment that might 
occur if the debt were issued directly from the sponsor’s balance sheet (John and John, 
1991). Further, it allows sponsors to avoid contamination risk, that is, a situation in where 
                                    
26 Project finance loans are often structured as limited or non-recourse finance, which insulate the project 
sponsors from any future liability from the project (Hainz and Kleimeier, 2006). The common form of lending 
for PF is through the syndicated loan market (Gatti 2012), where a group of banks form a syndicate to lend to a 
single borrower (project company). These syndicate banks are often represented by a lead bank who undertakes 
due diligence, develop the contractual terms and monitor the project company on behalf of the participating 
(syndicate) banks. Empirical examinations of PF lead arrangers in PF by Gatti et al. (2013) provide evidence on 
positive economic benefit when lead arrangers are prestigious.  
27Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) compares PF loans with non-PF loans and find that PF loans are more likely 
to be used in asset tangible industries. The loan spread on PF loan deals are also relatively lower than non-
project finance loans. Also Brealey et al (1996) argues that the dominant use of PF in asset tangible industries 
means that in the event of bankruptcy, the assets of the project can easily be converted to repay creditors.  
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default of the new project also leads to a default of already existing sponsor’s assets (Gatti 
2013).  
4.2.2 PF Sponsors Involvement as NFCs Counterparties 
In PF, any funding raised by the project company is reliant on the project characteristics 
rather than sponsors creditworthiness. From the sponsors’ standpoint, any funding raised by 
the project company is off-balance sheets. 28  Thus, there is limited impact on their 
creditworthiness, ratings and ability to raise additional capital in the future (Bonetti et al., 
2010).29 
Notwithstanding the legal and operational distinction between sponsors and the project 
company, there are plausible reasons why one would expect sponsors to exert influence on 
PF loan outcomes. First, sponsors are responsible for incorporating the project company and 
act as its shareholders. They also negotiate together with the project company, the financing 
package for the project. Further, lenders consider sponsors knowledge and experience in the 
project sector, equity commitment, potential return on equity and the financial when taking 
decisions with regards to how much to lend to the project company (Finnerty, 2013 ch.7, 
Yescombe, 2014, ch.3). Most importantly, sponsors act as counterparties to some of the 
project contracts (Gatti, 2013). However, only a few studies have examined this interlocking 
relationship between sponsors and project companies in PF. Studies by Dailami and 
Hauswald (2007) and Bonetti et al. (2010) examine specific projects (case studies) where the 
sponsors are key project counterparties to the NFCs. Using econometric techniques that relate 
projects debts (bonds) to credit spread of sponsors debt instruments, their findings reveal a 
significant positive relationship between key sponsor counterparties’ creditworthiness and the 
                                    
28 Off-balance sheet transactions occur when a borrower can keep away assets and/or liabilities from its 
statement of financial position.  
29 Gatti (2013) and Dailami and Hauswald (2007) provide situations where PF deal cannot be treated as off-
balance sheet. This is usually the case when the sponsor is the only counterparty to a key contract. 
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spread on PF loans.  Byoun et al. (2013) in a study of over 2,500 PF loans find that sponsors 
use less leverage if off-take agreements (NFCs) are in place due to the latter’s risk-reducing 
effects. Corielli et al. (2010) investigate the effect of NFCs and sponsor counterparties on PF 
loan spread and leverage ratios using a sample of 1,093 loan tranches, signed between 1998 
and 2003 and worth $195 million. They find that lenders use the NFCs as a mechanism to 
reduce agency cost and project risk. However, their results also reveal that lenders are less 
willing to (i) reduce loan spread on tranches; (ii) provide more debt to the project company; if 
the sponsors are counterparties to key contracts. Corielli et al. (2010) explain that where the 
tendency for conflict of interest is high, lenders would not appreciate sponsors involvement 
as counterparties. These conflicts of interest can take the form of opportunistic renegotiation 
or future increase in contract cost and price.  
4.3 Testable hypotheses 
The institutional background discussed in the previous section provides a basis for 
developing the following hypothesis. 
The first and second hypotheses states that 
Hypothesis 1: Loans with NFCs on average have a lower spread compared to those without 
NFCs. 
Hypothesis 2: Loans with NFCs on average have a higher leverage ratio compared to those 
without NFCs. 
As discussed earlier in Section 4.2, lenders often rely on NFCs and other project contracts 
when deciding how much financing to extend to the project company. This is because NFCs 
provide lenders mechanisms to ring-fence project cash flows from being utilized at the 
discretion of sponsors (Finnerty 2013; Yescombe, 2014). Also, the use of NFCs increase the 
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verifiability of the project cash flow and provide certainty on how specific project risks 
would be managed: reduction in cash flow volatility (Corielli et al., 2010; Subramanian and 
Tung, 2016). Therefore, NFCs provide an effective mechanism for managing project risks 
and lenders react by charging lower spreads. 
In addition to reducing the spread on loans, lenders may be willing to commit more capital 
to the project when NFCs are in place. One potential benefit from reduced cash flow 
volatility and limited scope for managerial discretion is an increase in lenders willingness to 
increase their exposure on these transactions. Byoun et al. (2013) however, offer an 
alternative view on this notion. The authors note that sponsors tend to use more NFCs when 
they wish to control cash flow and only seek more debt when they wish to transfer project 
risks to lenders, who are diversified through their portfolio of loans on the syndicated loan 
market. Thus, only sponsors willing to diversify their risks in the project apportion a higher 
stake to lenders.  
The third and fourth hypotheses state that 
Hypothesis 3: Loans with sponsors involved as NFC counterparties are likely have lower 
spread because of better alignment of sponsors’ interest to that of the project outcomes. 
Hypothesis 4: Loans with sponsors involved as NFC counterparties are likely to have higher 
leverage ratio because of better alignment of sponsors’ interest to project outcomes. 
The study also examines whether sponsors participation as counterparties to NFCs 
influence lenders decision on the spread and debt capital offered. Support for these 
hypotheses comes from Corielli et al. (2010) who argue risk management through NFCs are 
more effective when sponsoring firms also act as contractual counterparties to the project 
company. On the other hand, sponsors involvement as contractual counterparties can increase 
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the likely of conflict of interest between sponsors and lenders. This conflict of interest may 
arise from the possible opportunistic renegotiation by the supplier-sponsor in the case of 
supply agreement or a future increase in contract costs and price by the contractor-sponsor in 
the case in the case of construction contract. 
The fifth and sixth hypotheses state that; 
Hypothesis 5: Loans with credit-rated sponsor counterparties have lower spread lenders due 
to reduction in asymmetric information.  
Hypothesis 6: Loans with credit-rated sponsor counterparties have higher leverage ratio due 
to reduced asymmetric information.  
The last set of hypotheses examine whether credit rating of sponsors provide a valuable 
medium for lenders to estimate the extent of credit risks on these contracts. Credit ratings are 
generally seen as indication of firms’ credit risks quality (Hilscher and Wilson, 2016). In line 
with this, the chapter examine whether the availability of rating information for sponsors 
affects the hypotheses espoused earlier. Empirical supports for these hypotheses come from 
Dailami and Hauswald (2007) and Bonetti et al. (2010) who demonstrate that project bonds 
spreads are affected by sponsor creditworthiness. 
4.4 Methodology  
4.4.1 Data and Identification Strategy 
 Data for the present study comes from Dealogic Projectware, which covers over 14,000 
PF loan deals signed between 1998 and 2013. Dealogic Projectware provides information on 
loan characteristics, sponsors, contracts, and counterparties as well as an accompanying PDF 
file, that provides useful descriptive details on the loan agreement. The study focuses on loan 
tranches that have data on loan spread and leverage ratio. This reduced the sample to only 
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6,122 loan tranches. Subsequently, the study filters out tranches that are cancelled reducing 
the final sample to 5,872 loan tranches (2,669 deals). Next a dummy variable is created that 
equals 1 if the loan tranche has NFCs in place and 0 otherwise. To construct this, I track the 
contract field in Projectware, for each loan tranche and code it as one (1) if it has NFC in 
place. I also construct a dummy that equals one (1) when sponsors sign the contracts and 0 
otherwise. To construct this, I matched the NFC field that of sponsors, and where the names 
are the same, I label these tranches as having sponsor counterparties. Further check for 
subsidiary of sponsors is done by verifying the sponsor’s detail on Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
Where subsidiaries instead of sponsors sign these contracts, they are interpreted to have 
sponsors certification and thus treated as having being sponsored by the sponsors. 
Subsequently, tranches with sponsor counterparty risk are matched with the credit ratings 
data obtained from Thompson Reuters Eikon.30  Where these ratings are available, the 
tranches take the value one (1) and zero (0) otherwise. The main drawback of this approach is 
the text format of data on sponsors. Thus, relevant data on these variables are retrieved and 
processed manually. Appendix 2.1 describes the main variables used in the study.  
4.4.2 Estimation Procedure 
4.4.2.1 Motivation for Propensity Score Matching 
A potential limitation of estimating the baseline regressions with ordinary least square 
(OLS) is that NFCs and sponsors’ involvement can be endogenous to the spreads and 
leverage ratios. Thus, the decision to use such contracts or have sponsors as counterparties, 
are to a large extent, influenced by both the project company (i.e. the borrower) and the 
lenders. This, in turn, is likely to be related to observed characteristics such as project size, 
                                    
30 A main drawback is the text format of data on sponsors and credit rating. Therefore, relevant data on 
these variables have to be retrieved and processed manually. 
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industry, and country credit risk among others.31  
An ideal set-up would be to conduct experiment with pairs of loan contracts that are 
identical in all characteristics except the use of NFCs. The observed difference across the two 
groups would then be an estimate of the impact of NFCs on loan outcomes. Even though this 
is not feasible, propensity score matching (PSM) enables a pseudo-experiment to be 
conducted whereby loan contracts with and without NFCs can be compared to identify and 
quantify the effect of NFCs on loan outcomes based on matching observable pre-treatment 
characteristics across the two loan types. Specifically, PSM allows the comparison of loan 
tranches with NFCs to comparable twin loans tranches that do not have these features using a 
probit model.32 The basic idea behind PSM is to pair each participant in a treatment group to 
non-participants in the control group who are similar in all relevant pretreatment 
characteristics (for a detailed discussion on PSM see Appendix 2.2 and Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008).33 
The three treatments groups comprise (i) loan tranches with NFCs; (ii) loan tranches with 
sponsors participating as NFCs counterparties; and (iii) loan tranches with credit rated 
sponsor counterparties. The first treatment group allows for the estimate of the impact of 
NFCs on PF loans’ spreads and leverage ratios.  The second treatment group allows for the 
estimate of the impact of NFCs on these outcomes where the sponsors act as counterparties to 
the contracts. The third treatment group allows for the estimate of the impact of NFCs, where 
the sponsors counterparties are credit rated. The control group, loans tranches without NFCs, 
are matched with the treatment groups based on observable pre-contract characteristics, 
namely project size, project type/industry, loan type, country credit rating and a set of 
                                    
31 See Blanche-Brude and Strange (2007) and Corielli et al (2010) for discussion on the endogeneity of PF 
contracting process.  
32 PSMATCH2 in Stata is used to implement this procedure.  
33 Refer to Appendix 3 for details on propensity score matching estimation procedure. 
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dummies controlling for refinance loans and project located in advanced countries.34  
PSM has a two-stage structure. First is the estimate of the propensity scores. Then estimate 
of the differences in the outcome variable of interest between the two matched groups of 
similar propensity score. 
4.4.2.2 Estimating Propensity Scores and Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATET) 
The propensity score is estimated by specifying a probit regression with pre-contract 
observables as 
NFC = α + i CCRj + j INDi + j LOANTYPEi + β REFIN + β SIZE + β 
REGi + β ADV + εi                          (4.1) 
where the dependent variable NFC is a dummy variable that equals one (1) if the loan has (i) 
NFCs, (ii) NFCs and sponsor counterparties, and (iii) NFCs and credit-rated sponsor 
counterparties. Otherwise the value is zero (0). CCR is project country credit risk indicators 
based on S&P classifications (best grade, investment grade, speculative and poor grade), IND 
is industry indicators (commercial, electricity & energy, oil and gas, transportation, 
telecommunication and others), LOANTYPE is loan type indicators (short-term loans, secured 
loans, term loans), REFIN is a dummy that equals one if the loan is to refinance an existing 
project and zero otherwise, SIZE is project value in $US million,  REG is an indicator of 
project country regulatory environment,  ADV is a dummy that equals 1 if project is located 
                                    
34 In the propensity score regression set up, I exclude variables that are not observable prior to the loan contract 
stage. This is line with propensity score matching procedure’s assumption of conditional independence 
(unconfoundedness), that states that, given a set of observed covariates X, that are not affected by treatment, 
potential outcome Y are independent of the treatment assignment T (Khandker et al., 2010). This ensures that 
systematic differences in outcomes between treated and non-treated individuals with the same values for 
covariates are attributable to treatment T. In other words, it ensures that uptake of program is not influenced by 
the treatment process or any unobservable characteristics. Even though, conditional independence is a strong 
assumption and cannot be inherently tested it can credibly be invoked if there is a rich dataset on the observed 
characteristics that allow for adequate control of factors that affects program certification, as well as a deeper 
understanding of the institutional setting of the study (Cintina and Love, 2017).  
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in an advanced country (IMF classification) and zero otherwise.  
For each loan tranche in a treatment group, a comparable loan tranche without NFCs the 
closest propensity score is selected using the matching with techniques (with replacement and 
without replacement. To ensure common support across the loan sample any loan tranches in 
the treatment group with propensity scores larger than those in the control group is dropped.35 
Conversely, loan tranches in the control group that have propensity scores lower than the 
minimum score in the treatment group are dropped. Finally, the study calculated the average 
treatment on the treated (ATET) as the mean difference in outcomes over the common 
support, appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of the loan sample. This 
is specified as: 
 ATET = E [E{Y1i |Ti= 1, p (Xi)}- E{Y0i |Ti= 0, p (Xi)}|T=1]                                  (4.2) 
 where p(Xi)|Ti=1 is the propensity score given the observed characteristics conditional on 
loan tranches using NFCs; the outer expectation is over the distribution of (p(Xi)|Ti =1), Y1i 
and Y0i are potential outcomes in the two counterfactual situations of the treated and non-
treated groups, respectively.  
The reliability of PSM scores are based on the use of an adequate number of control 
variables and sampling of both treatment and control samples from the same experiment. The 
study used a number of pre-contract characteristics for the estimation of the propensity score. 
Further, the treatment and control groups from the same dataset - Dealogic Projectware. In 
the estimation of the propensity score, the study control for country differences, such as 
country rating and development level to ensure comparison is made over similar markets. 
                                    
35 A second assumption, common support, ensures that treatment units are similar to the control units in terms of 
observed characteristics by requiring that both groups have observations from similar propensity score 
distribution (Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999 cited in Khandker et al., 2010). Therefore, observations that 
fall outside the common support region would have to dropped for both treatment and control group, even 
though the former can lead to sampling bias and requires caution by the researcher.  
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4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Summary Statistics of Loan Variables 
Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics of the loan sample for the period January 1997 to 
March 2013. Panel A reports the results for the full sample, while Panel B and C report that 
of advanced and developing countries respectively. The average tranche spread for the full 
sample in Panel A is 201 basis points (bps) with standard deviation of 170 bps and a 
maximum value of 1,500 bps. There is greater variation in the loan spread due to the 
composition of countries in the sample. For advanced countries (Panel B), the average loan 
spread is 186 bps with a maximum value of 2284, while developing countries report a higher 
average loan spread of 237 (maximum of 1500). These results demonstrate the disparity in 
the pricing of PF loans across the sample countries. For instance, the maximum loan spread 
in observed in South Korea, while the lowest tranche spread is observed in Chile. The mean 
leverage ratio for the full sample is 0.88 with a standard deviation of 0.166. PF deals are 
usually highly levered with syndicated lending being the main source of loanable fund. The 
results are similar to those obtained in Byoun et al. (2013), Esty (2004) and Esty and 
Megginson (2002) and confirmed the highly levered nature of these transactions. Further, 
results in Panel B and C show that the leverage ratio is slightly higher for advanced countries 
relative to developing countries. The mean and maximum project size in the sample is $818.7 
million and $20 billion respectively, with a standard deviation of $1.5 billion. These results 
confirm the large-scale nature of these transactions. PF loans are mostly utilized for 
investments in infrastructure and capital-intensive industries like oil and gas, 
telecommunication and infrastructures. However, Panel B shows that in advanced countries, 
the mean project size is $751 million, which is lower than $958 million reported for 
developing countries. The largest project size of $20 billion is reported in advanced countries. 
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Tranche maturity in Panel A shows that average duration of these loans are 31 months (2.6 
years), with a standard deviation of 26 months. The maximum tranche maturity from the data 
is 798 months (66 years) confirming the long-term nature of these deals. Distribution of 
tranche maturity across advanced and developing countries in the sample are similar with 32 
and 30 months respectively. Similar results are obtained on the standard deviation and 
maximum values. Table 4.1 (Panel A) also shows that 44% of the loan tranches have NFCs in 
place with 20% having sponsor counterparties and only 12% have credit rated sponsors. 
Further, the results show that deals in advanced countries make up 63% of the total sample. 
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics of the main variables 
Variables % of total sample Mean Std. Dev Min Max Obs. 
Panel A: Total sample       
Tranche spread (bps)  201.379 158.447 0.075 1500 5594 
Leverage ratio  0.88 0.166 0.037 1 5871 
Project size (US$M)  818.787 1474.359 1.438 20,000 5871 
Tranche maturity (months)  31.508 26.326 0.24 798 5713 
Tranches with NFCs (% of total sample) 44%      
Tranches with NFCs in Advanced Countries (% of total sample) 63%      
Tranches with NFCs and sponsors as counterparties (% of total sample) 20%      
Tranches with NFCs and credit-rated sponsors as counterparties (% of total 
sample) 12%      
 
Panel B: By the Country's Level of Development      
 
Advanced Countries       
Tranche spread (bps)  186.46 151.073 0.079 2284 3787 
Leverage ratio  0.897 0.153 0.128 1 3971 
Project size (US$M)  751.828 1386.141 1.438 15175 3971 
Tranche maturity (months)  32.421 27.172 0.24 675 3852 
 
Developing Countries       
Tranche spread (bps)   237.244 198.425 0.075 1500 1807 
Leverage ratio  0.845 0.186 0.037 1 1901 
Project size (US$M)  958.731 1635.071 6 20000 1900 
Tranche maturity (months)  29.618 24.38 0.24 798 1861 
Sample period: 1998-2013       
  86 
4.5.2 Industrial Distribution of Loan Tranches 
Table 4.2 provides industrial distribution of the loan sample. The sample is dominated by 
deals in the electricity and power projects, which accounts for 1,803 loan tranches. Next is oil 
and gas with 1,228 projects. On the other hand, commercial projects have the least number of 
tranches (532), followed by telecommunication and other project category. These results are 
somewhat similar to those reported in Byoun et al. (2013) and Corielli et al. (2010).  
The number and percentage of tranches with NFCs in column 2 and 3 show that oil & gas 
and electricity & power projects have the highest number and percentage usage of NFCs in 
the sample. The percentages of NFCs used are 58% and 56% respectively. This is followed 
by other project category and transportation projects with 44% and 31% respectively. The 
least usage of NFC is recorded in commercial (26%) and telecommunication projects (19%) 
respectively. Overall these results show that when the outputs are more tangible and 
verifiable, as is the case with oil and gas and electricity projects, contracts can easily be 
written. On the other hand, where outputs are less tangible or storable, such as transportation 
and telecommunication, NFCs are less likely to be used (Yescombe, 2014).  
Electricity & power, and oil & gas industries also recorded the highest number of tranches 
with NFC sponsors counterparties, while telecommunication (15) and commercial projects 
(27) recorded the least number of sponsor counterparties on NFCs. With regards to credit 
rated sponsors, the results show higher number for electricity & power and oil and gas 
projects, while telecommunication and other infrastructure projects recorded the least credit 
rated sponsor counterparties.  
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Table 4.2 Industrial distribution of NFCs 
Industry No. of Tranches 
No. of tranches with 
NFCs 
% of Tranches with 
NFCs 
Sponsor 
Counterparty 
Rated 
Sponsor 
Leverage 
ratio (%) 
Project size 
(US$M) 
Transportation 951 302 0.317 164 63 0.883 234,037 
Commercial 532 142 0.266 27 23 0.884 93,325 
Oil and Gas 1228 718 0.584 208 143 0.845 304,980 
Electricity and 
Power 1803 1020 0.565 249 149 0.877 364,530 
Telecomm 584 116 0.198 15 6 0.902 175,533 
Others 755 330 0.437 160 49 0.919 83,513 
Total 5853 2628 0.449 823 433  1,255,918 
Sample period: 1998-2013. 
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Leverage ratios across the industries range between 0.84 and 0.91 indicating the highly 
levered nature of these projects. Telecommunication and other projects recorded the highest 
leverage ratio of 0.91 and 0.90 respectively, while oil & gas (0.84) and electricity & power 
(0.87) report the lowest leverage ratios. Finally, results for project size show that electricity & 
power ($3.6 billion), and oil and gas ($3 billion) are the largest in the sample, followed by 
transportation and telecommunication projects. The least industries regarding project size are 
commercial and other infrastructural projects. Overall the results show that electricity & 
power and oil & gas projects dominate the sample in terms of the number of deals and project 
size. 
4.5.3 Estimation Results 
In this section, the study investigates whether loans tranches with NFCs differ from those 
without them. The study first reports a univariate test of the loan samples without controlling 
for loan, industry and borrower country characteristics. Next ordinary least square regression 
results, controlling for the relevant project, loan and country characteristics. Then the study 
carry out propensity score matching procedure to obtain the treatment effect estimates.  
4.5.3.1 Univariate Test of Loan Sample  
The study investigates whether loan tranches with NFCs differ from those without NFCs 
by comparing loan variables across the sample in Table 4.3. In Panel A, the study reported 
the mean values on the loan variables for tranches with NFCs and those without NFCs. Panel 
B reports the results for the sample of loan tranches with sponsor counterparties and those 
without NFC, while Panel C reports the results for the sample with credit-rated sponsor 
counterparties. 
The results in Panel A. (Table 4.3) show that on average, loan tranches without NFCs have 
higher loan spreads relative to those with NFCs. T-test results also show that the mean 
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difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. The result possibly outlines the 
economic benefit of having NFCs due to its risk-reducing effect. Also, the mean difference in 
the leverage ratio for the two groups shows that tranches without NFCs have higher debt 
level on average and statistically significant at the 1% level. This is in line with the notion 
that without NFCs, lenders are willing to give more debt to pre-commit project company into 
higher debt repayment, which in turn, reduces the tendency of managerial discretion (Byoun 
et al. 2013). Project sizes for loan tranches without NFCs are lower compared to those with 
NFCs and statistically significant at the 1% level. The tranche maturity is also lower in the 
sample of loan tranches without NFCs and significant at the 1% level. 
Panel B compares mean difference for loan tranches NFC with sponsor counterparties to 
those without NFCs. The results are similar to those obtained in Panel A. The result on 
tranche spread for loans with sponsor counterparties is 7 bps lower in Panel B compared to 
tranches with NFCs in Panel A. Similarly, the mean difference for leverage ratio is 7% lower 
than that of Panel A. The difference in project size ($32million) and tranche maturity (5 
months) is also higher in Panel B relative to Panel A. These results demonstrate that tranches 
with sponsor counterparties have more favorable loan terms.  
Panel C shows the results on the mean difference between loans without NFC and those 
with credit-rated sponsor counterparties. These results are similar to those obtained in Panel 
A and B. Generally, these results provide evidence that loan tranches with NFCs, sponsor 
counterparties and credit rated sponsor counterparties enjoy significantly better pricing and 
non-pricing loan terms when compared to those without the contract in place.  
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Table 4.3: Univariate analysis of loan tranches 
Panel A: No NFCs vs. NFCs No NFC (dummy=0) NFC (dummy=1) T-statistics 
 (A) (B) (A)-(B) 
 
Tranche spread (bps) 208.912 195.369 2.973*** 
Leverage ratio 0.902 0.853 11.35*** 
Project size (US$M) 728.214 929.865 -5.224*** 
Tranche maturity (months) 27.473 36.477 -13.044*** 
    
Panel B: No NFCs vs. Sponsors Counterparty No NFC (dummy=0) Sponsors Counterparty (dummy=1) T-statistics 
 (A) (B) (A)-(B) 
Tranche spread (bps) 208.912 188.725 2.80*** 
Leverage ratio 0.902 0.833 10.84*** 
Project size (US$M) 728.214 961.206 -4.492*** 
Tranche maturity (months) 27.473 41.516 -14.082*** 
    
Panel C: No NFCs vs. Credit-Rated Sponsors Counterparty   
 No NFC (dummy=0) 
Credit-rated sponsors Counterparty 
(dummy=1) T-statistics 
 (A) (B) (A)-(B) 
Tranche spread (bps) 208.912 186.743 2.37** 
Leverage ratio 0.902 0.809 11.005*** 
Project size (US$M) 728.214 1213.57 -6.982*** 
Tranche maturity (months) 27.473 40.48 -10.051*** 
Panel A segregates the entire into No NFC (Dummy =0) and NFC's (dummy =1) tranches. The first and second columns report the mean values for the loan characteristic, while the third column reports the t-statistics 
of the difference in the column A and B. Panel B reports similar result but this time for loan tranches with NFC and sponsor counterparty. Finally, Panel C reports the result for tranches with credit-rated sponsor 
counterparty. The t-statistics are computed with equal variance. ***, **, and * is significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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However, the univariate analysis results does not consider the differences in the loan, 
project and country characteristics between loan tranches with NFCs and those without 
NFCs. It is possible that tranches with NFCs are fundamentally different in characteristics to 
those without NFCs. For example, the observed differences can be because only risky deals 
are structured using NFCs, while the less risky ones are structured without NFCs. Similarly, 
it can be argued that the intensity of use of NFCs are different across the industry. For 
instance, it is easier to write sales contract for electricity & power through power purchase 
agreements compared to a telecommunication or transportation project, where it is difficult to 
contract sales ex-ante (Yescombe, 2014).  
4.5.3.2 Multivariate Analysis  
In this section the study models loan spread and leverage ratio to depend on loan, industry 
and country characteristics. A linear regression model is specified as  
T_SPREAD = α + i CCRj + j INDi + j LOAN_TYPEi + β REFIN + βSIZE 
+ β REGi + β ADV + βMATi + β CURR + εi                             (4.3)
   
LEV = α + i CCRj + j INDi + j LOAN_TYPEi + β REFIN + β SIZE + β 
REGi + β ADV + βMATi + β CURR + εi                               (4.4) 
The dependent variable in equation 4.3, T_SPREAD, is the loan tranche spread over market 
base rate measured in bps. The dependent variable in equation 4.4, LEV, is the ratio project 
loan amount over the total project size. Two additional variable MAT (loan maturity) and 
CURR (a dummy that equals one if project is signed in currencies other than the project 
country, 0 otherwise), are added to the independent variables in equation 4.1 for model 
specification.36 
                                    
36 Refer to Appendix 2.1 for full definition of the variables used in the model. 
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The results from OLS estimate of equations 4.3 and 4.4 are reported in Table 4.4. Column 
1, 2, and 3 report the result for regression (4.3) (tranche spread) while Column 4, 5 and 6 
report the results for equation (4.4) (leverage ratio). Robust standards errors clustered at the 
deal level are used to correct for heteroskedasticity.  
Column 1, 2 and 3 of Table 4.4 show that NFC dummies have a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with the tranche spread. Column 1 of Table 5 shows that all things 
being equal, tranche spread on loans with NFCs are 18 bps lower compared to those without 
NFCs. This is also 5 bps higher than the results from the univariate analysis. The result is 
similar to those obtained in Corielli et al. (2010). Similarly, results in Column 2 show that 
tranches with sponsor counterparties are 23 bps lower than those without NFCs in place. This 
result is also 3 bps higher than those obtained in the univariate analysis. The results in 
Column 3 show that loans with credit rated sponsor counterparties are 35 bps lower. Overall, 
these results show that NFCs and sponsors involvement reduces the cost of borrowing 
between 20 and 35 bps. Short-term tranches and those with currency risks are negative and 
significantly related to the tranche spread. The remaining control variables are not 
statistically significant. Results on country rating dummies and project sector dummies are 
reported in Appendix 2.2. 
Results in column 4, 5 and 6 show that NFC dummies are negatively related to leverage ratio 
and significant at the 1% level. In Column 5, the results show that all things being equal, the 
leverage ratio for tranches with NFCs are 0.018% lower. The result is in line with Byoun et 
al. (2013) who examined the relationship between off-take contracts and leverage ratio in PF. 
These are also consistent with the findings of Corielli et al. (2010) who reported a negative 
association between NFCs and debt to equity ratio. Column 5 shows that tranches with 
sponsor counterparties are 0.035% lower compared to those without NFCs. Similarly, column 
6 also shows that tranches with credit-rated sponsor counterparties are 0.05% lower. Results 
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on country rating dummies and project sector dummies are reported in Appendix 2.3. With 
the control variables, the study finds that project size and refinance tranches are negatively 
related to the leverage ratio, while secured tranches, currency risk tranches, advanced country 
tranches are positively related to the leverage ratio. 
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Table 4.4: Regression of loan spread and leverage ratio on NFC dummy and control variables 
 Loan Spread Leverage Ratio 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
Constant 330.125*** 339.681*** 338.447*** 0.94*** 0.955*** 0.947*** 
 (13.620) (11.36) (9.16) (39.32) (34.3) (31.64) 
NFC dummy -17.535** - - -0.018*** - - 
 (-2.390) 
  (-2.72)   
NFCs with sponsor counterparty dummy - -22.784** - - -0.035*** - 
 
 (-2.120)   (-3.36)  
NFC with credit-rated sponsor dummy - - -35.46*** -  -0.04*** 
 
  (-2.61)   (-2.74) 
Log of project size -3.538 -3.745 -4.119 -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (-1.53) (-1.25) (-1.28) (-5.67) (-5.11) (-4.66) 
Final maturity (months) -0.194* -0.23** -0.241* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.92) (-1.97) (-1.94) (0.64) (-0.11) (-0.36) 
Refinance dummy -5.065 -7.954 -9.233 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.089*** 
 (-0.66) (-0.94) (-1.05) (13.29) (11.31) (10.89) 
Loan type dummy: short-term loans -21.326*** -23.724*** -21.77*** 0.011* 0.008 0.01 
 (-3.73) (-3.49) (-3.06) (1.81) (1.24) (1.29) 
Loan type dummy: secured loans 9.86 -4.985 -0.104 -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.041*** 
 (0.98) (0.37) (-0.01) (-3.66) (-3.16) (-3.18) 
Currency risk dummy -39.3*** -33.836*** -32.731*** 0.021** 0.026** 0.028** 
 (-3.71) (-2.59) (-2.41) (2.25) (2.24) (2.31) 
Regulatory environment -5.065 -1.469 3.300 0.015* 0.016* 0.011 
 (-0.66) (-0.15) (0.32) (1.85) (1.73) (1.21) 
Advanced country dummy -12.44 -17.35 -26.71 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.046*** 
 (-0.81) (-0.94) (-1.410) (2.640) (2.860) (3.10) 
Country rating dummies YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES Project sector dummies 
 
      
Number of observations 5093 3508 3177 5349 3681 3329 
R2  0.072 0.076 0.081 0.11 0.133 0.124 
Table 4.4 reports the regression estimates on loan spread and leverage ratio (t-statistics in parenthesis) using an OLS method with robust clustered standard errors. Model 1 is estimated with NFC dummy. Model 2 and 
3 are estimated with NFC with sponsor counterparty dummy and credit-rated sponsor counterparty dummies. Similarly, Model 4 5 and 6 are also estimated for leverage ratios as the dependent variable. ***, ** and * 
represents significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Results on country rating dummies and project sector dummies are reported in Appendix
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4.5.3.3 Estimate of Treatment Effect on the Treated 
As discussed in section 4.4.2.1, the decision by the project company to use NFCs is 
potentially endogenous to the loan outcomes. If this is true, both the univariate and regression 
results reported earlier are likely to be biased. In other words, these estimators would not 
account for the non-random distribution of NFCs across the sample. The chapter uses the 
propensity score matching estimator to generate the probability (propensity score) for each loan 
tranche having NFC to deal with this. These are then matched to loan tranche with and without 
NFCs using the nearest neighbour (NN) technique with and without replacement. To ensure the 
assumption of conditional independence (unconfoundedness) holds, the study selects as 
observables, variables that are known prior to the design of the PF deals. These pre-contract 
variables are used to generate propensity scores for each loan tranche. The matched sample is 
then used to calculate the average treatment effect on the treated as the difference in the tranche 
spread and leverage ratio between our treatment and control group. 
Table 4.5 shows the average treatment results for the full sample (Panel A) and the 
subsample of advanced countries (Panel B) and developing countries (Panel C). Column 1, 2 
and 3 show the results of the loan spread, while 4, 5 and 6 show that of the leverage ratio. From 
Panel A, the result indicate that tranche spread is at least 32 bps lower and statistically 
significant at the 1% level across Column 1 to 3. For loan tranches with sponsor counterparties, 
the magnitude of reduction in the tranche spread is slightly lower and ranges between 25 and 30 
bps. Further, results for credit-rated sponsor counterparties have the highest reduction on 
tranche spread, with coefficients between 34 and 48 bps.  These results are qualitatively similar 
to those obtained in our univariate and regression analysis, but higher with regards to the mean 
difference in the tranche spread. The reduction is plausible given that in multivariate analysis 
(4.5.3.2) there are no controls for potential endogeneity on sponsor involvement as 
counterparties. Thus, by matching the sample as opposed to assuming all loan tranches have 
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similar characteristics, the study obtains stronger effects for the use of NFCs. The results for 
matching with replacement are stronger with higher mean difference and t-statistics in most 
cases. Overall the results support Hypothesis 1, 3 and 5 that the use of NFCs reduce project 
risks and in turn reduce the spread lenders charge. The results are also in line with that of 
Corielli et al. (2010).  
Turning to the results for advanced countries in Panel B, the mean differences in tranche 
spreads are small and statistically insignificant. These results are expected. NFCs are risk-
mitigating instruments and likely to ameliorate institutional weakness, especially in developing 
countries. Given that these risks are relatively low in advanced economies, the effect of NFCs 
on loan spread is likely to be weaker, all things being equal. The mean difference for 
developing countries in Panel C, confirms the earlier notion of important risk factors that 
determine the use of NFCs. For developing countries, the higher mean difference in the tranche 
spread is observed across all groups. For loans tranches with NFCs, the mean difference ranges 
between 61 to 82 bps, almost twice the mean difference for the full sample, with, higher 
magnitudes for sponsor counterparties and credit rated sponsors in these (developing) countries. 
Kleimeier and Hainz (2012) and Subramanian and Tung (2016) show that PF is more likely in 
countries with higher political and legal/regulatory risk.  
The results, in column 4, 5 and 6 show the mean difference in leverage ratio for loan 
tranches. The full sample results in Panel A show that loan tranches with NFCs have a lower 
leverage ratio compared to those without NFCs. The difference in leverage ratio ranges 
between 0.008% and 0.016%. The results are significant at the 5% level for matching with 
replacement, while insignificant for matching without replacement. For sponsor counterparties, 
the difference in leverage ratio is 0.03 to 0.04 lower and significant at the 1% level for the 
matching with replacements (column 5 and 6). Further, tranches with credit-rated sponsor 
counterparties record lower leverage ratios between 0.016 and 0.31%. These results are 
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significant at the 5% and 10% level for matchings with replacement but insignificant for 
matching without replacement. The results for advanced countries in Panel B are broadly 
consistent with those observed in the tranche spread analysis in developed countries. Though 
reduction is recorded in the leverage ratio, they are statistically insignificant. This possibly 
indicates the lesser influence NFCs have on contracts in these countries. These results 
contradict hypothesis 2, 4 and 6. Though the study expected NFCs to induce more capital 
contribution from lenders, the findings indicate the opposite effect. As a result, the findings 
support Byoun et al. (2013) argument that NFCs are used when sponsors want to internalize the 
risks of the project. 
The results for developing countries in Panel C show a reduction in the leverage ratio across 
all the comparison groups with higher magnitudes and significance in most cases. For loans 
with NFCs, the leverage ratio is 0.05% lower for matching without replacement and significant 
at the 1% level. The results for matching with replacement also show a reduction in loan spread 
but they are not statistically significant. For loan tranches with sponsor counterparties, the 
leverage ratio is 0.07% to 0.1% lower and significant at the 1% level. Similarly, loan tranches 
with credit rated sponsor counterparty, the leverage ratio is 0.05 to 0.07% lower and at least 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.5: Average treatment on the treated for loan spread and leverage using propensity score matching 
 Loan spread Leverage ratio 
 NN (1) NN (5) NN (10) NN (1) NN (5) NN10) 
Panel A: Full sample       
Loan tranches with:        
NFCs vs. No NFCs -38.75 *** -31.61*** -31.686*** -0.008 -0.016** -0.015** 
 (-5.37) (--5.01) (-5.24) (-0.85) (-2.35) (-2.57) 
NFCs with sponsor counterparty vs. No NFCs -24.873*** -28.692*** -30.341*** -0.03 -0.032*** -0.041*** 
 (-2.71) (-3.18) (-3.49) (-2.61) (-3.91) (-5.12) 
NFCs with credit-rated sponsor counterparty vs. No NFCs -33.757** -47.605*** -44.907*** 
 
 
 
 
-0.016 -0.028** -0.031*** 
 (-2.08) -3.69 (-3.99) (-0.89) (-2.39) (-2.76) 
Panel B: Advanced Countries       
NFCs vs. No NFCs -1.196 -1.541 2.86 -0.013* -0.011* -0.008 
 (-0.12) (-0.24) (0.48) (-1.77) (-1.79) (-1.50) 
NFCs with sponsor counterparty vs. No NFCs -2.647 13.819 14.237 0.012 0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.22) (1.42) (1.49) -1.13 (-1.28) -1.24 
NFCs with credit-rated sponsor counterparty vs. No NFCs 1.28 -1.126 6.561 -0.008 0.003 0.007 
 (0.06) (-0.08) (0.52) (-0.47) 0.28 -0.65 
Panel C: Developing Countries       
NFCs vs. No NFCs -61.432** -81.897*** -64.145*** -0.055*** -0.018 -0.122 
 (-2.31) (-3.94) (-4.14) (-2.98) (-0.99) (-0.64) 
NFCs with sponsor counterparty vs. No NFCs -37.244* -78.297*** -77.438*** -0.097*** -0.07*** -0.071*** 
 (-1.62) (-4.29) (-3.9) (-3.82) (-3.08) (-3.34) 
 
NFCs with credit-rated sponsor counterparty vs. No NFCs -86.91*** -103.18*** -84.876*** -0.064* -0.067*** -0.057** 
 (-2.97) (-4.58) (-4.0) (-1.79) (-2.87) (-2.35) 
Table 4.5. reports the average treatment effect on the treated for the three treatment groups using propensity score matching. Column 1 reports the matching without replacement (NN (1)) and 
column 2 and 3 report matching with replacement with 5 (NN(5)) and 10 (NN(10)) nearest neighbours for the loan spread impact. Similarly column 4, 5 and 6 also report the results without 
replacement, replacement with 5 and 10 observations for the leverage ratio impact. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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4.5.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis of PSM Results - Test for Hidden Bias 
PSM estimators are not consistent estimators for treatment effect if unobserved factors that 
affect the assignment process are also related to the outcome (Bharath et al., 2009; Diprete and 
Gangl, 2004). If there are unobserved factors that simultaneously affect the assignment to the 
treatment and outcome variables, then hidden bias can arise and render matching estimators 
less robust (Rosenbaum (2002). For instance, if there are unobserved variables that affect 
simultaneously the decision to use NFCs and the loan outcomes, then PSM estimates are no 
longer robust. 
 To estimate the extent to which such selection on “unobservables” may bias the inferences 
about the effect of NFCs on loan outcomes, the study conducts the Rosenbaum bound 
sensitivity analysis outlined in Rosenbaum (2002). Specifically, Rosenbaum bound sensitivity 
analysis tests whether unobserved factors can alter inferences about treatment effect by 
estimating the extent to which unobserved variables alter the selection process resulting in the 
NFCs to undermine the implication of the matching analysis. Rosenbaum bound sensitivity 
analysis tests for potential hidden bias in PSM estimates by setting the level of hidden bias to a 
specific value Γ. This value (Γ) reflects the assumption about the endogeneity in treatment 
assignment regarding the odds ratio of differential treatment assignment due to unobserved 
covariates. At each level of Γ, a hypothetical p-critical value is computed. These p-critical 
values represent the bound on a significance level of treatment effect in the case of endogenous 
selection into treatment status.37 
This section reports the results of Rosenbaum bound sensitivity analysis for the propensity 
score estimates reported in the previous section (Section 4.5.3.3). The sensitivity analysis 
results on the loan spread are reported in Table 4.6, while that of the leverage ratio is reported 
                                    
37 Refer to Appendix 2.4 for details on Rosenbaum bound sensitivity analysis. 
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in Table 4.7. Γ is the likelihood ratio of hidden bias, and a value of one (1) indicates no hidden 
bias. The Wilcoxon signed rank test significance levels are reported for each value of Γ to 
determine the extent of hidden bias. 
Table 4.6 shows that robustness of loan spread estimate to hidden bias varies across the 
matching methods and the treatment groups. For tranches with NFCs, the results indicate that 
the Γ value at which conclusions of loan spread reduction are invalid is 1.3 in the case of 
NN(1), and 1.25 for both  NN(5) and NN(10). Turning to NFCs with sponsor counterparties, 
the level of hidden bias required to render the loan spread results less robust is between 1.2 and 
1.25 for NN (1). However, more robust estimates of hidden bias are reported for NN (5) 
(between 1.3 and 1.35) and NN (10) (1.4). Also, the result indicates that tranches with credit-
rated sponsors are the least robust to hidden bias. NN (5) and NN (10) values are less robust at 
Γ values of 1.2 compared NN(1). 
In Table 4.7 results of sensitivity analysis are reported for leverage ratio.38 First, these results 
show more robustness to hidden bias compared to those reported in Table 4.6 for loan spread. 
Tranches with NFCs are only prone to hidden bias if the likelihood ratio Γ is between 1.3 and 
1.45 with NN (1). For NN (5) and NN (10), these occur at Γ value of 1.6 and 1.65 respectively.  
Similarly, stronger results are reported for tranches with sponsors counterparties and credit 
rated. Hidden biases in these instances have to increase by a likelihood ratio of at least 1.7.39 
Overall, the results indicate that unobservable covariates may influence the results obtained 
on the impact of sponsors’ participation on loan spread. On the other hand, leverage ratio shows 
some robustness to hidden bias with a higher increase in likelihood ratio required to invalidate 
the PSM results. It is worth noting that, these coefficients do not necessarily confirm the 
                                    
38 Kumar rsen command in Stata is used in estimating the sensitivity analysis coefficients 
39 The Rosenbaum bound sensitivity analysis is also carried out for the sub-sample of advanced and developing 
countries. The unreported results demonstrate higher robustness to hidden bias for developing countries, but 
weaker in advanced countries. These results are available on request. 
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presence of hidden bias (unobserved covariates), but a ‘’worst-case scenario’’ test of the extent 
to which presence of hidden bias would affect inferences.  
Table 4.6: Rosenbaum bound sensitivity analysis results for loan spread 
 Loan spread     
 NN(1)  NN(5)  NN(10)  
 Γ Sig. level Γ Sig. level Γ 
Sig. 
level 
NFCs vs. No NFCs 1 0.99 1 0.99 1 0.99 
 1.05 0.99 1.05 0.99 1.05 0.99 
 1.1 0.99 1.1 0.99 1.1 0.99 
 1.15 0.99 1.15 0.99 1.15 0.99 
 1.2 0.99 1.2 0.98 1.2 0.93 
 1.25 0.99 1.25 0.89 1.25 0.74 
 1.3 0.94 1.3 0.68 1.3 0.46 
       
NFCs with sponsor counterparty vs. No NFCs 1 0.99 1 0.99 1 0.99 
 1.05 0.99 1.05 0.99 1.05 0.99 
 1.1 0.99 1.1 0.99 1.1 0.99 
 1.15 0.97 1.15 0.97 1.15 0.97 
 1.2 0.91 1.2 0.99 1.2 0.99 
 1.25 0.81 1.25 0.97 1.25 0.99 
 1.3 0.66 1.3 0.94 1.3 0.99 
 1.35 - 1.35 0.87 1.35 0.97 
 1.4 0.33 1.4 0.77 1.4 0.93 
       
       
NFCs with credit-rated sponsor counterparty vs. 
No NFCs - - 1 0.99 1 0.99 
 - - 1.05 0.98 1.05 0.99 
 - - 1.1 0.96 1.1 0.97 
 - - 1.15 0.92 1.15 0.94 
 - - 1.2 0.87 1.2 0.89 
 - - 1.25 0.79 1.25 0.74 
 - - 1.3 0.65 1.3 0.64 
 - - 1.35 0.58 1.35 0.52 
 - - 1.4 0.47 1.4 0.42 
Table 4.6 reports the Rosenbaum Bound sensitivity analysis result estimated. NN (1) NN(5) NN(10). Γ is the measure of hidden bias 
introduced into the results. Where Γ is set to 1, it is assumed that there is no unobservable effect. Sig level is the Wilcoxon signed rank test 
p-value significance level for the average treatment effect on the treated. NN (1) is 1 for 1 matching; NN (5) is matching with five (5) 
nearest neighbours and NN (10) represent matching with 10 nearest neighbours.  
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Table 4.7: Rosenbaum bound sensitivity analysis results for leverage ratio  
Leverage ratio       
  NN(1)  NN(5)  NN(10) 
 Γ Sig. level Γ Sig. level Γ Sig. level 
NFCs vs. No NFCs 1 0.99 1 1 1 1 
 1.15 0.99 1.05 1 1.05 1 
 1.3 0.95 1.1 1 1.1 1 
 1.45 0.77 1.15 1 1.15 1 
 1.2  1.2 1 1.2 1 
 1.25  1.25 0.99 1.25 0.99 
 1.3  1.3 0.99 1.3 0.99 
 1.35  1.35 0.99 1.35 0.99 
 1.4  1.4 0.99 1.4 0.99 
 1.45  1.45 0.99 1.45 0.99 
 1.5  1.5 0.99 1.5 0.99 
 1.55  1.55 0.98 1.55 0.96 
 1.6  1.6 0.92 1.6 0.86 
 1.65  1.65 0.79 1.65 0.67 
       
NFCs with sponsor counterparty vs. No NFCs 1 0.99 1 0.99 1 1 
 1.15 0.99 1.15 0.99 1.15 1 
 1.3 0.97 1.3 0.99 1.3 1 
 1.35 0.93 1.35 0.99 1.35 1 
 1.45 0.74 1.45 0.99 1.45 0.99 
 1.6 - 1.6 0.99 1.6 0.99 
 1.75 - 1.75 0.97 1.75 0.99 
 1.9 - 1.9 0.83 1.9 0.99 
 2.05 - 2.05 - 2.05 0.98 
 2.2 - 2.2 - 2.2 0.9 
 2.35 - 2.35 - 2.35 0.69 
       
NFCs with credit-rated sponsor counterparty vs. 
No NFCs 1 0.83 1 0.99 1 0.99 
 1.15 - 1.15 0.99 1.15 0.99 
 1.3 - 1.3 0.99 1.3 0.99 
 1.45 - 1.45 0.99 1.45 0.99 
 1.6 - 1.6 0.97 1.6 0.98 
 1.7 - 1.7 0.92 1.7 0.95 
 1.75 - 1.75 0.88 1.75 0.92 
 1.9 - 1.9 - 1.9 0.75 
 2.05 - 2.05 - 2.05 - 
 2.2 - 2.2 - 2.2 - 
 2.35 - 2.35 - 2.35 - 
Table 4.7 reports the Rosenbaum Bound sensitivity analysis result estimated. NN(1) NN(5) NN(10). Γ is the measure of hidden bias 
introduced into the results. Where Γ is set to 1, it is assumed that there is no unobservable effect Sig level is the Wilcoxon signed rank test p-
value significance levels for the average treatment effect on the treated. NN (1) is 1 for 1 matching; NN(5) is matching with five (5) nearest 
neighbours and NN(10) represent matching with 10 nearest neighbours. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
PF has increasingly been used as a vehicle for large-scale infrastructure and capital-
intensive projects. Its attractiveness is in part due to its ability to use contracting techniques 
(such as NFCs) to manage project projects. This, in turn, ensures there is separation of cash 
flow from sponsors business, allocation of risks to parties well suited to manage them and 
increase verifiability of managerial actions among others. However, an issue often 
overlooked is the potential costs and/ benefits of having sponsors as counterparties to these 
contracts (NFCs). Though sponsors involvement as counterparties can align their interest 
with that of project outcomes (and lenders), it also exposes project contracts to opportunistic 
behaviours by the sponsor (s).  
The chapter examines the potential benefits and costs, using a sample of almost 6,000 loan 
tranches signed between 1998 and 2013. After controlling for the potential endogeneity in the 
use of NFCs, the chapter finds that loan tranches with NFCs, sponsor counterparties and 
credit-rated sponsors have lower tranche spread and leverage ratios. Furthermore, the 
reduction in tranche spread and leverage ratio is stronger and significant for developing 
countries, but insignificant for advanced countries. These results are attributed to the 
difference in macroeconomic and investment risks in these countries. However, sensitivity 
analyses of the treatment effects on loan spread and leverage ratio indicate that results are 
likely to be biased by unobserved heterogeneity.  
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Chapter 5 How Political and Legal Institutions Shape the Terms 
of Project Finance Loans 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The funding of large-scale investments using project finance (PF) has grown over the last 
three decades. Data from Thomson Reuters’ Project Finance International database indicates 
that between 1994 and 2013, PF grew by a factor of ten from $41.3 billion to $415 billion in 
2013 (Esty et al. 2014). In 2016 and 2017 alone, approximately $267 billion and $229 billion 
deals were signed using this funding technique.  
Some factors are attributable for the growth of PF. First, governments have resorted to 
PF as az means to increase and diversify their infrastructure investments. As a result, there 
have been extensions of the technique to infrastructure projects like transportation, water and 
sewage, telecommunication, schools, hospitals, and prisons (Esty et al. 2014).40 Second, the 
peculiar features of PF make it suitable for countries with weak political and legal 
institutions. These features include separation of the project from sponsors, exhaustive due 
diligence, and risk management through contract counterparties. These features are argued to 
promote transparency and cash flow verifiability, which in turn, make it suitable for funding 
investments in countries with weak political and legal systems (Kingsley, 2009; Hainz and 
Kleimeier, 2012 and Subramanian and Tung, 2016).41 Third, PF promotes economic growth 
and help developing economies to reduce their infrastructure gap (Finnerty, 2013). Studies by 
Chan-Lau et al. (2016), for instance, show that increase in PF lending by one percentage 
point to GDP can lead to six to ten percentage point increase in real GDP growth per capita. 
                                    
40 Prior to the last three decades, PF was mainly used in resource-rich industrial projects like mining, pipelines, 
oil fields and power plants (Girardone and Snaith, 2011). 
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For developing countries, PF increase  GDP by 0.67 percentage point per annum (Kleimeier 
and Versteeg, 2010). 
Despite these burgeoning growth, little is known regarding the effect of country-level 
political and legal institutions on PF loan terms. Aside from Girardone and Snaith (2011), no 
other study has focused on the relationship between country-level political and legal 
institutions and PF loan terms. Thus there is limited knowledge on how PF contract terms 
differ under different political and legal regimes and whether they deliver value for money 
compared to other alternatives. Further, there is little evidence on whether PF loans are more 
sensitive to political risk factors or not. This lack of evidence is surprising, given its 
increasing popularity in the delivery of public infrastructure. Public infrastructures are prone 
to political and legal risks like creeping expropriation and regulatory changes because of 
asset specificity and hold-up costs, which raises some important contracting issues.  
This chapter fills the void by examining series of hypothesis. First, the chapter examines 
how political institutions affect loan spread and leverage ratio, after controlling for legal 
institutions. The hypothesis complements the work of Girardone and Snaith (2011) by 
analysing the role of legal institutions as well as the effect on an additional response variable, 
that is, leverage ratio. Second, the chapter examines whether political and legal institutions are 
substitutes or complements by analysing their interactions. The hypothesis extends the strand of 
the literature focusing on their interactions. Third, the chapter explores if project contracts 
(NFCs) have any influence on the relationship observed between political institutions and PF 
loan terms.42  
                                    
42 For instance, we do not know if the detailed due diligence, evaluation of project risk and subsequent transfer 
(management) to project counterparties are enough to compensate for weaker political and legal institutions. On 
the other hand, the exhaustive contractual process can make these projects costlier to offset, any benefit derived 
from detailed contracting process. 
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The chapter contributes to the PF literature in at least two ways. First, to the best of the 
author’s knowledge, the chapter is the first to examine how political and legal institutions 
simultaneously shape PF loans. An extensive body of work exists, linking country-level 
political and legal institutions to financial market development and economic growth. These 
studies demonstrate that improvement in political and legal institutions promote financial 
market development and the cost of financial intermediation. More recently, a strand of the 
literature has focused on the combined influences of both political and legal institutions on 
financial markets (Qi et al. 2010; Boubakri et al. 2014).43 These studies find that improvements 
in political institutions can substitute for weaker legal institutions. Like these studies, the 
chapter accounts for the interaction between these two institutions to determine their effect in 
the context of PF. Second, the chapter complements the work of Girardone and Snaith (2011). 
Their study is the only work, thus far, to have explicitly examined how political risk factors 
influence PF loan spread. They show that disaggregated measures of political risks, as oppose 
to aggregated measures, allow for identifying specific elements of political risks that affect loan 
pricing. In line with this, the chapter used a disaggregated measure of political risk: investment 
profile by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Investment profile measures the likelihood 
of the country’s political institutions to engage in expropriation, profit repatriation, and 
payment delays.44  
The chapter finds that political and legal institutions are substitutes. Improvements in 
political institutions lead to a decrease (increase) in loan spread (leverage ratio) for countries 
with weak legal institutions and governance. The chapter also finds that the impact of political 
                                    
43 Qi et al. (2010) test the effect of political and legal institutions on bond issues, while Boubakri et al. (2014) 
tests these for banks loans. However, in the context of PF two studies, Hainz & Kleimeier (2012) and 
Subramanian and Tung (2015) show that PF loans are more likely when political and legal institutions are weak. 
However, no studies have directly tested for the interaction of these two institutions on the loan terms. 
 
44 According to Hainz & Kleimeier (2012), investment profile directly linked to firm’s risk of an investment and 
therefore likely to affect PF loan terms. 
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institutions on loan spread reduces if there are NFCs in the PF deal. On the other hand, the 
impact on leverage ratio increases with NFCs. These results provide new evidence on how 
country-level institutions affect loan terms. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.3 reviews related literature on 
political and legal risks, capital flow, and PF. Section 5.4 presents the testable hypotheses, 
while section 5.5 details the research design for the study. Section 5.6 reports the descriptive 
statistics and the empirical results, while section 5.7 concludes. 
5.3 Related Literature  
5.3.1 Political Risks and the Flow of Capital  
The effect of political risks on capital inflow has been examined widely in the finance and 
economic literature. A number of these studies conclude that political risk factors like 
institutional uncertainties, corruption, nationalisation risks and weak contractual enforcement, 
impede inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Gastanaga et al., 1998; Brunetti and 
Weder, 1998 and Wei, (2000).  
Other studies have reported a positive relationship between political risks and FDI inflows. 
For instance, Henisz (2000) shows that foreign partners’ strategic partnerships, with domestic 
investors and political government, determine the extent to which political risks influence FDI 
inflow. Similarly, Durnev et al. (2014) find that political instability regarding change in 
government, promote majority stake FDI. Egger and Winner (2005) show that corrupt 
regimes are likely to attract FDI inflow because it allows investors to circumvent excessive 
regulations and administrative controls.  
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5.3.2 Political Risks and the Flow of Project Finance 
In the context of PF, Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) and Subramanian and Tung (2015) 
provide evidence of positive correlation between political risk factors and the likelihood to 
use PF. However, they attribute the relationship to the peculiar features of PF. They argue the 
separate incorporation of the new project through an SPV, ring-fencing of project cash flow 
from it sponsors and the involvement of development banks, among others, makes PF suitable 
for countries with weak political and legal systems. For instance, Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) 
compare PF loans to full-recourse corporate finance loans and show that where political risks 
are high PF lending are more preferable. Subramanian and Tung (2016) also came to a similar 
conclusion for legal institutions, after comparing PF loan to corporate finance loans. They 
find that countries with weak protection of outside investors use PF as a private response to 
these weaknesses. 
5.3.3 Political and Legal Risks Determinants of Loan Terms 
One of the earliest studies to examine the linkage between legal institutions and debt 
financing is Esty & Megginson (2003). The authors demonstrate that creditor right 
protections and improvement in legal risks positively affect debt ownership. Using a sample 
of 495 PF syndicated loans signed between 1986 and 2000 and worth approximately $151 
billion, the authors explore the effect of creditor rights on PF loan structures. They find that 
countries with weak (strong) creditor rights have concentrated (diffused) debt ownership 
structure. Specifically, countries with weak creditor rights have eight and a half (8.5) more 
banks in the loan syndicate, relative to loans signed in countries with stronger creditor 
protection. They argue their results support the notion that legal rather than portfolio 
diversification considerations, influence heterogeneity in syndicate structure across countries.  
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Using the same sample as Esty & Megginson (2003), Esty (2004) explores how financial 
and legal systems shape foreign banks behaviour in the syndicated loan market. The study 
relates the proportion of syndicate loan held by foreign banks to legal and institutional 
factors. The findings indicate that foreign banks share of loan increases with stronger creditor 
protection and improvements in legal systems. The study also finds that the share of foreign 
bank loans decreases with improvement in the financial development of the country.  
Recent works by Qian & Strahan (2007) and Qi et al. (2010) focus on how both political 
and legal institutions determine loan contract terms. Qian & Strahan (2007) is the first to 
provide a cross-country evidence on institutions and cost of financing. Using a sample of 43 
countries (excluding the US), the authors examine the effect of legal and institutional on loan 
terms. They find that stronger creditor right protection and legal enforcement is positively 
related to loan maturity, but negatively related to the loan spread. The authors note that 
creditor right protection laws provide certainty and clarity on financial contracts, which in 
turn, stimulate credit market growth and thus favourable loan terms. Qi et al. (2010), as a 
follow up to Qian & Strahan (2007) examine the effect of both political and legal risks on 
corporate bond yield and spread. The authors are the first to investigate the simultaneous 
effect of political and legal systems on bond yield and rating. Using loan samples from 39 
countries, they find that political and legal institutions are substitutes. They also show that 
increase in political rights lead to a reduction (increase) in the cost of debt (ratings), where 
the countries have weaker creditor rights. Further, they find that freedom of the press is a 
strong channel for reducing bond risks.  Similar works by Boubakri et al. (2014) Francis et al. 
(2014) also came to the same conclusion. Boubakri et al. (2014) explore how political and 
legal institutions affect firm’s cost of capital in 44 countries. They find that improvements in 
political rights lead to a reduction in the cost of equity. They also find that stronger political 
institutions can compensate (substitute) for weaker legal systems. Similarly, Francis et al. 
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(2014) examine the relationship between political uncertainty and the cost of capital on bank 
loans. The authors use data on 7,947 firms between 1990 and 2007 and measures political 
risk measures that capture individual firm exposure to political uncertainty. They find that 
firms with higher exposure to political uncertainty face higher cost of capital. They also show 
that these effects are lower for firms in relationship lending.  
5.3.4 Political and Legal Institutions Determinants of PF Contracts 
Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) demonstrate that non-recourse PF loans and the involvement 
of development banks in the loan syndicate help to mitigate political risks. Using a logit 
regression and data on 29 countries from 1996 to 2005 they show that PF is more likely to be 
used when countries with higher political and regulatory risks. They conclude that PF 
features like separate incorporation, high leverage and extensive use of contractual 
arrangements, and the certification of development banks reduce political risks. 
Subramanian and Tung (2016) also establish that PF provides a mechanism for mitigating 
the effect of weak legal protection of outside investors. The authors use the difference in 
difference regressions and data for 43 countries covering the period 1993 and 2007 to 
examine the causal relationship between weak investor protections and financing choice. 
They find, after controlling for country and project characteristics that PF is more likely in 
countries with weaker laws against insider stealing and weaker creditor rights in bankruptcy. 
Thus PF provides contractual and organisational substitutes for investor protection laws 
through the separate incorporation of the project and private enforcement of contracts 
through networks of project accounts that ensure lenders control of project cash flow.  
Sawant (2010) also demonstrate that the use of PF help to mitigate hold-up and country 
risk, especially in developing countries. The author developed a model that postulates that the 
use of PF as oppose to corporate financing for infrastructure help reduces political risks like 
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creeping expropriation from host government and hold-up cost from concentrated buyers and 
sellers. This is because high leverage and financing structure of PF improves the bargaining 
power of project stakeholders and serves as monitoring mechanism against creeping 
expropriation. Testing these predictions on 200 PF deals worth $159.97 billion, Sawant 
(2010) show that country-risks weakly predicts PF lending. Further, they find that PF lending 
help to mitigate the effect of hold-up from concentrated buyers and suppliers.  
Similarly, Byoun and Xu (2014) develop and tested a theoretical model, in which, they 
show that concession grants and offtake agreements benefit PF sponsors in the presence of 
political risks. The authors argue concession grants and offtake agreements provide 
incentives for private sponsors to undertake otherwise unacceptable projects and improve 
financial return while exposing private sponsors to political influence from the host 
government. They tested these predictions on a sample of PF data deals signed between 1990 
and 2012, and find that projects with higher political and financial risks are less likely to use 
government concessions and offtake agreements. They also find that project sponsors from 
countries with pervasive political risks are less likely to use government concessions grants in 
ordert to avoid political interference.  
Girardone and Snaith (2011) provide evidence that indicate that lower political risks 
reduce loan spread in PF. Using a cross-country regressions and PF loan data for the period 
1996 to 2003, the authors evaluate the extent to which various measures of political risk 
affects PF loan spread. Their findings reveal that the relationship between political risk 
measures and PF loan spread differs based on countries development, with stronger positive 
relationship observed in developing countries and weaker evidence in developed countries. 
They also find that the use of guarantees lowers the loan spread, which they attribute to  legal 
and institutional qualities.  
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5.4 Testable Hypotheses 
H1: Ceteris paribus, improvement in political institutions reduces loan spread and increases 
leverage ratio, even after controlling for legal and governance institutions. 
Some studies (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Roe, 2006; and Roe and Siegel, 2008) have 
demonstrate strong positive relationship between country-level institutions and financial 
development. These studies follow the seminal works of Laporta et al. (1997; 1998) who are 
the first to formalise the law and finance nexus in the economic literature. Laporta et al. 
(1997) show that a countries legal origin is positively related to the level of financial 
development. Studies building on Laporta et al. (1997) findings have shown that 
improvements in political institutions protect investors and creditors’ rights, which in turn, 
positively affect the availability of loanable funds and the cost of borrowing. Thus, 
improvements in political and legal institutions should increase lenders willingness to lower 
the spread on PF loans due to the reduced perception of risks. In addition, lenders should be 
willing to commit more debt to the project company. This willingness to provide the project 
company more capital should reflect in a higher leverage ratio (loan to size ratio) for these 
projects compared to those signed in countries with weaker institutions. In other words, loans 
signed in countries with stronger political and legal institutions should be priced lower and 
have a higher leverage ratio. 
H2:  Ceteris paribus, the impact of political institutions on tranche spread and leverage ratio 
are complemented (otherwise substituted) by improvements in legal and governance 
institutions. 
Recent studies have also established an interaction between political and legal institutions 
(Qi et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2014; Boukari et al. 2014). These studies argue that 
improvements in either of these institutions can make up for the deficiency in the other. The 
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assertion from these studies is that improvements in political institutions compensate for 
weakness in the political system. Further, stronger political and legal institutions do not lead 
to incremental improvement in loan outcomes. Thus, to some extent political and legal 
institutions are considered substitutes. Given, PF is more suitability for weak institutional 
environments; the chapter examine how PF loan spreads and leverage ratios respond to 
changes in these institutions.  
H3: Ceteris paribus, PF tranche spread and leverage ratios are less responsive to institutions 
when NFCs are in place.  
Following Subramanian and Tung (2016) findings that PF act as a private response to 
weak investor protection laws, one expects the spread on these loans to be less responsive to 
weaker legal institutions, especially when they already have contractual mechanisms (NFCs) 
in place. NFCs typically cover risks engineering, procurement and construction, input supply, 
output sales and the operation of the project. Collectively, these contracts provide the basis 
for lenders and creditors to monitor the activities of the project company. In other words, 
NFCs are one form of private responses to weak investor protection since; they allow lenders 
to pre-commit project company on how projects cash flow will be utilised. Thus, H3 
conjectures that loan spread and leverage ratio are likely to respond less to country-level 
institutions quality if project contracts (NFCs) are included in the loan agreement. 
Specifically, the relationship observed in H1 and H2 should become weaker once NFCs are 
included as part of the loan agreement. However, it is also possible that the time and cost 
involving in designing PF loans can offset these benefits of reduced pricing or higher debt 
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capital.45 In that case, the inclusion of NFCs would not lead to any significant reduction 
(increase) in the loan spread (leverage ratio).  
5.5 Research Resign  
The section details the research approach adopted to test the study hypotheses. It provides 
details on data collection, sample selection and the description of study variables. The section 
ends with a review of the econometric procedure used to test the hypotheses.   
5.5.1 Data and Sample 
Data for the study comes from Dealogic Projectware database. Projectware contains 
comprehensive information on PF transactions including loan contracts characteristics, 
project company, sponsors and lenders. The database also provides details on the various 
contracts and agreements used to manage the project company. However, a main drawback of 
the dataset is the unavailability of information on pricing and fees for a large number of 
deals. The only pricing information available is the tranche spread. Other relevant costs like 
loan commitment fees are unreported in most instance. 
The initial sample is composed of 6,000 PF loan tranches signed across 100 countries 
from 1998 to 2012. From this, a filter is applied to restrict the sample to deals that have 
complete information on loan spread which reduced the number of observations to 5,230. 
Moreover, a common practice in cross-country studies of the relationship between loan 
pricing and political risk is to exclude US from the analysis (for an argument, see Hainz & 
Kleimeier 2012; Qian & Strahan 2007). Hence, we exclude US loan tranches. The final 
sample comprises 3,362 loan tranches representing (approximately 1, PF loan) signed 
between May 1998 and December 2012. This data is then matched with country-level 
political, legal and governance indicators as further described below.  
                                    
45 For instance, Esty (2004b) estimate that the transaction cost involved in structuring a PF deal is usually 
between 5-10% of the loan value. 
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5.5.2 Description of Variables  
 
5.5.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Loan spread: Loan spread is the loan tranche spread over market base rates such as Libor, 
Euribor and US T-Bill. This treatment is in line with Corielli et al. (2010)., Blanche Brude 
and Starnge (2007), and Gatti et al. (2013). Most of the loan tranches have spread charges as 
a single rate above a market base rate. However, some tranches are priced in tiers 
corresponding to various phases of the project such as construction and operational phases. 
Consequently, to obtain a single rate for such tranches, we calculate an average rate weighted 
by the number of years assigned to each tier of loan spread (see Corielli et al., 2010). When 
the spread is quoted as a fixed rate (without a market reference), the observation is excluded 
from the analysis to ensure that the study capture the market premium.  
Leverage ratio: Leverage ratio is the ratio of loan size to total project size. The total project 
size includes debt (loans) and equity (sponsor’s capital). The loan size is made up of all the 
loans used to finance the project company. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, where the latter 
indicate 100% debt financing. Where a loan is financed with two or more tranches, the 
leverage ratio at the loan-level is used.  
5.5.2.2 Political, legal and governance measures  
Political risks measure (Investment profile): The measure of political risk, investment profile, 
comes from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).46 The index ranges between zero (0) 
and twelve (12) and captures three subcomponents of risks, that is, (i) contract viability or 
expropriation; (ii) profit repatriation and (iii) payment delays. Each of these subcomponents 
is scored between 0 and 4, where 0 indicates “very high risk,” 4 indicate “very low risk.” The 
investment profile variable captures risks that most firms and investors are likely to be 
                                    
46 Knack and Keefer (1995) shows that ICRG political risk measures have higher explanatory powers relative to 
country risk and legal measures.  
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concerned about, with regards to foreign investment and long-term lending (see Hainz & 
Kleimeier, 2012 and Bekaert et al. 2007). For the univariate analysis (5.6.2.1), an average 
score of Investment profile is estimated for each country over the sample period (1998 to 
2012). The average scores are used to categorise project countries into three groups, that is, 
“High Risk” (0-9) and “Low Risk” (10-12). For each of these categories, dummies are 
constructed for with each risk category. In the multivariate analysis, annual investment 
profile index is used to capture the responsiveness of loan spreads and leverage ratio to 
variations in this measure across countries.  
Legal risk (Creditors Right): Creditor right index by Djankov et al. (2007) is the measure of 
creditor protection in the study. This index aggregates the existence of creditor rights in the 
laws and regulations of a country. The index is composed four subcomponent with each  
assigned the value one, if any of the following law or regulations exist, (i) existence of 
restrictions such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for a debtor to file 
reorganisation; (ii) secured creditors can seize their collateral after the reorganisation petition 
is approved; (iii) secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt 
firm, as opposed to other creditors such as governments or workers ; and (iv) management 
does not retain administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganisation. A 
score of zero (0) indicates weaker creditor protection; while four (4) indicate stronger creditor 
protection.   
Governance measures (WGI): The study also measures the quality of countries governance 
system using World Governance Indicators (WGI) index. The study focuses on indicators 
that directly affect investments in a country. As a result, four indicators, that is, regulatory 
risk, government effectiveness, the rule of law and control of corruption are used to estimate 
the effect of variables that potentially influence on investment risks. Principal component 
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analyses are carried on the four governance measures to reduce noise in these measures and 
maximise the variation. This process led to one principal component and as a proxy for 
project country’s governance quality.   
5.5.2.3 Control Variables  
Aside the political, legal and governance measures, the study controls for loan and deal 
level characteristics. Industry and country level controls are also included to capture general 
macroeconomic and country-level effects on the loan contracts.  
Loan characteristics: The study controls for some loan-specific features and include (i) loan 
maturity, measured as the tranche tenor in months, and (ii) loan amount, measured as the log 
of tranche amount measured in $US millions. Also, deal-level characteristics include 
dummies that consider whether the loan is in a currency different from the project country 
(domestic), refinance an existing loan or secured through a development agency guarantee. 
Further, control variables are introduced to capture the loan types, that is, whether the loan is 
long-term or short-term loan in nature.  
Project type: Following Byoun & Xu (2014) finding that project types induce political 
influences, the study control for concession agreements and public-private partnerships 
(PPP/PFI). As a result, two dummy variables, PFI and Concession dummies are constructed 
to account for projects exposure to host country government influences. These dummies also 
interacted with the measures of political and legal institutions to evaluate their effect through 
political and legal institutions.  
NFCs dummy: Following Corielli et al. (2010)’s finding that NFCs are effective mechanisms 
to reduce project risks and agency costs, the study creates a dummy variable controlling for 
the use of NFCs in PF transactions.  
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Bilateral dummy: To account for deal type, the study control for deals structured between the 
project company and a single lender (bilateral agreement). Thus, the base group is the 
syndicated loan deals, where a group of lenders, as opposed to a single lender, borrow to the 
project company. This variable is found to be a significant determinant of PF loan spread by 
Sorge & Gadanecz (2008).  
Country sovereign rating: The study captures country risk using S&P sovereign debt rating in 
the year the loan deal is signed. The study follows the methodology of Altunbaş & Gadanecz 
(2004) and Corielli et al. (2010) to classify project countries into Best Grade, Investment 
Grade, Speculative, poor and default or unrated. For each of these classifications, a dummy 
variable is created to identify their effects in the primary model.  
Currency risk dummy: The variable takes the value one (1), if the deal is signed in a currency 
other than, the project country’s currency, and zero otherwise. This variable is included to 
control for the exchange rate differential and its potential effect on loan spread and leverage 
ratio. 
Industry and year fixed effects: The final set of controls captures project industry 
classifications and year fixed effects. For the industrial classification, dummies are used for 
each industry.  
5.5.3 Econometric Procedure 
The chapter addresses the hypotheses in section 5.4, using ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression models. The regression equation is estimated with robust standard errors clustered 
at the deal level to account for potential serial correlation between tranches that go into 
financing a single deal. The baseline equations (4.1) and (4.2) are specified as  
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Spreadi = γ0 + β1Political institutionsit + β2 Legal institutionsi + β3 Governance measuresit + δ1 NFC dummyi + 
δ2 PPPi + δ3 Concessionsi + δ4 Bilateral loansi + η’ Controlsit + εit                                   (5.1) 
Leverage ratioi = γ0 + β1Political institutionsit + β2 Legal institutionsi + β3 Governance measuresit + δ1 NFC 
dummyi + δ2 PPPi + δ3 Concessionsi + δ4 Bilateral loansi + η’ Controlsit + εit             (5.2)  
where i identifies a particular loan tranche, and t denotes the time (year) of the loan 
tranche signing, β are the coefficients on political, legal and governance variables, δ’ are the 
coefficients on deal level variables, and η are the coefficients on the control variables.  
By using predetermined (i.e. before the PF loan agreement is signed) country 
characteristics we greatly reduce the possibility that they are endogenous with the loan spread 
and leverage ratio for a later PF loan. A more plausible criticism is the existence of an 
omitted variable bias due to some excluded country characteristics. However, due to the very 
nature of PF lending, it is not possible to examine loan-level fixed effects regression. 
However, the study includes loan-level dummies to control for omitted country-level and 
loan-level variables.  
5.6 Results 
This section presents the empirical results of the chapter. The section begins with 
descriptive statistics at the country level and that of the total sample. Next, a correlation 
analysis is performed to ascertain the level of dependence between the main variables. Then 
the empirical results which includes a univariate analysis comparison of loan samples as well 
as multivariate regression analysis to test the hypotheses.  
5.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
5.6.1.1 Country Level Summary Statistics  
Table 5.1 reports the distribution of the key variables by country. The chapter reports 
statistics for the main loan terms, together with country-year political and legal institutions 
measure, for 36 selected countries out of the sample. The selected countries have at least 20 
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tranche observations for the sample period (1998-2012) and collectively represent 85% of the 
total sample. The statistics show that Spain (440), United Kingdom (419) and Australia (164) 
dominate the sample.  
Regarding the tranche spread, the data reveals that loan tranches in countries with weaker 
political and legal institutions tend to have higher tranche spread, with the highest values 
recorded in Columbia (392.81bps), Brazil (316.97bps) and Argentina (294.8bps). On the 
other hand, developed countries recorded lower tranche spread,  with lowest values in Japan 
(108.8bps), Greece (103.73bps) and Taiwan (89.43 bps). Tranche amount shows considerable 
variations across countries. Resource-rich countries like UAE ($532.19m), Saudi Arabia 
($598.03m), Russia ($570.6m) and Qatar ($616.16m) reported larger tranche amounts 
compared to the rest of the sample. Further, tranche maturities record higher values in 
advanced countries like UK (48.47 months), Ireland (44.65 months) and Portugal (44.1 
months). On the other hand, lower tranche maturities are reported in Columbia (17.38 
months), Argentina (19.26 months) and Russia (19.65 months). Interestingly, these patterns 
are also consistent with the strength of political institutions in these countries. 
Table 5.1 also shows summary statistics of the political (investment profile), legal 
(creditor rights) and governance measures. Countries like Egypt (7.26), Brazil (6.77) and 
Columbia (4.56) report higher political risk, with similar results on creditor rights and 
governance measures. Similarly, countries with better investment profile (that is, UK, 
Canada, Japan, Spain, and Portugal) also have strong creditor rights and governance 
institutions. 
 
 
 
  121 
 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics by country 
Country 
Tranche 
spread (bps) 
Investment 
profile 
Creditor 
right Governance 
Tranche 
Maturity 
(months) 
Tranche Amount 
(US$ M) 
No. 
obs. 
Argentina 294.8 6.71 1 -2.25 19.26 99.02 38 
Australia 141.24 10.23 3 1.62 17.42 169.58 164 
Belgium 140.97 9.88 2 1.16 36.66 284.27 27 
Brazil 316.97 6.77 1 -2.28 24.63 204.77 161 
Canada 222.74 11.42 1 2.12 22.46 222.65 52 
Chile 189.78 10.67 2 1.01 26.74 209.95 53 
China 134.24 6.92 2 -2.86 32.45 120.52 41 
Colombia 392.81 4.56 0 -2.82 17.38 93.55 24 
Egypt 133.46 7.26 2 -2.99 36.79 213.29 38 
France 132.66 11.23 0 1.17 32.45 262.07 71 
Germany 207.9 10.42 3 1.8 32.23 323.78 58 
Greece 103.73 10.34 1 -0.66 26.43 275.96 29 
Hungary 127.93 11.07 1 -0.99 39.15 151.31 42 
India 241.62 8 2 -2.62 29.25 261.64 59 
Indonesia 290.23 7.39 2 -3.52 21.45 215.76 57 
Ireland 136.75 11.15 1 1.73 44.65 76.98 46 
Italy 135.54 10.87 2 -0.73 28.76 271.98 144 
Japan 108.8 11.42 2 0.17 37.32 121.31 42 
Mexico 238.9 9.82 0 -2.25 26.8 158.19 94 
Netherlands 162.2 11.02 3 2.16 41.2 295.82 42 
Oman 125.14 11.05 0 -1.02 43.3 235.93 46 
Philippines 206.72 8.39 1 -2.79 27.16 195.19 60 
Poland 126.12 10.48 1 -0.81 28.01 213.77 35 
Portugal 157.67 11.66 1 0.29 44.1 97.87 148 
Qatar 115.47 10 - -0.62 42.86 616.61 62 
Russian Federation 280.91 8.73 2 -3.62 19.65 570.6 51 
Saudi Arabia 114.74 10.45 3 -2.17 38.3 598.03 74 
Singapore 154.27 10.83 3 2.51 21.21 362.85 31 
South Africa 253.54 8.88 3 -1.34 22.99 104.21 21 
South Korea 231.86 8.56 3 -0.29 32.31 138 22 
Spain 139.31 11.63 2 0.58 33.57 152.64 440 
Taiwan 89.43 10.58 2 -0.12 29.61 106.58 28 
Thailand 158.2 8.21 2 -1.82 35.58 107.85 46 
Turkey 209.07 7.68 2 -2 25.39 145.04 64 
United Arab Emirates 183.53 9.05 2 -0.39 36.42 532.19 44 
United Kingdom 148.54 11.37 4 2.05 48.47 247.76 419 
Total (Average)  181.88 9.58 1.77 -0.63 31.18 234.93 2873. 
The table reports the mean for the key variables in the main regressions for PF loans. Sample period: 1998-2012. Governance variable is 
captured using four governance indicators from World Governance Indicators (WGI): (i) regulatory risk; (ii) government effectiveness; (ii) 
rule of law; and (iv) control of corruption. A principal component analysis is carried out to reduce noise and maximize variation in the 
measures. This yields one principal component used as our proxy for the quality of a country’s governance.   
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5.6.1.2 Univariate Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of the main variables  
Panel A: Full Sample 		 		 		 		 		
Variables Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
Tranche amount ($million) 3362 225.3 91.21 407.54 0.07 5400 
Tranche Maturity (months) 3293 32.21 27 22.98 0.24 354 
Tranche Spread (bps) 3362 183.96 140 136.75 1 1275 
Leverage ratio  3350 0.842 0.892 0.176 0.0375 1 
Investment Profile 3356 9.795 10.5 2.37 0 12 
Creditor rights 3243 2.05 2 1.15 0 4 
Governance 2776 -0.358 0.136 1.95 -6.07 2.93 
Spread with selected variables: 	 	 	 	
Tranche spread with:  	 	 	 	 	
NFCs 1554 172.51 135.32 121.02 1 1175 
Concession 486 182.38 141.17 123.68 6.65 690 
PPP  568 146.39 115 109.49 8.7 1175 
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the primary variables in the regression model. 
 
Table 5.2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The table 
reports the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for each 
variable. The full sample of loan tranches is composed of 3,243 loan tranches.  
The mean (median) tranche amount for the full sample is US$225.3 million (US $91.21 
million). The statistics also show that mean tranche amount is highly skewed with the mean 
value twice as much as the median values. Mean (median) tranche maturity is 32.21 months 
(27 months) with a standard deviation of 22.98 months. This value translates into an average 
maturity of 2.6 years per tranche. However, the standard deviation of 22 months (1.83 years) 
indicates high level of variation around the mean. Tranche spread estimates show an average 
value of 183.96bps with a standard deviation of 136.75 bps. Leverage ratio has a mean 
(standard deviation) of 0.84 or 84% (0.89) with the minimum value of 0.037. The leverage 
ratio, 84%, is slightly higher when compared to 81% reported by Byoun et al. (2013).  
The mean value for political institutions (investment profile) and legal institutions 
(creditor rights) are 9.79 and 2.05 respectively, with standard deviations of 2.37 and 1.15. 
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Similarly, the mean (median) value of governance is 0.36 (0.14). The standard deviation of 
1.95 indicates some variations in the governance measure. These results indicate that most 
countries in the sample have stable political institutions and relatively moderate legal and 
governance institutions.  
5.6.1.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 5.3 presents the correlation coefficients for the key variables. The table reports a 
negative correlation between tranche spread, investment profile, creditor right, and 
governance variables. On the other hand, a positive correlation exists between leverage ratio 
and investment profile, creditor rights and governance. These results indicate that loans in 
countries with stronger political, legal and governance institutions are likely to have lower 
tranche spreads and higher leverage ratios. Political, legal and governance institution 
measures show positive correlations with each other. However, the correlation between 
political and legal institution is small (0.19), and suggests the two measures capture different 
effects. Investment profile and governance, on the other hand, show high correlation (0.67) 
indicating that the two measures probably capture similar effects. The result also shows that 
loan spread negatively correlated with NFC, concession and PPP/PFI dummies. Further, it is 
observed that a negative correlation exists between NFCs and the political and legal 
institution measures. Further, tranche maturity exhibits positive correlation with political and 
legal measures. 
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Table 5.3: Correlation coefficients of the main variables 
  
Tranche 
loan spread 
Leverage 
ratio  
Investment 
profile 
Creditor 
rights 
Governance 
measures 
NFC dummy Concessions PPP/PFI 
Tranche 
maturity 
Loan spread 1         
Leverage ratio -0.132*** 1        
Investment profile -0.29*** 0.108*** 1       
Creditor rights -0.10*** 0.067*** 0.19*** 1      
Governance measures -0.24*** 0.141*** 0.67*** 0.40*** 1     
NFC dummy -0.07*** -0.198*** -0.040 -0.07*** -0.100*** 1    
Concessions -0.12 -0.079*** -0.09*** -0.16*** -0.170*** 0.180*** 1   
PPP/PFI -0.12*** -0.067*** 0.250*** 0.19*** 0.300*** 0.007 -0.190*** 1  
Tranche maturity 0.01 -0.108*** 0.070*** 0.06*** 0.060*** 0.220*** 0.120*** 0.210*** 1 
This table presents the correlation coefficient of the key variables used in the regression. Sample period: 1998-2012. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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5.6.2 Empirical Results 
In this section, the chapter examines the impact of country-level political, legal and 
governance institutions on tranche spread and leverage ratio. First, the chapter conducted 
univariate analysis to compare key loan terms for countries with strong to those with weak 
institutions. Afterwards, results of multivariate regression analysis of the impact of these 
institutional measures on both loan tranche spread and leverage ratio is performed. The 
multivariate analysis covers the baseline regression as well as the interacting effect of the 
institutional measures. Further, the institution features are interacted with NFC to ascertain 
their substitutability. 
5.6.2.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 5. 4: Univariate analyses of loan terms 
Panel A: Investment profile 
High risk (dummy =0) 
(A) 
Low risk (dummy =1) 
(B) 
T-statistics 
(A-B) 
Tranche Spread 211.13 150.37 13.13*** 
Tranche Maturity 30.23 34.68 -5.548*** 
Tranche Amount 239.09 208.25 2.18*** 
Panel B: Creditor Rights Weak (A) (dummy=0)  Strong (B) (dummy=1)  
T-statistics 
(A-B) 
Spread 192.12 167.74 4.89*** 
Maturity 30.64 35.36 -5.58*** 
Tranche Amount 192.72 290.08 -6.57*** 
This table presents a univariate comparison of the loan terms used in the regression. Panel A reports comparative statistics for countries with 
high political risk (Investment profile between 0 and 9) and those with low political risk (Investment profile between 10-12).   The 
categorisation of countries is done by first estimating an average investment profile for all the countries for the sample period (1998-2012). 
After this, the average investment profile score is used to categorise the countries into low and high investment risk. Panel B categorise the 
sample based on country creditor right measure. Given that creditor rights is time-invariant, the study classified project country as “weaker” 
if they have creditor right between 0 and 2, and stronger if they have creditor right between 3 and 4. 
 
Table 5.4 reports the univariate analyses based on political and legal institution measures. 
Panel A reports the result for investment profile, while Panel B reports that of creditor rights.  
For each category, the mean values are compared using the t-test with equal variance.47 
                                    
47 The t-test is also estimated using unequal variance with the results statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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For tranche spread, the results indicate that countries with weaker investment profile and 
creditor rights have higher values compared to loans in countries with weaker investment 
profile and creditor rights. Similarly, results for tranche maturity show that countries with 
weaker investment and creditor rights have lower maturity on loans than those stronger 
investment profile and creditor rights. Tranche amounts are also higher in countries with 
weaker political institutions. 
5.6.2.2 Multivariate Analysis 
5.6.2.2.1 Impact of Institutional Quality on Loan Spread 
Table 5.5 presents the regression results of the relationship between tranche spread and the 
political and legal institutions. Model 1 reports the main specification with investment profile 
(political risk variable), loan characteristics and country controls. Model 2 and 3 add creditor 
rights and governance measure respectively to the specification in Model 1. In Model 4 and 
5, the investment profile interacts with legal and governance measures respectively.48  
Consistent with the first hypothesis (H1) and the findings of Girardone and Snaith (2011) 
and Qi et al. (2010), the present chapter finds that loan spread reduces with improvement 
(stronger) in political institutions. These results hold for all regression specifications in Table 
5.5. Taking results in Model 1 for instance, a percentage increase in investment profile lead 
to 5.6% decrease in spread. Given mean (median) spread for the sample is 183.96 (140) bps 
(in Table 5.2), one percentage improvement in investment profile will lead to 10.3 bps (7.84 
bps) reduction in the spread. This result suggests that loans signed in countries with strong 
politcal institutions benefits from lower financing cost. This result is in line with Girardone 
and Snaith (2011) and Qi et al. (2010) who also report lower spread (cost of debt) for 
countries with stronger political institutions. However, the coefficients (-0.045 to -0.092 from 
                                    
48 Unreported coefficients on industry, loan-type, sovereign credit rating and year dummies are provided in 
Appendix 3.1. 
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Model 1 to 5) are much lower than 0.216 to 0.668 obtained in Qi et al. (2010). A potential 
explanation for the smaller coefficients is that (together with Girardone and Snaith (2011)) 
PF has peculiarities-political risk-mitigants and certification benefits of development banks 
(Kingsley, 2009; Hainz and Kleimeier, 2012). Thus, loan spreads on PF are less likely to 
respond to political risks relative to corporate debt, bonds, and equity. 
For legal institutions, the results in Table 5.5 indicate that stronger creditor rights lead to 
reduction in the spread. Model 4, for instance, show that one percent improvement in legal 
institution reduces loan spread by 19.6% and statistically significant at the 5% significance 
level. This result also provides support for the role legal institutions on financial contracts, 
and in line with previous studies by Qi et al. (2010). On the other hand, the coefficient on 
legal institutions in Model 2 is positive and statistically insignificantly. This finding is 
interesting considering Subramanian and Tung (2016) study that show that PF act as a private 
response to weak creditor protection. Thus, separate incorporation of the project company 
and ring fencing its project cash flow through network of contracts (NFCs), lenders can 
provide an alternative to weaker creditor protection. If this is true, the loan spread on these 
transactions should also be less responsive to legal institutions.  
Governance in Model 3 shows a positive relationship on loan spread. A one percent 
increase in governance is associated with 4.7 percent increase in the loan spread. The result 
is, however, counter-intuitive, but likely due to governance’s high correlation with 
investment profile (0.67 from Table 5.3). As a result, it is possible investment profile 
captures most of the effects from governance. 
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Table 5.5: OLS regression of tranche spread on political and legal institution 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant term 5.136*** 5.793*** 5.712*** 6.132*** 5.608*** 
 (32.79) (25.45) (31.63) (22.79) (29.04) 
Investment profile -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.055*** -0.092*** -0.045*** 
 (-5.18) (-4.80) (-4.65) (-5.12) (-3.42) 
Creditor right  0.026  -0.196**  
  (1.63)  (-2.43)  
Governance   0.047***  0.000 
   (3.00)  (0.000) 
Investment profile x Creditor rights    0.022***  
    (2.90)  
Investment profile  x  Governance     0.004 
     (1.17) 
NFC dummy -0.146*** -0.140*** -0.149*** -0.138*** -0.149*** 
 (-3.68) (-3.70) (-4.11) (-3.68) (-4.08) 
Concession dummy 0.022 0.043 -0.020 0.038 -0.019 
 (0.46) (0.85) (-0.38) (0.76) (-0.37) 
Public finance initiatives/PPP dummy -0.113** -0.118** -0.151*** -0.130*** -0.155*** 
 (-2.41) (-2.46) (-3.12) (-2.74) (-3.18) 
Bilateral agreement dummy 0.031 0.033 0.008 0.029 0.008 
 (0.50) (0.65) (0.17) (0.59) (0.16) 
Log of maturity 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.077*** 0.060*** 0.077*** 
 (3.95) (3.66) (4.62) (3.65) (4.64) 
Log of tranche amount -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.053*** 
 (-5.42) (-5.29) (-5.25) (-5.28) (-5.20) 
Currency dummy -0.105** -0.094** -0.0502 -0.087* -0.043 
 (-2.34) (-1.98) (-1.02) (-1.83) (-0.89) 
Refinance dummy 0.011 0.0169 -0.035 0.011 -0.033 
 (0.29) (0.40) (-0.85) (0.27) (-0.80) 
Industrial dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan type dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Sovereign Rating dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
      
Obs. 3284 3167 2717 3167 2717 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.27 0.33 0.28 0.33 
Table 5.5 shows regression estimates of the log of loan spread on political and legal institutions, loan characteristics and country controls for 
project finance loans. The variables: Investment profile x creditor right and Investment profile x governance are interaction terms of political 
institutions with legal and governance institutions respectively. Model 1 shows the estimates of loan spread on political institutions, loan, 
and country controls. Model 2 adds legal institutions while in Model 3 governance is the substituted for legal institutions. Model 4 and 5 add 
interaction terms of political institution and legal and governance institutions respectively. The sample period is 1998-2012. The models are 
estimated using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the deal level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
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Turning to interaction terms in Model 4 and 5 reveal some interesting findings.  Model 4 
provides evidence on the interaction between political risk and creditor right. The estimated 
coefficient on interacting political and legal institution is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This result indicates that as countries’ political institutions improve, the 
impact of creditor right on PF loan spread reduces, all things being equal. Similarly, as 
countries’ legal institutions improve, the impact of political institutions on spread reduces. 
The finding suggests some degree of substitutability between political and legal institutions. 
The coefficient on the interaction between political institutions and governance is positive but 
statistically insignificant.  
The coefficients on the control variables are consistent and in line with previous studies. 
NFC dummy, which proxies for risk-shifting contracts show a negative relationship with loan 
spread throughout Model 1 to 5. The estimated coefficients on the NFC dummy range 
between 0.138 and 0.149. These results are consistent with the findings of Corielli et al. 
(2010) who also report a negative relationship between loan spread and NFCs. NFCs provide 
contractual mechanisms for lenders to control the project company and its sponsors. In 
addition, following Byoun and Xu (2014) concession and PFI/PPP dummies are included to 
account projects with a higher tendency of government control. The results on concession 
report show both positive and negative results. However, they are insignificant throughout 
Model 1 and 5. On the other hand, PFI/PPP loans report negative and significant relationship 
with PF loan spread. Tranche maturity and amount show a positive and negative relationship 
with loan spread respectively.  
5.6.2.2.2 The Effect of Political, Legal, Governance Institution on Leverage Ratio 
Table 5.6 reports regression results of leverage ratio on political and legal institutions, 
together with the control variables. Model 1 reports the results of the basic specification with 
investment profile (political measure), loan characteristics and country controls. Model 2 
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adds creditor rights to the basic specification in Model 1, while Model 3 adds governance 
measure to Model 1 specification. In Model 4 and 5, the political variable interacts with legal 
and governance measures respectively.49  
Overall, results in Table 6 suggest that political institutions positively affect leverage 
ratios offered on PF deals. The coefficients on investment profile are positive throughout the 
specifications, except Model 3. Interpreting Model 2, one percentage increase in investment 
profile is likely to be associated with a 0.006 (0.6%) increase in the leverage ratio. On 
creditor rights, the results are mixed. While Model 2 report negative signs, this changes to 
positive once interaction terms with investment profile is included. However, the coefficients 
are statistically insignificant and suggest legal institutions are not significant determinants of 
leverage ratios in PF. Similarly, the coefficients on governance measures are insignificant in 
from Table 5.6. Turning to the interaction terms, it is observed that both creditor rights and 
governance interacted with investment profile are insignificant predictors of leverage ratio.  
On the loan characteristics, results indicate that tranches with NFCs are negatively related 
the leverage ratios. The coefficients on NFC dummy range between -0.032 and -0.036 across 
the five regression specifications. Taking Model 1, the result shows that leverage ratio on 
tranches with NFCs are 3.6% lower than those without these contracts in place. This finding 
is consistent with Byoun et al. (2012) and Corielli et al. (2010) who observe a negative 
relationship between loans with NFCs and leverage ratio. On the other hand, the leverage 
ratios for PPI/PFI PF deals are 3.1% higher than their counterparts. Loan maturity is 
negatively related to leverage ratio, while refinance loan tranches are associated with higher 
leverage.  
 
                                    
49 Unreported coefficients on industry, loan-type, sovereign credit rating and year dummies are provided in 
Appendix 3.2. 
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Table 5.6:  Regression of leverage ratio on political and legal institutions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Constant term 0.931*** 0.922*** 0.944*** 0.884*** 0.930*** 
 (17.27) (16.29) (15.88) (14.13) (14.20) 
Investment profile 0.005* 0.006** 0.004 0.011** 0.006 
 (1.82) (1.98) (1.30) (2.51) (1.37) 
Creditor right  -0.002  0.024  
  (-0.57)  (1.08)  
Governance   -0.002  -0.009 
   (-0.53)  (-0.67) 
Investment profile x Creditor rights    -0.00263  
    (-1.26)  
Investment profile x Governance     0.0006 
     (0.51) 
NFC dummy -0.036*** -0.032** -0.036*** -0.033** -0.036*** 
 (-3.47) (-3.18) (-3.33) (-3.20) (-3.31) 
PFI/PPP dummy 0.031* 0.031* 0.031* 0.032* 0.031* 
 (1.90) (1.84) (1.80) (1.91) (1.76) 
Concession dummy 0.000 -0.004 0.014 -0.004 0.014 
 (0.00) (-0.34) (0.96) (-0.31) (0.97) 
Bilateral dummy -0.025* -0.027* -0.026 -0.027* -0.026 
 (-1.68) (-1.78) (-1.53) (-1.75) (-1.53) 
Log of maturity -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.017*** 
 (-3.85) (-3.60) (-3.82) (-3.58) (-3.81) 
Log of tranche amount -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.12) (-0.14) (-0.01) (-0.13) (0.01) 
Currency dummy -0.017 -0.009 -0.032** -0.010 -0.031** 
 (-1.38) (-0.76) (-2.14) (-0.84) (-2.07) 
Refinance dummy 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 
 (9.19) (9.07) (8.43) (9.14) (8.43) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan type dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Sovereign rating dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 3272 3155 2705 3155 2705 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 
Table 5.6 shows regression estimates of leverage ratio on political and legal institutions, loan characteristics and country controls for project 
finance loans.  The variables: Investment profile x creditor right and Investment profile x governance are interaction terms of political 
institutions with legal and governance institutions respectively. Model 1 shows the estimates of leverage ratio on political institutions, loan 
and country controls. Model 2 adds legal institutions while in Model 3 governance is the substituted for legal institutions. Model 4 and 5 add 
interaction terms of political institution and legal and governance institutions respectively. The sample period is 1998-2012. The models are 
estimated using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the deal level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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5.6.2.2.3 Interaction of NFCs and Political, Legal and Governance Institutions 
Impact on loan spread 
Table 5.7 reports regression results relating loan spread to PF contract terms and country 
characteristics, together with the interaction of political and legal institutions with NFC 
dummies. In Model 1, the basic specification (Table 5.5, Model 1) is updated with an 
interaction term of NFC dummy and political institutions. Model 2 adds legal measure 
(creditor rights) with it interaction with NFC dummy, while Model 3 reports the interaction 
of NFC dummy with governance measures.50  
First, the result shows that the impact of political risk measure (investment profile) on loan 
spread is slightly higher for Table 5.7 relative to those obtained in Table 5.5 earlier. Turning 
to the interaction of political risk measure and NFC dummy, the positive coefficient suggests 
that the impact of political risk on loan spread is smaller when loan tranches have NFCs. This 
result possibly suggests that NFCs (that is, the network of project contracts) can substitute for 
the effect of political risk on loan spread. In other words, where project country already has a 
high political risk, the use of NFCs does not derive any positive economic benefits, 
suggesting substitution between the two measures. This is not surprising given Hainz and 
Kleimeier (2012) show that use of non-recourse nature of PF as well as the certification of 
development banks make PF a relatively more suitable than corporate debt finance in weak 
countries with high political risk.  
The study also finds that legal measure and its interaction with NFC dummy (Table 5.7, 
Model 2) yield positive but insignificant coefficients. The coefficients on these measures are 
also close to zero suggesting a weaker relationship between these variables and the loan 
spread.  
                                    
50 Unreported coefficients on industry, loan-type, sovereign credit rating and year dummies are provided in 
Appendix 3.3. 
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The result also shows that the use of NFCs substitute for the effect of governance 
measures on loan spread. Loan tranches with NFCs located in countries with stronger 
governance indicators receive lower interest rate compared to their counterparts in countries 
with lower governance indicators (Table 5.57, Model 3). The reason for this result appears to 
be that countries with better governance systems already have mechanisms in place to deal 
with such risks, while countries with weaker governance systems would have to rely on the 
extensive contracting mechanism in PF to protect creditors. This is consistent with 
Subramanian and Tung (2016) who show that verifiability of cash flows in PF through an 
extensive network of contracts and the private enforcement of these makes them suitability 
for countries with weaker legal and investor protection.  
Impact on leverage ratio 
Table 5.8 reports regression results relating leverage ratio to PF contract terms and 
country characteristics, together with the interaction of political and legal institutions with 
NFCs tranches. In Model 1, the basic specification (Table 5, Model 1) is updated with an 
interaction term of NFC dummy and political institutions. Model 2 adds legal measure 
(creditor rights) with its interaction with NFC dummy, while Model 3 reports the interaction 
of NFC dummy with governance measures.51 
Similar to results in Table 5.6, the relationship between leverage ratios and our political and 
legal institution measures are weak and statistically insignificant except for governance 
measures in Model 3, which shows weak statistical significance at the 10% level.  However, 
interactions terms of NFCs and political and legal measures reveal some interesting findings. 
First, the interaction of NFCs and political risk measure (investment profile) indicate that 
NFCs compliment political institution. In other words, countries with stronger political 
                                    
51 Unreported coefficients on industry, loan-type, sovereign credit rating and year dummies are provided in 
Appendix 3.4. 
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institutions are likely to see a willingness on the part of the lender in committing higher 
leverage to the PF deals.  
Table 5.7: OLS regression estimates of loan spread on political and legal institution and its interaction with Non-financial contracts (NFCs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant term 5.524*** 6.207*** 5.977*** 
 (32.89) (30.32) (36.64) 
Investment profile -0.095*** -0.084*** -0.071*** 
 (-8.12) (-7.57) (-5.97) 
Creditor rights  0.001  
  (0.08)  
Governance   -0.039*** 
   (-2.57) 
NFC dummy -0.440*** -0.151** -0.157*** 
 (-2.92) (-1.98) (-4.29) 
Investment profile x NFC dummy 0.028*   
 (2.04)   
Creditor rights x NFC dummy  0.002  
  (0.06)  
Governance x NFC dummy   0.054*** 
   (2.80) 
Loan characteristics variables YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES 
Loan type dummies YES YES YES 
Sovereign rating dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Obs. 3284 3167 2717 
R-square 0.26 0.25 0.31 
Table 5.7 reports regression results of loan spread on the interaction of NFCs with political, legal and governance institutions. The variables: 
Investment profile x NFC dummy, Creditor rights x NFC dummy and Governance*NFC dummy are interaction terms of political, legal and 
governance institutions with NFC dummy respectively. Model 1 shows the estimates of spread on the interacting terms political institutions and 
NFC dummy together with loan and country controls. Model 2 substitutes the interaction terms with that of credit rights and NFC dummy, 
while Model 3 does the same with the interaction of governance and NFC dummy. The sample period is 1998-2012. The models are estimated 
using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the deal level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
On the other hand, results on the interaction of NFC and governance measures indicate 
that NFCs substitute for stronger governance measures. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on the interaction of governance and the NFCs dummy in column 3 
suggests that NFCs substitute for governance. This result is consistent with the evidences 
reported in Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) that the probability of using PF is lower if the legal 
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provisions and corporate governance are better. Lastly, the interaction of NFCs and creditor 
rights in Model 2 (Table 5.8) reports negative but is however, statistically insignificant. 
Table 5.8: OLS regression estimates of leverage ratio on political and legal institution and its interaction with (NFCs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant term 0.963*** 0.917*** 0.925*** 
 (17.35) (15.83) (15.17) 
Investment profile 0.002 0.006** 0.004 
 (0.49) (1.97) (1.14) 
Creditor rights  -0.0002  
  (-0.05)  
Governance   -0.010* 
   (-1.80) 
Investment profile * NFC dummy 0.009**   
 (2.04)   
Creditor rights* NFC dummy  -0.005  
  (-0.66)  
Governance* NFC dummy   0.015*** 
   (2.70) 
NFC dummy -0.120*** -0.022 -0.033*** 
 (-2.76) (-1.18) (-2.95) 
Loan Characteristics YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES 
Loan type dummies YES YES YES 
Sovereign rating dummies YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Obs. 3272 3155 2705 
R-square 0.148 0.142 0.16 
Table 5.7 reports regression results of leverage ratio on the interaction of NFCs with political, legal and governance institutions. The 
variables: Investment profile x NFC dummy, Creditor rights x NFC dummy and Governance*NFC dummy are interaction terms of political, 
legal and governance institutions with NFC dummy respectively. Model 1 shows the estimates of spread on the interacting terms political 
institutions and NFC dummy together with loan and country controls. Model 2 substitutes the interaction terms with that of credit rights and 
NFC dummy, while Model 3 does the same with the interaction of governance and NFC dummy. The sample period is 1998-2012. The 
models are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the deal level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the effect of country-level institutions quality on PF loan terms. 
The findings indicate that improvement in political institutions is associated with 
significantly lower spread for PF loans. A percentage increase in investment profile (political 
institutions) lead to 4.5% decrease in spread. Further, the interaction of political institutions 
with legal and governance institutions lead to an increase in loan spread, indicating that 
political institutions to an extent substitute for legal and governance institutions. The chapter 
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also finds that the percentage impact of political institutions on the spread is lower for PF 
relative to those obtained for bond and equity issues. This finding is attributed to various risk-
mitigating mechanisms instituted by parties to manage political risks. These findings are 
consistent with the existing literature on the role of country-level institutions on financial 
institutions. The chapter also finds that improvements in political institutions is associated 
with an increase in leverage ratio for PF loans. A one standard deviation change in 
investment profile implies a 0.1% increase in leverage ratio. However, the interaction term of 
investment profile and creditor rights or governance measures does not yield any significant 
impact on the loan spread.  
Furthermore, the chapter examines whether NFCs (project contracts) influence the effect 
of political risks on loan spread and leverage ratio. The findings from the interaction of NFCs 
with political institutions indicate that NFCs reduce the impact of political institutions on 
loan spread. This is finding indicate that where political institutions are weak, NFCs are 
essential in managing these risks. Similarly, when countries already have a developed 
political and governance regime, NFCs do not add significant value to these deals. This 
finding demonstrates the importance of NFCs in PF lending in developing and emerging 
economies.  
Overall, the results in this chapter indicate that political risks matter in PF lending. There 
are economic benefits when PF deals are undertaken in countries with improved political 
systems. However, these reductions are lower when compared to corporate bond issues or 
banks loans. Further, the chapter demonstrates that political risks can be ameliorated through 
NFCs.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings and Policy Implications 
The thesis examines the determinants of PF loan terms, given its increasing use in the 
financing of long-term capital investments and infrastructure. The primary objectives are to 
(i) examine whether certification by domestic FIs impact the spread on PF loans (ii) assess 
whether sponsors participation as counterparties have an impact on the key loan terms 
(spread and leverage ratio), and (iii) whether country-level political and legal institutions 
simultaneously affect PF loans terms. These three objectives are addressed in Chapter 3, 4 
and 5 respectively. 
The use of PF in emerging and developing economies has increased in the last two 
decades. Accompanying this increase is the participation of domestic FI as lead arrangers 
(also known as certification). In Chapter 3, the study attempts to quantify the economic 
benefits of these certifications, using a sample of 1,270, PF syndicated loan tranches signed 
in 53 emerging economies, between 1998 and 2011. The study used an endogenous switching 
regression to control for the joint determination of certification and loan outcomes. The study 
first estimates the determinants of domestic FI certification and the loan spread. Second, the 
study uses the estimates of the determinants of certification and loan spread to derive the 
conditional and counterfactual loan spreads, with the difference interpreted as the impact of 
certification by domestic FI. The findings indicate that domestic FIs are more likely to certify 
loan do not have political risk guarantees, but less likely to certify if it an EXIM loan facility 
or signed in currencies other than the project countries. On the loan spread determinants, the 
study finds that EXIM facilities, transportation and commercial projects, and Latin America 
and South East Asia projects have higher spreads. The impact of certification by domestic FIs 
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on the loan spread is approximately 47 bps. The reduction in loan spread is highest for 
projects located in water and sewage, oil and gas, power and mining industry. Further, 
projects located in Indian Subcontinent, Latin America and lower-income countries also 
report higher impact for loans with certification by domestic FIs. From a policy perspective, 
the findings suggest some economic benefits for borrowers and other key stakeholders. More 
generally, the findings show that in an environment where asymmetric information is 
pervasive, lenders can use domestic institutions to overcome these challenges. The results 
also support on-going efforts to deepen financial development in emerging market 
economies.  
An essential basis for the use of PF is the ring-fencing of the new investment from its 
sponsors, to ease information production and risk management. Among its benefits, PF can 
reduce underinvestment, promote cash flow verifiability and reduce cash flows volatility. It is 
thus surprising that the sponsors also become counterparties to key contracts with the project 
company. This involvement often complicates the separation between the project company 
and the sponsors. Sponsor counterparties can be a blessing or a curse to the PF venture. On 
the one hand, sponsors involvement can potentially make risk management more effective by 
aligning sponsors interest to that of the project. (Corielli et al., 2010). However, it can 
increase the likelihood of conflict of interest between sponsors and lenders. These conflicts 
arise because sponsor counterparties can have control over key variables that affect cash 
flow. This, in turn, induces opportunistic renegotiation of key contracts like construction or 
supply agreements. Chapter 4, examines these economic benefits (or costs) of sponsors 
involvement as counterparties, using a sample of 5871 PF loans signed between 1998 and 
2013. Specifically, the chapter examines whether NFCs reduce project risks, which in turn 
reduce the loan spread and leverage ratios charged by lenders. Next, the chapter examines 
whether these effects are distorted if the sponsors also act as counterparties to key NFCs. 
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This chapter hypothesises that the decision to include NFCs, and sponsors as counterparties is 
endogenous to the loan terms. To control for this endogeneity, the propensity score matching 
proceudre is used match loan tranches with sponsor counterparties to those without, using 
observed pre-contractual covariates. The results indicate that loans with NFCs are 32 bps 
lower. Loan with sponsor counterparties are, however, 25 bps lower, and those with credit-
rated counterparties are 37 bps lower. On the leverage ratio, the findings reveal that loan 
tranches with NFCs are 0.008% lower, those with sponsor counterparties are 0.03% lower, 
and those with credit-rated counterparties are 0.016% lower. These results are driven by loans 
signed in developing countries. These findings provide useful insights into PF lending and 
demonstrate a trade-off between the cost of borrowing (loan spread) and the proportion of 
debt capital lenders offer in PF ventures. Sponsors must thus analyse this trade-off before 
engaging as counterparties to the project company. 
Political risk continues to hinder the flow of capital into long-term investments globally. 
In recent years, these risks have heightened because of regulatory changes in developed 
countries and political instabilities in emerging and developing countries. Extant studies also 
suggest that political risk can substitute for deficiencies in legal systems and vice versa. In 
Chapter 5, the thesis explores how political and legal institutions shape PF loan terms. Three 
research hypotheses are developed. First, the chapter tests whether political institutions 
influence loan spreads and leverage ratios after controlling for legal institutions and 
governance. Given the interrelationship between political and legal institutions, the chapter 
also tests whether political institutions substitute (or complement) deficiencies in legal 
institutions. The chapter also examines whether the various NFCs used to manage project 
risks substitute for weaknesses in these institutions. To test these hypotheses, linear 
regressions are used to relate loan spread and leverage ratio to country-level political and 
legal institutions. The findings indicate that improvements in political institutions are 
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associated with lower loan spreads and higher leverage ratio. The findings also indicate that 
PF loans are less sensitive to political institutions, relative to corporate bonds and bank loans. 
The study results further reveal that political institutions substitute for legal institutions in 
relation to the spread, but complements in the case of the leverage ratio.  The main policy 
implication from Chapter 5 is on the sensitivity of PF lending to institutional characteristics. 
In countries, where either political or legal institutions is weak, PF can generate economic 
benefits through its lesser response to institution weakness compared to corporate bonds or 
bank loans. For corporations and sponsors, PF represent a viable alternative for reducing the 
cost of financing long-term investments.  
6.2 Directions for future research 
The present thesis examines the determinants of PF loan terms in three empirical chapters. 
These chapters provide useful understandings on loan terms and role of various parties. 
Chapter 3 shows that domestic FIs are integral part of emerging market financial systems. 
These institutions create value by ameliorating asymmetric information between domestic 
and foreign lenders. Domestic FIs are also able to mobilise domestic financial resources and 
generate political support for projects. These factors are argued in the thesis to account for 
the reduction in loan spreads. Given the economic significance of the findings, it is essential 
to broaden the perspective on domestic FI certification. For instance, it will be interesting to 
know whether these economic benefits are related to peculiar features of domestic banks. For 
instance, it is possible that government-owned banks might provide stronger channels for 
mobilising political support, but simultaneously expose the project to political interference 
from the host government. With access to data on FIs origin, future studies can clarify some 
of these issues.  
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In Chapter 4, the results indicate that NFCs are an essential feature of risk management in 
PF. More importantly, the involvement of sponsors can align their interest to that of the 
project. Though the findings suggest some economic gains from sponsors’ involvement at the 
project level, it opens up issues on conflict of interest. Future studies can examine sponsors 
involvements across various contract types (NFCs) and industries to deepen insights on 
sponsors’ involvement and ascertain their suitability on sector by sector basis. Another issue 
of the importance is the potential endogeneity from unobserved heterogeneity. The 
econometric approach adopted in chapter 4 (PSM) assumes that differences across loans 
samples are due to observable differences. Though sensitivity analysis indicates some 
robustness of the unobserved differences, future studies can examine the extent to which 
unobservable differences affect these estimates. 
In Chapter 5, the findings reveal that PF loans are less sensitive to political and legal 
institutions, relative to corporate debt finance (bank loans and bonds). However, these 
conclusions are based on a comparison of the chapter’s results to those reported in previous 
studies. Future studies can carry out comparative analysis of PF and corporate loans drawn 
from the same population. These studies can also utilise treatment effect models like the 
difference-in-difference approach to generate causal inferences on the effects of political 
institutions. 
Beyond these chapters, PF remains mostly under-researched. Some of the principles and 
conceptions of PF are still in their formative stages. First, there is little direction on the 
motivation and the economic benefits of high leveraging in PF. A typical PF deal is funded 
with 70% to 80% debt capital making them risky. However, PF loans are also one of the least 
defaulted financial instruments. According to Moody’s Investors Service (2017), the ten-year 
cumulative default rate on PF loans is 6.7%. Future research is required to understand these 
issues to draw relevant insights that may be useful in other areas of finance. For instance, it is 
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useful to understand how organisational and managerial structures are utilised to achieve 
expected outcomes in PF. 
Another critical area for future research is project finance bonds. Though the majority of 
PF lending is carried out through the syndicated loan market, project finance bonds are 
increasingly used in recent years. These bonds are often targeted at institutional investors and 
sovereign wealth funds who are looking to diversify their portfolios. Academic research is 
required to analyse the PF return and premium on these bonds. Studies on project bonds can 
also provide avenues to analyse the spread impact of project finance loans over time. For 
instance, studies can analyse the behaviour of bond spread at the construction and operational 
stages of the project. These are likely to provide meaningful insights on risk management for 
these project companies. 
PF also provides a promising avenue to examine issues of sustainable investments. PF is 
often deployed to fund large-scale and long-term projects that have implications for the 
environment and sustainability. Research is thus required to determine if the structuring or 
pricing of these deals considers these issues, and to what extent. 
Further, an issue of interest is why sponsors take up vital roles in PF. Though one of the 
motivations for PF lending is to separate project from its sponsors to ensure adequate risk 
evaluation and allocation. Given the potential for conflict of interest and opportunistic 
behaviour, it is interesting to shed more lights on this in the future.  
Finally, an area for promising future research is case studies on PF loan deals. Given the 
paucity of information on the operational aspect of PF, especially he project company, future 
research can focus on specific projects that are carried out with PF to provide exciting and 
novel findings. 
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Appendix 1 
Appendix 1.1 Description of Variables for Chapter 3 
Appendix 1  Description of Variable 
Variable Description 
Loan Spread 
Log of spread over the base rate in basis point. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware.  
Local FI Participation Dummy equals to 1, if a local financial institution acts as one of the Mandated Lead Arranger (MLA), 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: 
Dealogic Projectware. 
Tranche Maturity  
Log of loans tranche maturity measured in months. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Tranche Amount 
Log of tranche amount measured in million of US Dollars. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Tranche Guarantee  
Dummy equals to 1 if tranche has an explicit political risk guarantee, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Tranche Refinance  
Dummy equals to 1 if tranche is to finance an ongoing project, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Tranche Currency Dummy equals to one if deal is structured in a currency other than that of the project home country. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic 
Projectware. 
II Credit Risk September release of Institutional Investor (II) sovereign credit Risk score. Ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating a better credit quality. Source: 
Institutional Investor Magazine September Issues.  
Private Credit_GDP Log of the ratio of financial claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions divided by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Available 
from 1998-2011. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Loan Type Dummies 
 
Secured Loans  
Dummy equals to 1, if loan is secured with a collateral, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Short-Term Loans Dummy equals to 1, if loan is a short-term financing facility such as bridge loans and standby facilities. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic 
Projectware. 
Credit Facility 
Dummy equal to 1, if loan type is a credit facility and 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Term Loan  
Dummy equals to 1, if loan type is term loans. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
EXIM 
Dummy equals to one if loan type is an EXIM facility. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
II Credit_Year Dummy 
An interaction of II Credit and Year Dummies. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware/Institutional Investor Magazine 
 
 
Industrial Dummies   
Industry  & Commercial 
Dummy equals to 1, if project fall under Industrial and Commercial sector. 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Mining  
Dummy equals to 1, if project fall under Mining sector. 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
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Appendix 1.1 contd.   Description of Variable or Chapter Three (3) 
Oil & Gas 
Dummy equals to 1, if project falls under Oil and Gas sector. 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Petrochemical  
Dummy equals to 1, if project falls under Petrochemical sector, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Telecom  
Dummy equals to 1, if projects falls under Telecommunication sector, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Transportation 
Dummy equals 1, if project falls under Transportation sector, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Water and Sewage 
Dummy Equals to 1, if project falls under Water and Sewage sector, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Regional Dummies 
 
India Subcontinent 
Dummy equals to 1, if project country falls under India Subcontinents region. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Latin America 
Dummy equals to 1, if project country falls under Latin American Region. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Middle East  
Dummy Equals to 1, if project country falls under Middle East Region. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
South East Asia  
Dummy equals to 1 if project country falls under South-East Asia region. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Dummy equals to 1, if project country falls under Sub-Saharan African region. 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2011. Source: Dealogic Projectware. 
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Appendix 1.2 Unreported Coefficients for Table 3.4 
Appendix 1.2 Unreported coefficients for Table 3.4 
 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg.  3 Reg. 4 Reg.  5 
II Credit Risk by year dummies      
II Credit Risk * 1998  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.0007 
  (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.008) (0.011) 
II Credit Risk * 1999  -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 0.0006 
  (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.006) (0.009) 
II Credit Risk * 2001  -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.0054 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
II Credit Risk * 2003  0.001 0.003 0.005 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
II Credit Risk * 2004  -0.0005 0.0006 0.002 0.004 
  (-0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
II Credit Risk * 2005  0.006 0.008 0.01 0.014** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
II Credit Risk * 2006  0.008 0.01 0.01 0.011 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
II Credit Risk * 2007  0.005 0.006 0.007 0.010 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
II Credit Risk * 2008  0.002 0.003 0.005 0.008 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
II Credit Risk * 2009  0 0.001 0.003 0.006 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
II Credit Risk * 2010  -0.001 0.0008 0.003 0.004 
  (-0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
II Credit Risk * 2011  0.002 0.003 0.005 0.008 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Industry dummies:       
Mining    -0.114 -0.159 
    (-0.456) (-0.576) 
Oil and Gas    -0.326 -0.0207 
    (-0.279) (-0.291) 
Power & Utility    0.0004  
    (0.262) (0.317) 
Telecommunication    -0.073  
    (-0.322) (0.336) 
Water & Sewage    -0.097  
    (-0.453) (-0.567) 
Industrial and Commerce   0.432 0.353 
    (0.33) (0.294) 
Petrochemical   0.341 0.184 
    (0.297) (0.324) 
Transportation   0.379 0.295 
    (0.286) (0.264) 
Regional Dummies:     
Indian Subcontinent    0.711 
     (0.423) 
Latin America    -0.426 
     (0.304) 
Eastern Europe    -0.408 
     (0.355) 
Regional dummies:     
Indian Subcontinent    0.711 
     (0.423) 
Latin America    -0.426 
     (0.304) 
Eastern Europe    -0.408 
     (0.355) 
Indian Subcontinent    0.711 
     (0.423) 
Latin America    -0.426 
     (0.304) 
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Appendix 1.2 contd. Unreported coefficients for Table 3.4 
 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg.  4 Reg.  5 
Regional dummies     
Eastern Europe    -0.408 
     (0.355) 
South-East Asia    0.27 
     (0.294) 
Sub-Saharan Africa    -0.095 
     (0.328) 
Middle East    0.2 
     (0.297) 
This table reports the results of the determinants of certification by domestic FI using an ESR model. Model 1 includes microeconomic and 
macroeconomic determinants. Model 2 adds the interaction term II Credit Risk of year dummies. In Models 3-5 controls for loan type, 
industrial and regional differences are added respectively. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. Sample period: 1998-2011. 
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Appendix 1.3 Correlation coefficients of the main variables 
 
Tranche 
Maturity 
Tranche 
Amount 
Tranche 
Guarantee 
Tranche 
Refinance II Credit Risk 
Tranche 
Currency 
Private 
Credit/GDP Short Term Credit Facility Term Loan 
EXIM 
loans 
Tranche Maturity 1 
          
Tranche Amount 0.0837 1 
         
Tranche Guarantee -0.0242 0.0243 1 
        
Tranche Refinance -0.223 0.0174 0.0079 1 
       
II Credit Risk 0.3618 0.1087 -0.221 -0.0409 1 
      
Tranche Currency -0.3178 0.0693 0.1243 0.1521 -0.4854 1 
     
Private Credit/GDP 0.3771 -0.0997 -0.1405 -0.125 0.6414 -0.6459 1 
    
Short Term  -0.2024 -0.0066 0.0057 0.0303 0.1081 -0.0413 0.0391 1 
   
Credit Facility -0.0157 -0.0422 -0.031 0.0014 -0.0945 0.049 -0.1076 -0.0777 1 
  
Term Loan 0.1476 0.0684 0.0042 0.0388 0.0456 -0.0815 0.1135 -0.5486 -0.3167 1 
 
EXIM loans 0.0756 -0.0148 0.0994 -0.0741 -0.1124 0.09 -0.1066 -0.0548 -0.0316 -0.2235 1 
This table presents the correlation coefficients of key variables used in the main regression in Table 3.4. Sample period: 1998-2011 
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Appendix 1.4 Unreported Coefficients for Table 3.5 
Appendix 1.4 Unreported coefficients for Table 3.5 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
II Credit Risk by year dummies      
II Credit Risk * 1999  0.006 0.007** 0.006* 0.006 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
II Credit Risk * 2000  0.008** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
II Credit Risk * 2001  0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
II Credit Risk * 2002  0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
II Credit Risk * 2003  0.009** 0.010** 0.009** 0.012** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
II Credit Risk * 2004  0.014** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
II Credit Risk * 2005  0.0162*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
II Credit Risk * 2006  0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012** 0.012** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
II Credit Risk * 2007  0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
II Credit Risk * 2008  0.0137*** 0.0145*** 0.0141*** 0.0150*** 
  (0.003) (0.00325) (0.00332) (0.00342) 
II Credit Risk * 2009  0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
II Credit Risk * 2010  0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
II Credit Risk * 2011  0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Industrial dummies      
Industry Commercial     0.0626 0.135 
    (0.227) (0.220) 
Mining    0.135 0.0774 
    (0.279) (0.294) 
Oil and Gas    -0.125 -0.223 
    (0.222) (0.194) 
Petrochemical    0.0675 0.118 
    (0.223) (0.220) 
Power & Utility    0.255 0.250 
    (0.183) (0.177) 
Telecommunication     0.121 0.255 
    (0.255) (0.240) 
Transportation    0.291 0.321* 
    (0.156) (0.149) 
Water & Sewage    0.0741 0.0310 
    (0.188) (0.198) 
Regional Dummies:       
Indian Subcontinent     0.124 
     (0.234) 
Latin America     0.680** 
     (0.226) 
Middle East     0.135 
     (0.211) 
South-East Asia     0.373* 
     (0.184) 
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Appendix 1.4 Contd. Unreported coefficients for Table 3.5 
Variables  Reg. 1 Reg.  2 Reg.  3 Reg.  4 Reg.  5 
Regional Dummies:       
Eastern Europe     0.0581 
     (0.223) 
Error Term Covariance 
 
0.54 
 
0.52 
 
0.46 
 
0.46 
 
0.58 
Number of Observations 
 
1228 
 
1228 
 
1228 
 
1228 
 
1228 
Notes: This table reports the loan spread equation of the ESR model for deals with domestic FI certification. Model 1 includes microeconomic 
and macroeconomic determinants. Model 2 adds the interaction term II CR multiplied by yearly dummies. Models 3-5 control for loan type, 
industrial and regional dummies. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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Appendix 1.5 Unreported Coefficients for Table 3.6 
Appendix 1.5 Unreported coefficients for Table 3.6 
Variables Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg.  3 Reg.  4 Reg.  5 
II Credit Risk by year dummies      
II Credit Risk * 1999  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
II Credit Risk * 2000  0.006 0.008 0.008 0.009* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
II Credit Risk * 2001  0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
II Credit Risk * 2002  0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
II Credit Risk * 2003  0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
II Credit Risk * 2004  0.008 0.007 0.008 0.009 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
II Credit Risk * 2005  0.013* 0.013* 0.015* 0.016* 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
II Credit Risk * 2006  0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
II Credit Risk * 2007  0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
II Credit Risk * 2008  0.012* 0.012** 0.014** 0.013** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
II Credit Risk * 2009  0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
II Credit Risk * 2010  0.013* 0.014* 0.017** 0.019*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
II Credit Risk * 2011  0.0182*** 0.0174*** 0.0202*** 0.023*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Industrial dummies      
Industry & Commercial     0.515* 0.551* 
    (0.242) (0.241) 
Mining    0.336 0.307 
    (0.313) (0.332) 
Oil and Gas    0.087 0.144 
    (0.281) (0.295) 
Industrial dummies      
Petrochemical    0.466 0.501 
    (0.252) (0.271) 
Power & Utility    0.413 0.407 
    (0.263) (0.286) 
Telecommunication    0.414 0.481 
    (0.280) (0.284) 
      
Water & Sewage    0.354 0.341 
    (0.334) (0.357) 
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Appendix 1.5 contd. Unreported coefficients for Table 3.6 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Regional dummies      
Indian Subcontinent     0.656 
     (0.405) 
Latin America     0.224 
     (0.149) 
Middle East     -0.075 
     (0.185) 
South East Asia     0.331 
     (0.211) 
Sub Saharan Africa     0.092 
     (0.217) 
Eastern Europe     -0.136 
     (0.176) 
Error Term Covariance 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.9 0.92 
Number of Observations 1228 1228 1228 1228 1228 
Notes: This table reports the loan spread equation of the ESR model for deals without domestic FI certification. Model 1 includes 
microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants. Model 2 adds the interaction term II CR multiplied by yearly dummies. Models 3-5 
control for loan type, industrial and regional dummies. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix 2  
Appendix 2.1 Variable Definition and Data Source for Chapter Four (4)  
The following table summarised the explanatory variables in terms of definition and sources.  Most the loan data comes from Dealogic Projectware unless otherwise stated.  Best Grade captures 
project countries rated from AAA to A+. Investment captures project countries rated from A to BBB-. Speculative captures project countries rated from BB+ to BB. Poor captures project 
countries rated from BB- to CC as well as “default, unrated, or undisclosed”. The ratings are those assigned to country by Standard & Poor’s in the year the loan was agreed. Advanced country 
is based on the international Monetary Fund (IMF) country classification. Regulatory quality is the regulatory quality indicator of the World Governance Indicator.  
Variable  Label Definition 
Tranche spread T_SPREAD Log of tranche spread over the base rate in basis point. Available for the period 1998-2013.  
Leverage ratio LEV The ratio of project loan amount over total project size. Available for the period 1998-2013.  
Tranche maturity  MAT Loan tranche maturity measured in months. Available for the period 1998-2013. 
Project size SIZE Log of tranche amount measured in millions of US Dollars. Available for the period 1998-2013.  
Tranche Refinance REFIN Dummy equals to 1 if tranche is to refinance an existing project, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013.  
Tranche currency CURR Dummy equals to one if deal is structured in a currency other than that of the project home country. Available for the period 1998-2013.  
Traches with:     
NFCs NFC Dummy equals 1 if tranche has a non-financial contract in place, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013.  
NFCs and sponsor counterparty   Dummy equals 1 if tranche has non-financial contracts with sponsors participating as counterparties, 0 otherwise.  Available for the period 1998-2013.  
NFC and credit-rated sponsor 
counterparty   
Dummy equals 1 if tranche has non-financial contracts with credit-rated sponsors participating as counterparties, 0 otherwise. 
Available for the period 1998-2013. 
LoanType Dummies LOAN_TYPE  
Secured Loans    Dummy equals to 1, if loan is a guaranteed facility, export facility,  0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2012.  
Short-Term Loans   Dummy equals to 1, if loan is a short-term financing facility such as bridge loans and standby facilities. Available for the period 1998-2013.  
Term Loans    Dummy equals to 1, if loan type is term loans, Term A and Term B. Available for the period 1998-2013.  
Industrial Dummies  IND 
Industry  & Commercial   Dummy equals to 1, if project falls under Industrial and Commercial sector. 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013.  
Oil & Gas   Dummy equals to 1, if project falls under Oil and Gas sector. 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013. 
Power & Utility   Dummy Equals to 1, if project falls under Oil and Gas sector, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013. 
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Appendix 2.1 (contd). Variable Description and Data Source for Chapter Four  
Variable  Label Definition 
Telecom  
Transportation  
Dummy equals to 1, if projects falls under Telecommunication sector, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013.  
Dummy equals 1, if project falls under Transportation sector, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013.  
Others  Dummy Equals to 1, if project falls under other sectors, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013. 
Country Rating Dummies CCR  
Best grade   Dummy equal 1, if tranche is signed in project country rated by S&P as" Best grade", 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013. Source: S&P.  
Investment grade  Dummy equal 1, if tranche is signed in project country rated by S&P as" Investment grade", 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013. Source: S&P. 
Speculative grade  Dummy equal 1, if tranche is signed in project country rated by S&P as" Speculative grade", 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013. Source: S&P. 
Poor grade  Dummy equal 1, if tranche is signed in project country rated by S&P as" Poor grade", 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013. Source: S&P. 
Additional Controls   
Currency dummy CURR Dummy equal 1, if tranche is signed in a currency other than the project country’s currency, 0 otherwise. Available for the period 1998-2013. 
Regulatory quality REG Measure of the project country regulatory quality. Source: World Governance Indicators (WGI). 
Advanced Countries ADV Dummy equals 1 if tranche was signed in advanced countries, 0 otherwise. Source: IMF classification. 
  164 
Appendix 2.2 Propensity Score Matching  
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a statistical technique that computes the 
conditional probability of receiving a treatment based on a given pretreatment 
characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Its basic idea is to pair each participant 
in a treatment group to nonparticipants in the control group who are similar in all 
relevant pretreatment characteristics X (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
 Propensity score can be expressed as: 
P(X) = Pr(T=1/X) = E (T/X)        (1) 
where P(X) denotes the propensity score; T={0, 1} is the indicator of treatment and X 
is the multidimensional vector of pretreatment characteristics. Two important 
identifying assumptions must be sufficiently satisfied for the validity of propensity 
score matching estimates. First is conditional independence also referred to as 
unconfoundedness, which states that, given a set of observed covariates X, that are not 
affected by treatment, potential outcome Y are independent of the treatment 
assignment T (Khandker et al., 2010). This ensures that systematic differences in 
outcomes between treated and non-treated individuals with the same values for 
covariates are attributable to treatment T. In other words, it ensures that, uptake of 
program is not influenced by the treatment process or any unobservable 
characteristics52. Even though, conditional independence is a strong assumption and 
                                    
52 Formal tests can be conducted to test for the influence of unobserved characteristics. See Jalan and 
Ravallion (2003) for details on the specification and context of their test. However, Heckman et al. 
(1997, 1998a, 1998b) argue that the bias coming from unobservable characteristics is small relative to 
the bias coming from the incorrect use of observable characteristics (i.e., comparing units outside of the 
common support). Glazerman et al. (2003) find that bias of nonexperimental estimates was lower when 
the comparison group was drawn from within the evaluation itself rather than from a national dataset 
and locally matched to the treatment population. Diaz and Handa (2006) argue that, in cases when the 
outcomes are measured using comparable surveys, the bias arising from PSM is negligible. 
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cannot be inherently tested, it can credibly be invoked if there is a rich dataset on the 
observed characteristics that allow for adequate control of factors that affects program 
participation, as well as a deeper understanding of the institutional setting of the study 
(Cintina and Love, 2017)53.  
The second assumption, common support, ensures that treatment units are similar to 
the control units in terms of observed characteristics by requiring that both groups 
have observations from similar propensity score distribution (Heckman, LaLonde and 
Smith, 1999 cited in Khandker et al., 2010). Therefore, observations that fall outside 
the common support region would have to dropped for both treatment and control 
group, even though the former can lead to sampling bias and requires caution by the 
researcher. 
 
Estimating the treatment effect 
Given that the conditional independence and common support holds, the propensity 
score for average treatment on the treated (ATET), can be estimated as follows: 
ATET  = E {Y1i –Y0i |Ti= 1}         (2) 
= E [E{Y1i –Y0i |Ti= 1, p (Xi)}] 
= E [E{Y1i |Ti= 1, p (Xi)}- E{Y0i |Ti= 0, p (Xi)}|T=1] 
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of (p(Xi)|Ti =1) and Y1i and Y0i are 
potential outcomes in the two counterfactual situations of the treated and non-treated 
                                                                                                       
 
53 According to Khandker et al., (2010) if one is only interested in the average treated on the treated 
(ATET) then only a weaker assumption of the conditional independence, where potential outcome Y 
must only be independent for only the control group, is required. 
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group respectively. The PSM estimator is simply the mean difference in outcomes 
over the common support, appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution 
of participants. 
A number of studies have also established that PSM estimator generate reliable results 
if there are a rich set of control variables, both treatment and control sample comes 
are drawn from the study and comparison of participant and non-participant are from 
the same local market. 
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Appendix 2.4: Hidden Bias (unobserved heterogeneity) for PSM results 
 
Suppose that the probability of using NFCs in PF is given by  
Pi = P (xi, µi) = P (NFCi = 1/xi, µi) = F (β xi + γ µi)                                (A1) 
where xi are the observed characteristics for loans with NFC, µi is the unobserved 
variables and γ is the effect of µi on the decision to use NFCs. If the selection process 
is free from of hidden bias γ will be zero and NFCs use will be solely determined by 
xi. However, if γ is non-zero (hidden bias) two loans with the same observed 
covariates (xi) will have different chances of receiving treatment.  
Let us assume we have a matched pair of loans tranches, i and j with logistic 
distribution denoted F. The odd that loan tranches have NFCs are given by  and 
 with odd ratios given by  
 =   .       (A2) 
If both loan tranches have identical observed covariates as implied by the matching 
procedure, the x vector cancel out implying that, 
= exp(γ (µi  - µj)).        (A3) 
From equation (3), both loan tranches differ in their odds of receiving treatment by a 
factor that involves the parameter γ and the difference in their unobserved covariates 
µ. So, either if there are no differences in unobserved variables (ui = uj) or if 
unobserved variables have no influence on the probability of participating (γ = 0), the 
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odds ratio is 1, implying the absence of hidden bias.  
Rosenbaum bound sensitivity analysis examines how changing the value of γ (ui = uj) 
alters inferences about the treatment effect. Rosenbaum (2002) for simplicity assumes 
that the unobserved variable is a dummy, i.e., µ ∈ 0, 1. Rosenbaum shows that this 
relationship implies the following bounds on the ratio of the odds that either of two 
matched loan tranches will receive treatment: 
     exp (γ)        (A4) 
Both matched loan tranches have the same probability of NFCs if exp (γ) =1. 
Otherwise, if for instance, exp (γ) =2, loan tranches that are similar in (terms of x) 
could differ in their odds of receiving the treatment by as much as a factor of 2. In this 
sense, exp (γ) is a measure of the degree of departure from a study that is free of 
hidden bias. 
Rosenbaum (2002) also develops a test statistics T (a Wilcoxon signed rank test 
statistics) for matched pairs where the outcome for the treatment is greater than the 
outcome for control. The ranks of these cases are summed and compared with the 
distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis that the treatment has no 
effect: 
	
where Z is the variable that records which of each of the s pairs was treated, and r is 
the outcome for each case in the S pairs. Zsi equals 1 if a case is treated, and 0 
otherwise; c is defined as follows: 
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c:  
 
Finally, ds is the rank of |rs1 − rs2| with average ranks used for ties. As Rosenbaum 
(2002) shows in the case where the assignment to the treatment is not random, the 
above test statistic can be bounded. Under the assumption that a confounding variable 
u exists, the formula for T is the sum of S independent random variables where the sth 
pair equals ds with probability. 
ps =             (6) 
 
and equals zero with probability 1−ps. Define 
ps+   
ps-  
Rosenbaum (2002) shows that for a given value of γ, the null distribution of T = t(Z, 
r)  is bounded by two known distributions for T+   and  T -, where  
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These formulas are used to compute the significance level of the null hypothesis of no 
effect. 
For any specific γ the study compute  
,   
where T is the Wilcoxon signed ranked statistics. These two values give the bounds of 
the significance level (p-values) of a one-sided test for no effect of the treatment.
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Appendix 3.1 Unreported Results for Table 5.5 
 
 
Appendix 3.1 Unreported results for Table 5.5    
 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
Project-type dummies     
Transportation 0.110** 0.120** 0.132*** 0.138*** 0.133*** 
 (2.20) (2.30) (2.60) (2.64) (2.62) 
Commercial 0.183** 0.194** 0.303*** 0.215*** 0.307*** 
 (2.37) (2.42) (3.71) (2.70) (3.74) 
Oil & Gas 0.0563 0.0678 0.0627 0.0841 0.0614 
 (0.96) (1.11) (1.07) (1.36) (1.04) 
Electricity & Energy 0.116** 0.126** 0.114** 0.137** 0.115** 
 (2.13) (2.25) (2.04) (2.43) (2.06) 
Telecom 0.442*** 0.459*** 0.492*** 0.473*** 0.501*** 
 (5.87) (5.98) (6.46) (6.08) (6.55) 
Loan-type dummies     
Short term loans -0.0276 -0.0347 -0.0673 -0.0289 -0.0643 
 (-0.60) (-0.73) (-1.48) (-0.61) (-1.41) 
Long Term loans 0.0724* 0.063 0.0174 0.0668* 0.0179 
 (1.83) (1.56) (0.45) (1.65) (0.46) 
Sovereign rating dummies     
Unrated 0.286*** 0.281*** 0.305*** 0.263** 0.310*** 
 (2.78) (2.63) (2.97) (2.41) (2.98) 
Poor grade 0.437*** 0.435*** 0.652*** 0.469*** 0.642*** 
 (4.04) (3.82) (5.83) (4.02) (5.66) 
Speculative grade 0.250*** 0.246*** 0.414*** 0.251*** 0.414*** 
 (3.22) (3.03) (4.75) (3.12) (4.73) 
Investment grade 0.350*** 0.351*** 0.466*** 0.355*** 0.476*** 
 (6.50) (5.81) (7.80) (5.84) (7.95) 
Year dummies     
YR97 0 0 0 0 0 
 (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
YR98 0 -0.706*** -0.665*** -0.712*** -0.665*** 
 (-) (-3.42) (-5.23) (-3.47) (-5.23) 
YR99 -0.0153 -0.722*** 0 -0.739*** 0 
 (-0.14) (-3.71) (-) (-3.82) (-) 
YR00 0.0778 -0.630*** -0.576*** -0.654*** -0.578*** 
 (0.82) (-3.33) (-5.80) (-3.48) (-5.82) 
YR01 0.186 -0.520*** 0 -0.545*** 0 
 (1.82) (-2.68) (-) (-2.81) (-) 
YR02 0.228** -0.492** -0.412*** -0.520*** -0.434*** 
 (2.20) (-2.57) (-4.03) (-2.72) (-4.16) 
YR03 0.155 -0.539*** -0.469*** -0.558*** -0.491*** 
 (1.36) (-2.77) (-4.10) (-2.88) (-4.31) 
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Appendix 2.3 contd. Unreported results for Table 5.5 
 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg. 5 
YR04 0.249** -0.447** -0.384*** -0.468** -0.402*** 
 (2.28) (-2.29) (-3.59) (-2.41) (-3.72) 
YR05 0.116 -0.570*** -0.494*** -0.600*** -0.515*** 
 (1.12) (-2.99) (-4.92) (-3.13) (-5.09) 
YR06 -0.136 -0.839*** -0.754*** -0.862*** -0.770*** 
 (-1.27) (-4.36) (-7.03) (-4.49) (-7.14) 
YR07 -0.0109 -0.688*** -0.634*** -0.704*** -0.656*** 
 (-0.11) (-3.64) (-6.42) (-3.74) (-6.56) 
YR08 0.212* -0.477** -0.403*** -0.498*** -0.417*** 
 (2.15) (-2.52) (-4.19) (-2.65) (-4.34) 
YR09 0.885*** 0.175 0.266*** 0.158 0.258*** 
 (9.38) (0.94) (2.82) (0.86) (2.73) 
YR10 0.750*** 0.0628 0.14 0.0528 0.132 
 (7.24) (0.33) (1.35) (0.28) (1.27) 
YR11 0.869*** 0.195 0.261** 0.194 0.251** 
 (8.09) (1.03) (2.54) (1.03) (2.44) 
YR12 0.677*** 0 0.043 0 0.0449 
 (3.35) (-) (0.23) (-) (0.24) 
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Appendix 3.2 Unreported Results for Table 5.6 
Appendix 3.2.  Unreported results for Table 5.6 
 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.3 Reg.4 Reg.5 
Project-type dummies      
Transportation 0.0678*** 0.0690*** 0.0700*** 0.0713*** 0.0697*** 
 (-3.89) (-3.89) (-3.72) (-4.00) (-3.70) 
Commercial -0.0421* -0.0414* -0.0616** -0.0443* -0.0610** 
 (-1.77) (-1.68) (-2.14) (-1.79) (-2.11) 
Oil & Gas -0.0578*** -0.0551*** -0.0557*** -0.0574*** -0.0559*** 
 (-3.12) (-2.93) (-2.81) (-3.04) (-2.81) 
Electricity & Energy -0.0219 -0.0233 -0.0198 -0.0249 -0.0196 
 (-1.24) (-1.28) (-1.05) (-1.36) (-1.04) 
Telecom -0.0470** -0.0478** -0.0412 -0.0498** -0.04 
 (-2.14) (-2.11) (-1.61) (-2.19) (-1.56) 
Loan-type dummies 
     
Short-term loans 0.0086 0.0105 -0.0002 0.0098 0.0002 
 (0.80) (0.96) (-0.02) (0.91) (0.02) 
Long-term loan 0.0149 0.0169* 0.0126 0.0163* 0.0127 
 (1.61) (1.78) (1.23) (1.74) (1.24) 
Sovereign rating dummies 
Unrated -0.0133 -0.0314 -0.0132 -0.0282 -0.0127 
 (-0.39) (-0.87) (-0.33) (-0.78) (-0.32) 
Poor grade -0.0153 -0.0236 -0.00586 -0.0274 -0.0073 
 (-0.61) (-0.92) (-0.18) (-1.08) (-0.23) 
Speculative grade 0.0034 -0.0031 -0.0072 -0.0035 -0.0074 
 (0.17) (-0.15) (-0.30) (-0.17) (-0.31) 
Investment grade -0.0102 -0.0173 -0.0124 -0.0176 -0.0111 
 (-0.70) (-1.11) (-0.69) (-1.13) (-0.62) 
Year dummies 
YR_97 0 0 0 0 0 
 (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
YR_98 -0.0130 -0.0089 -0.0031 -0.0104 -0.0031 
 (-0.30) (-0.20) (-0.09) (-0.24) (-0.09) 
YR_99 -0.021 -0.018 0 -0.0183 0 
 (-0.54) (-0.45) (-) (-0.46) (-) 
YR_00 -0.033 -0.0291 -0.0289 -0.0285 -0.0293 
 (-0.86) (-0.74) (-0.94) (-0.72) (-0.95) 
YR_01 -0.0685* -0.0626 0 -0.0619 0 
 (-1.72) (-1.53) (-) (-1.51) (-) 
YR_02 -0.0690* -0.0686 -0.0638* -0.0676 -0.0669** 
 (-1.65) (-1.58) (-1.89) (-1.55) (-1.96) 
YR_03 -0.0612 -0.0596 -0.0548 -0.0597 -0.0578 
 (-1.42) (-1.34) (-1.58) (-1.35) (-1.64) 
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 Reg.1 Reg.2 Reg.3 Reg.4 Reg.5 
YR_04 -0.0754* -0.0747* -0.0703** -0.0745* -0.0726** 
 
(-1.95) (-1.87) (-2.43) (-1.87) (-2.47) 
YR_05 -0.0720* -0.0695* -0.0698** -0.0683 -0.0728** 
 (-1.80) (-1.67) (-2.23) (-1.64) (-2.25) 
YR_06 -0.0664 -0.0658 -0.0607* -0.0655 -0.0629* 
 
(-1.63) (-1.55) (-1.82) (-1.54) (-1.88) 
YR_07 -0.0565 -0.0504 -0.0513* -0.051 -0.0543* 
 
(-1.44) (-1.26) (-1.76) (-1.27) (-1.84) 
YR_08 -0.06 -0.0583 -0.0542** -0.058 -0.0562** 
 
(-1.59) (-1.50) (-1.98) (-1.50) (-2.03) 
YR_09 -0.0999** -0.0953** -0.0936*** -0.0957** -0.0947*** 
 (-2.46) (-2.29) (-2.93) (-2.30) (-2.95) 
YR_10 -0.0825** -0.0834** -0.0788** -0.0845** -0.0800** 
 
(-1.99) (-1.96) (-2.34) (-1.99) (-2.37) 
YR_11 -0.0915** -0.0751 -0.0851** -0.0774* -0.0864** 
 
(-1.97) (-1.65) (-2.06) (-1.70) (-2.09) 
YR_12 0 0 0.0072 0 0.0071 
 
(-) (-) -0.16 (-) (0.16) 
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Appendix 3.3. Unreported coefficients for Table 5.7 
 
Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
Loan characteristics   
Log of maturity 0.0574*** 0.0586*** 0.0770*** 
 (3.52) (3.55) (4.51) 
Log of tranche amount -0.0561*** -0.0535*** -0.0539*** 
 (-5.63) (-5.32) (-5.11) 
Currency dummy 0.0544 0.0564 0.0733 
 (1.35) (1.29) (1.58) 
Refinance dummy 0.0064 0.0135 -0.0468 
 (0.16) (0.32) (-1.06) 
Loan-type dummies   
Short-term loans -0.0298 -0.027 -0.0438 
 (-0.64) (-0.57) (-0.93) 
Long-term loans 0.0812** 0.0775* 0.0303 
 (2.03) (1.9) (0.76) 
PFI dummy -0.100** -0.102** -0.133** 
 (-2.04) (-2.04) (-2.63) 
Bilateral dummy 0.0499 0.0482 0.0317 
 (0.97) (0.93) (0.59) 
Sovereign rating dummies  
Unrated -0.010 -0.0138 -0.0531 
 (-0.11) (-0.14) (-0.56) 
Industry dummies   
Transportation 0.135*** 0.121** 0.158*** 
 (2.62) (2.22) (3.07) 
Commercial 0.161** 0.174** 0.255*** 
 (2.02) (2.11) (3.04) 
Oil & Gas 0.0634 0.068 0.0443 
 (1.02) (1.06) (0.73) 
Electricity & Energy 0.139** 0.134** 0.122** 
 (2.44) (2.3) (2.15) 
Telecom 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.491*** 
 (6.04) (5.95) (6.29) 
Year dummies   
YR_97 0 0 0 
 (-) (-) (-) 
YR_98 0 -0.818*** -0.735*** 
 (-) (-4.14) (-6.16) 
YR_99 0.027 -0.793*** 0 
 (0.25) (-4.25) (-) 
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 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
YR_00 0.123 -0.703*** -0.577*** 
 (1.25) (-3.93) (-6.61) 
YR_01 0.243** -0.581*** 0 
 (2.30) (-3.17) (-) 
YR_02 0.315*** -0.515*** -0.409*** 
 (2.94) (-2.81) (-4.51) 
YR_03 0.245** -0.576*** -0.485*** 
 (2.14) (-3.08) (-4.80) 
YR_04 0.358*** -0.473** -0.362*** 
 (3.22) (-2.52) (-3.98) 
YR_05 0.202* -0.607*** -0.522*** 
 (1.89) (-3.29) (-5.97) 
YR_06 -0.0661 -0.880*** -0.782*** 
 (-0.60) (-4.75) (-8.03) 
YR_07 0.0741 -0.731*** -0.653*** 
 (0.7) (-4.05) (-7.09) 
YR_08 0.292*** -0.514*** -0.436*** 
 (2.89) (-2.83) (-5.12) 
YR_09 0.974*** 0.151 0.253*** 
 (10.04) (0.85) (3.20) 
YR_10 0.846*** 0.0285 0.116 
 (8.05) (0.16) (1.22) 
YR_11 0.952*** 0.165 0.227** 
 (9.01) (0.92) (2.5) 
YR_12 0.793*** 0 0.0972 
 (4.08) (-) (0.55) 
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Appendix 3.4. Unreported coefficient for Table 5.8 
 Reg.1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
Loan characteristics    
Log of tranche maturity -0.0157*** -0.0149*** -0.0163*** 
 (-3.80) (-3.59) (-3.64) 
Loan of tranche amount 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0009 
 (0.06) (-0.15) (0.29) 
Currency dummy -0.0195 -0.0095 -0.0312** 
 (-1.51) (-0.73) (-2.05) 
Refinance dummy 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 
 (9.27) (9.08) (8.37) 
Loan-type dummy    
STLoans 0.00914 0.0104 0.000629 
 (0.85) (0.96) (0.05) 
LTLoan 0.0145 0.0169* 0.0119 
 (1.55) (1.79) (1.16) 
PFI 0.0309* 0.0306* 0.0306* 
 (1.91) (1.84) (1.77) 
CONCESSION 0.0022 -0.0056 0.0189 
 (0.17) (-0.40) (1.32) 
BILLATERAL -0.0246* -0.0274* -0.0247 
 (-1.65) (-1.82) (-1.48) 
Sovereign rating dummies    
Unrated -0.0092 -0.0331 -0.0117 
 (-0.27) (-0.91) (-0.30) 
Poor Grade -0.0125 -0.0233 -0.0136 
 (-0.51) (-0.91) (-0.42) 
Speculative Grade 0.0050 -0.00278 -0.0089 
 (0.24) (-0.13) (-0.37) 
Investment grade -0.0089 -0.0178 -0.0153 
 (-0.61) (-1.15) (-0.87) 
Industry dummies    
Transportation -0.0669*** -0.0695*** -0.0664*** 
 (-3.84) (-3.90) (-3.50) 
Commercial -0.0439* -0.0420* -0.0619** 
 (-1.84) (-1.70) (-2.17) 
Oil & Gas -0.0568*** -0.0558*** -0.0515*** 
 (-3.07) (-2.95) (-2.59) 
Electricity & Energy -0.0220 -0.0238 -0.0173 
 (-1.25) (-1.30) (-0.92) 
Telecom -0.0494** -0.0477** -0.0431* 
 (-2.25) (-2.10) (-1.69) 
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 Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 
Year dummies    
YR97 0 0 0 
 (-) (-) (-) 
YR98 -0.0096 -0.0078 0.0127 
 (-0.23) (-0.18) (0.35) 
YR99 -0.0194 -0.0165 0 
 (-0.51) (-0.41) (-) 
YR00 -0.0298 -0.0282 -0.0129 
 (-0.80) (-0.71) (-0.40) 
YR01 -0.0648* -0.0624 0 
 (-1.67) (-1.52) (-) 
YR02 -0.0655 -0.0676 -0.0490 
 (-1.61) (-1.55) (-1.44) 
YR03 -0.0570 -0.0583 -0.0399 
 (-1.34) (-1.31) (-1.10) 
YR04 -0.0692* -0.0728* -0.0534* 
 (-1.84) (-1.81) (-1.80) 
YR05 -0.0676* -0.0679 -0.0548* 
 (-1.73) (-1.62) (-1.69) 
YR06 -0.0650 -0.0639 -0.0467 
 (-1.64) (-1.48) (-1.39) 
YR07 -0.0521 -0.0497 -0.0343 
 (-1.37) (-1.23) (-1.16) 
YR08 -0.0595 -0.0571 -0.0414 
 (-1.63) (-1.46) (-1.48) 
YR09 -0.0994** -0.0944** -0.0817** 
 (-2.53) (-2.25) (-2.53) 
YR10 -0.0802* -0.0823* -0.0659* 
 (-1.98) (-1.92) (-1.92) 
YR11 -0.0906** -0.0737 -0.0743* 
 (-1.99) (-1.61) (-1.77) 
YR12 0 0 0.0185 
 (-) (-) (0.43) 
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